prosecutor improperly denigrated defense in Ohio

2002State v. Liberatore (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589 , 23 O.O.3d 489 , 433 N.E.2d 561 . {¶ 146} Myers claims that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel by commenting that the evidence presented by defense counsel “in some cases * * * was almost a snow job.” This isolated, unobjected-to comment, however, was only marginally denigrating, and was not close in scope or scale to the comments we found improper in State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405-406 , 613 N.E.2d 203 . {¶ 147} Next, Myers contends that the prosecutor improperly argued non-statutory aggravating factors durin

2002State v. Liberatore (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589 , 23 O.O.3d 489 , 433 N.E.2d 561 . {¶ 146} Myers claims that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel by commenting that the evidence presented by defense counsel “in some cases * * * was almost a snow job.” This isolated, unobjected-to comment, however, was only marginally denigrating, and was not close in scope or scale to the comments we found improper in State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405-406 , 613 N.E.2d 203 . {¶ 147} Next, Myers contends that the prosecutor improperly argued non-statutory aggravating factors durin

2002State v. Liberatore (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589 , 23 O.O.3d 489 , 433 N.E.2d 561 . {¶ 146} Myers claims that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel by commenting that the evidence presented by defense counsel “in some cases * * * was almost a snow job.” This isolated, unobjected-to comment, however, was only marginally denigrating, and was not close in scope or scale to the comments we found improper in State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405-406 , 613 N.E.2d 203 . {¶ 147} Next, Myers contends that the prosecutor improperly argued non-statutory aggravating factors durin

2002State v. Liberatore (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589 , 23 O.O.3d 489 , 433 N.E.2d 561 . {¶ 146} Myers claims that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel by commenting that the evidence presented by defense counsel “in some cases * * * was almost a snow job.” This isolated, unobjected-to comment, however, was only marginally denigrating, and was not close in scope or scale to the comments we found improper in State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405-406 , 613 N.E.2d 203 . {¶ 147} Next, Myers contends that the prosecutor improperly argued non-statutory aggravating factors durin

2024State v. Whitaker, 2022-Ohio-2840, ¶ 161 ; State v. Johnson, 2018-Ohio-4131, ¶ 35 (1st Dist.). {¶40} Truesdell also argues that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel during closing arguments.

2017"It is improper to denigrate defense counsel in the jury's presence." State v. Davis , 116 Ohio St.3d 404 , 2008-Ohio-2 , 880 N.E.2d 31 , ¶ 304. {¶ 236} First, he complains that the prosecutor argued, "Now, implicit in the cross-examination is, * * * they-you know, and it's natural, trying to, as I say, kind of dirty up the victim." After the trial court sustained an objection, the prosecutor continued, "Implicit in the cross-examination is to question Heather Jackson's lifestyle." {¶ 237} The prosecutor's initial comment that "it's natural, trying to * * * dirty up the victim" denigrated defe

2002State v. Twyford , supra. {¶ 25} Finally, Williams contends the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel's statements and tactics.

2001State v. Tibbets, supra. Appellant also asserts during his final address to the jury, the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel's statements and tactics.

1992Appellant objected to a number of these allegedly improper comments. “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 87 .

1992Appellant objected to a number of these allegedly improper comments. “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 87 .