unrequested instruction in New York

2002Defendant’s objections to the court’s delivery, during voir dire, of an unrequested instruction to the jury to draw no adverse inference in the event that defendant chose not to testify, and to the expansive language of that charge, are objections requiring preservation (People v Autry, 75 NY2d 836 ), and we decline to review these unpreserved claims in the interest of justice.

1992Since no objection was made, this claim is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Autry, 75 NY2d 836 ).

1992The defendant contends that the trial court erred when it delivered an unrequested instruction on his failure to testify (see, People v McLucas, 15 NY2d 167 ).

1989The Supreme Court erred in setting aside the verdict on the basis of the trial court’s unrequested instruction on the defendant’s failure to testify (see, People v McLucas, 15 NY2d 167 ).

1990Although the Trial Judge erred in delivering an unrequested instruction to the jurors concerning the defendant’s failure to testify, which instruction also exceeded the plain and simple language of CPL 300.10 (2), the portion of the charge complained of was not so lengthy as to draw the jurors’ attention to the issue, was "neutral in tone” and " 'consistent in substance with the intent of the statute’ ” (People v Morris, 129 AD2d 591 , quoting from People v Gonzalez, 72 AD2d 508 ), and did not "imply that the [defendant’s] failure to testify was merely a trial maneuver rather than a constituti

1989While the trial court acted improperly in giving such a charge (see, People v Koberstein, 66 NY2d 989 ; People v Ogle, 142 AD2d 608 ; People v Concepcion, 128 AD2d 887 ), we find that reversal of the judgment of conviction is not warranted under the circumstances of this case.

2002Were we to review these claims, we would find that the court’s instructions as a whole conveyed the proper standards (see People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821 ; People v Sanchez, 288 AD2d 16 , lv denied 97 NY2d 733 ), and that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.

2002Were we to review these claims, we would find that the court’s instructions as a whole conveyed the proper standards (see People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821 ; People v Sanchez, 288 AD2d 16 , lv denied 97 NY2d 733 ), and that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.

1995The court did not imply that defendant should have testified or that he refrained from doing so as a tactical maneuver (People v Wilkins, 176 AD2d 976 , Iv denied 79 NY2d 833 ).

1995CPL 300.10 (2) is not an "absolute prohibition against the court exercising its discretion [albeit rarely] in submitting such a charge without a request from the defendant” (People v Vereen, 45 NY2d 856, 857 ), and the error, if any, was harmless in that the unrequested instruction was short and was given prior to jury selection.

1991However, this contention is also unpreserved for appellate review because no objection was made to the charge as given (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Autry, supra; People v Ruscitti, 163 AD2d 431 ).

1990Although the Trial Judge erred in delivering an unrequested instruction to the jurors concerning the defendant’s failure to testify, which instruction also exceeded the plain and simple language of CPL 300.10 (2), the portion of the charge complained of was not so lengthy as to draw the jurors’ attention to the issue, was "neutral in tone” and " 'consistent in substance with the intent of the statute’ ” (People v Morris, 129 AD2d 591 , quoting from People v Gonzalez, 72 AD2d 508 ), and did not "imply that the [defendant’s] failure to testify was merely a trial maneuver rather than a constituti

1990Although the Trial Judge erred in delivering an unrequested instruction to the jurors concerning the defendant’s failure to testify, which instruction also exceeded the plain and simple language of CPL 300.10 (2), the portion of the charge complained of was not so lengthy as to draw the jurors’ attention to the issue, was "neutral in tone” and " 'consistent in substance with the intent of the statute’ ” (People v Morris, 129 AD2d 591 , quoting from People v Gonzalez, 72 AD2d 508 ), and did not "imply that the [defendant’s] failure to testify was merely a trial maneuver rather than a constituti

1990In view of the foregoing, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction and that it was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ; People v Morris, supra).

1990In view of the foregoing, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction and that it was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ; People v Morris, supra).

1989While the trial court acted improperly in giving such a charge (see, People v Koberstein, 66 NY2d 989 ; People v Ogle, 142 AD2d 608 ; People v Concepcion, 128 AD2d 887 ), we find that reversal of the judgment of conviction is not warranted under the circumstances of this case.

1989While the trial court acted improperly in giving such a charge (see, People v Koberstein, 66 NY2d 989 ; People v Ogle, 142 AD2d 608 ; People v Concepcion, 128 AD2d 887 ), we find that reversal of the judgment of conviction is not warranted under the circumstances of this case.

1987Although no objection was made, none was required to preserve the error for review (see, People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307, 310 , rearg denied 67 NY2d 647 ; People v McLucas, supra).