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7 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Neese v. LITHIA CHRYSLER JEEP OF ANCHORAGEgreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc., 210 P.3d 1213, 1219, 1222 (Alaska 2009) (holding that there was no error in dismissing, on standing grounds, a complaint alleging violation of Alaska’s consumer-protection law and other claims when the complaint did not allege that an injury was caused by a ear dealership); Lee v. Am. 2015See, e.g., Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc., 210 P.3d 1213, 1219, 1222 (Alaska 2009) (holding that there was no error in dismissing, on standing grounds, a complaint alleging violation of Alaska’s consumer- protection law and other claims when the complaint did not allege that an injury was caused by a car dealership); Lee v. Am. | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2015Express Travel Related Servs., 348 Fed.Appx. 205 , 207, 2009 WL 2017665 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming dismissal of putative class-action claims against credit-card issuers who allegedly violated California’s consumer-protection statute by including unconscionable arbitration provisions in their credit-card agreements because the plaintiffs had not been injured by the “mere inclusion” of those provisions in the agreements); Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 283 F.3d 315, 319-320 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring complaint alleging violation of Texas’s consumer-prot 2015Express Travel Related Servs., 348 Fed.Appx. 205 , 207, 2009 WL 2017665 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming dismissal of putative class-action claims against credit-card issuers who allegedly violated California’s consumer-protection statute by including unconscionable arbitration provisions in their credit-card agreements because the plaintiffs had not been injured by the “mere inclusion” of those provisions in the agreements); Rivera v. Wyeth- Ayerst Laboratories, 283 F.3d 315, 319-320 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring complaint alleging violation of Texas’s consumer-pro | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murphygreen1 sentence2013However, the Supreme Court did not specifically characterize this inquiry as additional “element” of the offense nor did it make any ruling regarding the sufficiency of the complaint alleging a violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(2). {¶16} Moreover, “the requirements of an indictment may be met by reciting the language of the criminal statute.” State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194, 199 (2000), citing State v. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 583 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Childsgreen1 sentence2013However, the Supreme Court did not specifically characterize this inquiry as additional “element” of the offense nor did it make any ruling regarding the sufficiency of the complaint alleging a violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(2). {¶16} Moreover, “the requirements of an indictment may be met by reciting the language of the criminal statute.” State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194, 199 (2000), citing State v. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 583 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. American Express Travel Related Services, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2015Express Travel Related Servs., 348 Fed.Appx. 205 , 207, 2009 WL 2017665 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming dismissal of putative class-action claims against credit-card issuers who allegedly violated California’s consumer-protection statute by including unconscionable arbitration provisions in their credit-card agreements because the plaintiffs had not been injured by the “mere inclusion” of those provisions in the agreements); Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 283 F.3d 315, 319-320 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring complaint alleging violation of Texas’s consumer-prot 2015Express Travel Related Servs., 348 Fed.Appx. 205 , 207, 2009 WL 2017665 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming dismissal of putative class-action claims against credit-card issuers who allegedly violated California’s consumer-protection statute by including unconscionable arbitration provisions in their credit-card agreements because the plaintiffs had not been injured by the “mere inclusion” of those provisions in the agreements); Rivera v. Wyeth- Ayerst Laboratories, 283 F.3d 315, 319-320 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring complaint alleging violation of Texas’s consumer-pro | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Milligan v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences2012This court did not hold in Milligan , contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, that the common pleas court has jurisdiction over an action against a utility so long as the action existed at common law. {¶ 24} The court of appeals relied on the following language from Milligan, 56 Ohio St.2d at 195 , 383 N.E.2d 575 , to support its holding: “Whereas the right of privacy has been recognized as a legal right existing at common law in this state, * * * it follows that the Court of Common Pleas has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2305.01 to hear a complaint alleging a violation of 2012This court did not hold in Milligan , contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, that the common pleas court has jurisdiction over an action against a utility so long as the action existed at common law. {¶ 24} The court of appeals relied on the following language from Milligan, 56 Ohio St.2d at 195 , 383 N.E.2d 575 , to support its holding: “Whereas the right of privacy has been recognized as a legal right existing at common law in this state, * * * it follows that the Court of Common Pleas has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2305.01 to hear a complaint alleging a violation of | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Carver v. the Township of Deerfield
green
1 sentence2005No. 2001-P-0144, 2003-Ohio-6768, at ¶ 8 , citing Carver v. Deerfield Twp. (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 64 , 77 . {¶ 7} Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Downs' argument and the appeal is dismissed as moot. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Goff, Unpublished Decision (12-12-2003)
green
1 sentence2005No. 2001-P-0144, 2003-Ohio-6768, at ¶ 8 , citing Carver v. Deerfield Twp. (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 64 , 77 . {¶ 7} Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Downs' argument and the appeal is dismissed as moot. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Fox v. Eaton Corp.
green
2 sentences2003Nestle's argument lacks merit. {¶ 45} Apparently, Nestle is contending that SIEEB lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint because Nestle cites to Fox v. Eaton Corp. (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 236 , in which the Ohio Supreme Court found that a common pleas court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972. 2003In Fox, supra, the court noted that the statute vests subject matter jurisdiction exclusively in the proper federal court. {¶ 46} SIEEB is a creature of R.C. 4123.352 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Gustafson
green
2 sentences2003The ALS continues no later than when “the complaint alleging the violation for which the person was arrested * * * is adjudicated on the merits.” R.C. 4511.191(H)(2); Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 441 , 668 N.E.2d 435 . {¶ 12} The second type of suspension enumerated under former R.C. 4511.191(L) — a suspension under R.C. 4511.196 — is an interim suspension that the trial judge may impose if the judge at the initial appearance terminates the ALS but nonetheless determines “that the person’s continued driving will be a threat to public safety.” R.C. 4511.196(B)(1). 2003The ALS continues no later than when “the complaint alleging the violation for which the person was arrested * * * is adjudicated on the merits.” R.C. 4511.191(H)(2); Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 441 , 668 N.E.2d 435 . {¶ 12} The second type of suspension enumerated under former R.C. 4511.191(L) — a suspension under R.C. 4511.196 — is an interim suspension that the trial judge may impose if the judge at the initial appearance terminates the ALS but nonetheless determines “that the person’s continued driving will be a threat to public safety.” R.C. 4511.196(B)(1). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
City of Cincinnati v. Lipps
neutral
1 sentence1998Cincinnati v. Lipps (1970), 26 Ohio App.2d 128 , 129 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.