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7 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. French
green
2 sentences2000In State v. French (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 446 , the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant in a DUI prosecution could challenge the admissibility at trial of a chemical test when he had failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress the results. 1999The state disagrees, citing State v. French (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 446 , for the proposition that failure to challenge the two-hour requirement in a pre-trial motion to suppress waives the requirement for the state to lay such a foundation for the admissibility of the results at trial. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2006Pursuant to Mincey, supra, the Fourth Amendment did not bar them from making the warrantless entry into appellee's home. {¶ 32} However, although we do not agree with the trial court that exigent circumstances did not exist, we stress that appellant failed to carry its burden of proof on the Miranda issue as well as on the two-hour requirement pursuant to R.C. 4511.19 (D)(1), which were clearly set forth in appellee's motion to suppress. 2 There does not appear to be any legal prejudice with respect to the Miranda issue since we are unable to discern from the record whether appellee in fact ma | 1 | 2006–2006 |
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences2004As for the second blood sample, the trial court stated that the two-hour requirement for the collection of blood and urine specimens did not apply to aggravated vehicular homicide prosecutions and that any defects in the testing affected the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. {¶ 6} On August 23, 2002, Wells entered guilty pleas in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 . 2004As for the second blood sample, the trial court stated that the two-hour requirement for the collection of blood and urine specimens did not apply to aggravated vehicular homicide prosecutions and that any defects in the testing affected the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. {¶ 6} On August 23, 2002, Wells entered guilty pleas in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
City of Newark v. Lucas
green
2 sentences1998Counsel for the defendant recognizes the admissibility of blood evidence in excess of the two-hour rule in R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) actions (or any similar municipal ordinance), as outlined in Newark v. Lucas (1988) 40 Ohio St.3d 100 , 532 N.E.2d 130 . 1998Counsel for the defendant recognizes the admissibility of blood evidence in excess of the two-hour rule in R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) actions (or any similar municipal ordinance), as outlined in Newark v. Lucas (1988) 40 Ohio St.3d 100 , 532 N.E.2d 130 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In re Brooks
green
1 sentence1982The bodily substance must be withdrawn within two hours of the time of such alleged violation. * * * ” However, in Cincinnati v. Sand , as well as the other cases cited by defendant containing language as to the exclusion of chemical test results based upon withdrawal beyond the two hour standard, In re Brooks (1971), 27 Ohio St. 2d 66 , and State v. Hall (Monroe Cty. 1973), 39 Ohio App. 2d 87 , the prosecution was attempting to introduce the test results for the purpose of establishing the presumptions set forth in R. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences1982In this case, the result of appellant’s blood-alcohol test was not introduced for the purpose of establishing the presumption set forth in R.C. 4511.19(B);_ In State v. Hernandez (1978), 62 Ohio App. 2d 63 [ 16 O.O.3d 114 ], this court held that the two-hour requirement for collecting blood and urine samples did not affect the admissibility of test results procured from such samples in a prosecution for aggravated vehicular homicide. 1982In this case, the result of appellant’s blood-alcohol test was not introduced for the purpose of establishing the presumption set forth in R.C. 4511.19(B);_ In State v. Hernandez (1978), 62 Ohio App. 2d 63 [ 16 O.O.3d 114 ], this court held that the two-hour requirement for collecting blood and urine samples did not affect the admissibility of test results procured from such samples in a prosecution for aggravated vehicular homicide. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Hall
green
1 sentence1982The bodily substance must be withdrawn within two hours of the time of such alleged violation. * * * ” However, in Cincinnati v. Sand , as well as the other cases cited by defendant containing language as to the exclusion of chemical test results based upon withdrawal beyond the two hour standard, In re Brooks (1971), 27 Ohio St. 2d 66 , and State v. Hall (Monroe Cty. 1973), 39 Ohio App. 2d 87 , the prosecution was attempting to introduce the test results for the purpose of establishing the presumptions set forth in R. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.