participant factors in California

2026Although appellants challenge the trial court’s “reckless indifference findings,” we briefly address the major participant factors enumerated in Banks, as well as the trial court’s application of them in this case because there is a “significant[] overlap” in the requirements for being a major participant in a dangerous felony and acting with reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615.) “‘[T]he greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.].” (Id. at p. 615.) Th

2026Without deciding whether Clark was a major participant in the underlying robbery, the Supreme Court noted there is significant overlap between the major participant requirement and the reckless indifference requirement, “‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 .) This overlap was further elucidated when the court articulated the factors it considered pertinent to the reckless indifference analysis, namely, “the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use

2026What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord, Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808 .) “ ‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Courts must view “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether [the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.) The major participant factors “significantly overlap” with the reckless indifference factors.

2026All may be weighed in determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation . . . was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major’ [citations].” (Ibid.) Applying these factors to the defendant’s actions in Banks, the Supreme Court found his conduct failed to satisfy the major participant requirement because he was not involved in planning the robbery, he did not procure weapons for the shooter, neither he nor the other participants had any history of violent crime, he was not present at the scene of the shooting, and there was “no evidence he saw or heard the shooting,

2026(See People v Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 [examining the major participant requirement]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 [examining the reckless indifference requirement]; see also Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 [discussing the constitutional parameters of the felony-murder rule].) As to whether Flores was a member of a conspiracy to commit robbery for purposes of CALCRIM No. 540B, the trial court instructed the 5 jury to refer to its separate instruction on conspiracy, CALCRIM No. 416.

2025What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [listing factors set forth in Clark, at pp. 618–623].) The factors for evaluating reckless indifference “ ‘significantly overlap’ ” with the factors defining a major participant, “ ‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 .) As with the major participant factors, “ ‘[n]o one of [the reckless indifference] considerations is necessar

2025The Court has further held: “It is undisputed that when Senate Bill 1437 amended Penal Code section 189 to incorporate major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 .) The major participant factors identified in Banks “are these: What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?

2025The court observed these factors “ ‘significantly overlap’ ” with the major participant factors because “ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he [or she] acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 .) The factors include “ ‘use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’ ” (Emanuel,

2024(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611 ; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 ; see Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) As Banks explained, reckless indifference to human life means engaging in a felony known to carry a grave risk of death 7 The reckless indifference requirement was first articulated in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 in relation to the imposition of the death penalty. 21 while “‘“subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death.”’” ( Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 801, 807.) The factors

2024(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611 ; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 ; see Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) As Banks explained, reckless indifference to human life means engaging in a felony known to carry a grave risk of death 7 The reckless indifference requirement was first articulated in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 in relation to the imposition of the death penalty. 21 while “‘“subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death.”’” ( Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 801, 807.) The factors

2014In addition, when Smith emerged from [the victim’s] room covered in enough blood to leave a trail from the motel to McFadden Street, Taffolla chose to flee rather than going to [the victim’s] aid or summoning help.” (Id. at p. 927.) Turning to the major participant requirement, the court explained: “The jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Taffolla’s contributions were ‘notable and conspicuous’ because he was one of only three perpetrators, and served as the only lookout to an attempted robbery occurring in an occupied motel complex. [Citation.] Unlike the hypothetical ‘non-maj

2014In addition, when Smith emerged from [the victim’s] room covered in enough blood to leave a trail from the motel to McFadden Street, Taffolla chose to flee rather than going to [the victim’s] aid or summoning help.” (Id. at p. 927.) Turning to the major participant requirement, the court explained: “The jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Taffolla’s contributions were ‘notable and conspicuous’ because he was one of only three perpetrators, and served as the only lookout to an attempted robbery occurring in an occupied motel complex. [Citation.] Unlike the hypothetical ‘non-maj

2014(See Lopez, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115 [“Brousseau contends no substantial evidence supports the robbery-murder special circumstance finding, because the evidence does not show she acted with reckless indifference to human life”].) 16 Beginning with the major participant requirement, the court explained: “To begin with, this is not a crime committed by a large gang or a group of several accomplices.

2014(See Lopez, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115 [“Brousseau contends no substantial evidence supports the robbery-murder special circumstance finding, because the evidence does not show she acted with reckless indifference to human life”].) 16 Beginning with the major participant requirement, the court explained: “To begin with, this is not a crime committed by a large gang or a group of several accomplices.

2010As a result, the attorneys were unable to prepare adequately for trial. ( Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 750.) Here, there is no evidence the defense was impaired, other than counsel's unsupported, conclusory statement in his declaration, which the trial court reasonably accorded "zero weight." In addition, given the circumstances of the violation in Barber , it would have been particularly difficult for the defendants to prove prejudice, because there was essentially no written record of what the officer learned as a participant in the defense meetings, what information he conveyed to his sup

2010(Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 750.) Here, there is no evidence the defense was impaired, other than counsel’s unsupported, conclusory statement in his declaration, which the trial court reasonably accorded “zero weight.” In addition, given the circumstances of the violation in Barber , it would have been particularly difficult for the defendants to prove prejudice, because there was essentially no written record of what the officer learned as a participant in the defense meetings, what information he conveyed to his superiors, and what information he or his superiors could have conveyed to t

2025Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding Ortega Was a Major Participant Substantial evidence shows Ortega’s participation in the underlying robbery and carjacking “was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 .) There was evidence that Ortega “was on the scene from start to finish.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575 , 591 (Mitchell) [defendant’s physical presence “on the scene from start to finish” supported major participant finding]; see also In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 50-51 [“there may be significantly greater culpabili

2024Further, even crediting that Jackson was the only shooter—a point on which the evidence was mixed—“it is noteworthy that the shooting was not spontaneous or accidental; rather, [Jackson] made clear his intent to shoot, which afforded [Dyer] the time to observe and react before the murder.” (Loza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 53 ; see also Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 483 [finding probative that petitioner was aware that codefendant intended to use firearm to kill victim during robbery].) And as with the major participant analysis, “we find particularly significant in concluding that [Dye

2023(See Gilbert v. State of California (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 234, 240, fn. 4 ; US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 909 [“We do not review the rationale for the court’s decision.

2023(See Gilbert v. State of California (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 234, 240, fn. 4 ; US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 909 [“We do not review the rationale for the court’s decision.

2022(Id. at p. 618.) Further, although major participation is not enough on its own to establish reckless indifference, major participation can “often provide significant support for such a finding.” (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615 [noting the “interrelationship” between the two Tison elements and that they often overlap]; People v. Medina (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 778, 788 [noting that “[t]hese two requirements—having a reckless disregard for human life and being a major participant—will often overlap”].) 3.