participant hearing in Connecticut

2009Although the proposed zoning regulation may be a regulation of general application for which no person would have standing to challenge on the merits if adopted or denied, an individual’s right to petition is, itself, a specific legal right subject to legal protection.” The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for that proposition. *344 To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “[m] ere status . . . as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review.” Hartford Distributors,

2009Although the proposed zoning regulation may be a regulation of general application for which no person would have standing to challenge on the merits if adopted or denied, an individual’s right to petition is, itself, a specific legal right subject to legal protection.” The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for that proposition. *344 To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “[m] ere status . . . as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review.” Hartford Distributors,

2017The enabling statutes, however, do not confer standing under such circumstances. "[M]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services , 242 Conn. 152 , 169, 699 A.2d 142 (1997).

2017The enabling statutes, however, do not confer standing under such circumstances. "[M]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services , 242 Conn. 152 , 169, 699 A.2d 142 (1997).

2009Although the proposed zoning regulation may be a regulation of general application for which no person would have standing to challenge on the merits if adopted or denied, an individual’s right to petition is, itself, a specific legal right subject to legal protection.” The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for that proposition. *344 To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “[m] ere status . . . as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review.” Hartford Distributors,

2009Although the proposed zoning regulation may be a regulation of general application for which no person would have standing to challenge on the merits if adopted or denied, an individual’s right to petition is, itself, a specific legal right subject to legal protection.” The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for that proposition. *344 To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “[m] ere status . . . as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review.” Hartford Distributors,

2010New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132 , 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); see also Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, supra, 291 Conn. 327 ; Concerned Citizens for the Preservation of Watertown, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 337, 344 , 984 A.2d 72 (2009) (“[m]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 934

2010New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132 , 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); see also Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, supra, 291 Conn. 327 ; Concerned Citizens for the Preservation of Watertown, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 337, 344 , 984 A.2d 72 (2009) (“[m]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 934

2009Although the proposed zoning regulation may be a regulation of general application for which no person would have standing to challenge on the merits if adopted or denied, an individual’s right to petition is, itself, a specific legal right subject to legal protection.” The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for that proposition. *344 To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “[m] ere status . . . as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review.” Hartford Distributors,

2009Although the proposed zoning regulation may be a regulation of general application for which no person would have standing to challenge on the merits if adopted or denied, an individual’s right to petition is, itself, a specific legal right subject to legal protection.” The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for that proposition. *344 To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “[m] ere status . . . as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review.” Hartford Distributors,

2010New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132 , 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); see also Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, supra, 291 Conn. 327 ; Concerned Citizens for the Preservation of Watertown, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 337, 344 , 984 A.2d 72 (2009) (“[m]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 934

2010New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132 , 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); see also Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, supra, 291 Conn. 327 ; Concerned Citizens for the Preservation of Watertown, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 337, 344 , 984 A.2d 72 (2009) (“[m]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 934

2009Likewise, this court has observed that “standing to file the zoning application, which is subsequently denied, does not alone give a party the aggrievement necessary to pursue an appeal of that decision in the courts.” Trimar Equities, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Board, 66 Conn. App. 631, 637 , 785 A.2d 619 (2001); see also R.

2009Likewise, this court has observed that “standing to file the zoning application, which is subsequently denied, does not alone give a party the aggrievement necessary to pursue an appeal of that decision in the courts.” Trimar Equities, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Board, 66 Conn. App. 631, 637 , 785 A.2d 619 (2001); see also R.

2002"While one who bids upon the property of an estate offered for sale has no interest in the property itself, he does have an interest in the proceedings employed by the court to approve the sale." Erisoty's Appeal From Probate, 216 Conn. 514 , 521 , 582 A.2d 760 (1990).

2002"While one who bids upon the property of an estate offered for sale has no interest in the property itself, he does have an interest in the proceedings employed by the court to approve the sale." Erisoty's Appeal From Probate, 216 Conn. 514 , 521 , 582 A.2d 760 (1990).

1998Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services , 242 Conn. 152 , 169 , 699 A.2d 142 (1997). "[T]he plaintiffs' status as parties at the agency level does not constitute aggrievement." Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control , 219 Conn. 168 , 178 , 592 A.2d 386 (1991); see also Taftville Reservoir Preservation Group v. Norwich Commission on City Planning, supra , 19 CONN.

1998Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services , 242 Conn. 152 , 169 , 699 A.2d 142 (1997). "[T]he plaintiffs' status as parties at the agency level does not constitute aggrievement." Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control , 219 Conn. 168 , 178 , 592 A.2d 386 (1991); see also Taftville Reservoir Preservation Group v. Norwich Commission on City Planning, supra , 19 CONN.

1995Doyle v. Reardon, 11 Conn. App. 297 , 307-08 (1987); see also: Hartford Distributors, Inc. v. Liquor Control Commission, 177 Conn. 616 , 620 (1979) ("Mere status, however, as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purpose of appellate review").

1995In Kaskel v. Steinberg, 142 Conn. 379 (1955), it was stated that to appeal from a Probate Court decree, a person "must have some pecuniary interest which the decree appealed from will in some way injuriously affect," and, that the "only persons . . affected by an order approving the sale of property constituting an asset of an estate are those to whom the estate will be distributed, or creditors if the estate is insolvent." 3 In Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, supra, it was recognized that "the frequent statement" that a party "must have a direct pecuniary interest . . . is too narrow

1995In Kaskel v. Steinberg, 142 Conn. 379 (1955), it was stated that to appeal from a Probate Court decree, a person "must have some pecuniary interest which the decree appealed from will in some way injuriously affect," and, that the "only persons . . affected by an order approving the sale of property constituting an asset of an estate are those to whom the estate will be distributed, or creditors if the estate is insolvent." 3 In Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, supra, it was recognized that "the frequent statement" that a party "must have a direct pecuniary interest . . . is too narrow

1979Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419 , 399 A.2d 834 (1978); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 703-704 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974).

1979Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419 , 399 A.2d 834 (1978); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 703-704 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974).

1979Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419 , 399 A.2d 834 (1978); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 703-704 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974).

1979Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419 , 399 A.2d 834 (1978); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 703-704 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974).