starting presumption in New York

2013Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). “[D]espite the variety of these opportunities for federal preeminence, [however, courts] have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of [preemption] with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law” (id.).

2013Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). “[D]espite the variety of these opportunities for federal preeminence, [however, courts] have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of [preemption] with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law” (id.).

2013Thus, “[i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ ” (Arizona v United States, 567 US —, —, 132 S Ct 2492, 2501 [2012]).

2013Thus, “[i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ ” (Arizona v United States, 567 US —, —, 132 S Ct 2492, 2501 [2012]).

2026However, "[i]t is never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead courts have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law" (<i>Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC</i>, 6 NY3d 338, 356 [2006] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]; <i>see also Egelhoff v Egelhoff ex rel.

2026"It is never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead courts have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law" ( Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC , 6 NY3d 338, 356 [2006] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]).

2026"Where a federal law treads on a traditional state power [such as the power to tax], this presumption is especially strong, and is overcome only where the statute evidences that preemption is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" ( Matter of Disney Enters., Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 10 NY3d 392, 403 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Wyeth v Levine , 555 US 555, 565 [2009]).

2026Breiner</i>, 532 US 141, 160 [2001, Breyer, J. dissenting] ["the Court has recognized the practical importance of . . . applying pre-emption analysis with care . . . in order to determine how best to reconcile a federal statute's language and purpose with federalism's need to preserve state autonomy"]).

2026"Where a federal law treads on a traditional state power [such as the power to tax], this presumption is especially strong, and is overcome only where the statute evidences that preemption is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" ( Matter of Disney Enters., Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 10 NY3d 392, 403 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Wyeth v Levine , 555 US 555, 565 [2009]).

2020The presumption against preemption applies to preemption in the bankruptcy context (see BFP v Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 US 531, 546 [1994]), and defendants here must overcome “‘the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law’” (De Buono, 520 US at 814 , quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins.

2020Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). -9- - 10 - No. 80 Looking to congressional intent in regulating bankruptcy, the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to give a “‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’” (Marrama v Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 US 365, 367 [2007], quoting Grogan v Garner, 498 US 279, 286, 287 [1991]) by “provid[ing] a procedure by which . . . insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt’” (Gr

2020Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). -9- - 10 - No. 80 Looking to congressional intent in regulating bankruptcy, the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to give a “‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’” (Marrama v Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 US 365, 367 [2007], quoting Grogan v Garner, 498 US 279, 286, 287 [1991]) by “provid[ing] a procedure by which . . . insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt’” (Gr

2020Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). -9- - 10 - No. 80 Looking to congressional intent in regulating bankruptcy, the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to give a “‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’” (Marrama v Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 US 365, 367 [2007], quoting Grogan v Garner, 498 US 279, 286, 287 [1991]) by “provid[ing] a procedure by which . . . insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt’” (Gr

2020Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). -9- - 10 - No. 80 Looking to congressional intent in regulating bankruptcy, the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to give a “‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’” (Marrama v Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 US 365, 367 [2007], quoting Grogan v Garner, 498 US 279, 286, 287 [1991]) by “provid[ing] a procedure by which . . . insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt’” (Gr

2006It is “never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead [courts] have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law” (id.; see Nealy v US Healthcare HMO, 93 NY2d 209, 217 [1999]).

2006It is "never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead [courts] have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law" ( id. ; see Nealy v US Healthcare HMO, 93 NY2d 209, 217 [1999]).