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7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Kellygreen2 sentences2023See Smith v. Kelly, 318 Or App 567, 569 , 508 P3d 77 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 822 (2023) (holding that trial counsel do not perform deficiently by failing to advise regarding the unanimity issue before Ramos was litigated); Peeler v. Reyes, 328 Or App 110, 119 , 537 P3d 206 (2023) (petitioner’s pre-Ramos guilty plea was knowing and intelligent because he was correctly informed about the scope of the Sixth Amendment right at the time of his plea). 2023See Smith v. Kelly, 318 Or App 567, 569 , 508 P3d 77 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 822 (2023) (holding that trial counsel do not perform deficiently by failing to advise regarding the unanimity issue before Ramos was litigated); Peeler v. Reyes, 328 Or App 110, 119 , 537 P3d 206 (2023) (petitioner’s pre-Ramos guilty plea was knowing and intelligent because he was correctly informed about the scope of the Sixth Amendment right at the time of his plea). | 1 | 1 |
Eklof v. Stewardgreen2 sentences2016See 360 Or at 722 n 3, above. 2016The Court of Appeals’ Rationale The Court of Appeals, relying on Verduzco for the proposition that petitioner bore the burden of establishing that her Brady violation claim fell within a statutory escape clause, concluded that, “to withstand the state’s summary Cite as 360 Or 717 (2016) 735 judgment motion,” petitioner was required, but failed to, “come forward with admissible evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to find that the escape clause applied to the Brady claim.” 273 Or App at 794 . | 1 | 1 |
Verduzco v. State of Oregongreen1 sentence2016Looking at the wording of the statutory escape clause, the Supreme Court in Verduzco explained that the use of the word “could” “connotes capability, as opposed to obligation.” Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eklof v. Steward
green
2 sentences2016The Court of Appeals’Rationale The Court of Appeals, relying on Verduzco for the proposition that petitioner bore the burden of establishing that her Brady violation claim fell within a statutory escape clause, concluded that, “to withstand the state’s summary *735 judgment motion,” petitioner was required, but failed to, “come forward with admissible evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to find that the escape clause applied to the Brady claim.” 273 Or App at 794 . 2016The Court of Appeals’ Rationale The Court of Appeals, relying on Verduzco for the proposition that petitioner bore the burden of establishing that her Brady violation claim fell within a statutory escape clause, concluded that, “to withstand the state’s summary Cite as 360 Or 717 (2016) 735 judgment motion,” petitioner was required, but failed to, “come forward with admissible evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to find that the escape clause applied to the Brady claim.” 273 Or App at 794 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Gutale v. State
green
2 sentences2023ORS 138.550(3) bars successive petitions for post- conviction relief, requiring that all claims “must be asserted in the original or amended petition” and providing that “any claims not so asserted are deemed waived.” The escape clause of ORS 138.550(3) nevertheless allows successive claims if the petitioner alleges grounds for post-conviction relief that “could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition:” “ORS 138.550(3) codifies claim preclusion principles: It addresses the question of whether a petitioner who already has litigated a petition for post-conviction reli 2023ORS 138.550(3) bars successive petitions for post- conviction relief, requiring that all claims “must be asserted in the original or amended petition” and providing that “any claims not so asserted are deemed waived.” The escape clause of ORS 138.550(3) nevertheless allows successive claims if the petitioner alleges grounds for post-conviction relief that “could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition:” “ORS 138.550(3) codifies claim preclusion principles: It addresses the question of whether a petitioner who already has litigated a petition for post-conviction reli | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Peeler v. Reyes
green
2 sentences2023See Smith v. Kelly, 318 Or App 567, 569 , 508 P3d 77 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 822 (2023) (holding that trial counsel do not perform deficiently by failing to advise regarding the unanimity issue before Ramos was litigated); Peeler v. Reyes, 328 Or App 110, 119 , 537 P3d 206 (2023) (petitioner’s pre-Ramos guilty plea was knowing and intelligent because he was correctly informed about the scope of the Sixth Amendment right at the time of his plea). 2023See Smith v. Kelly, 318 Or App 567, 569 , 508 P3d 77 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 822 (2023) (holding that trial counsel do not perform deficiently by failing to advise regarding the unanimity issue before Ramos was litigated); Peeler v. Reyes, 328 Or App 110, 119 , 537 P3d 206 (2023) (petitioner’s pre-Ramos guilty plea was knowing and intelligent because he was correctly informed about the scope of the Sixth Amendment right at the time of his plea). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bean v. Cain
green
2 sentences2022Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner as the opposing party, we review a post-conviction court’s grant of summary judgment to determine “whether the court cor- rectly concluded that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the superintendent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bean v. Cain, 314 Or App 529, 530 , 497 P3d 1273 (2021) (brackets and citation omitted). 2022Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner as the opposing party, we review a post-conviction court’s grant of summary judgment to determine “whether the court cor- rectly concluded that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the superintendent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bean v. Cain, 314 Or App 529, 530 , 497 P3d 1273 (2021) (brackets and citation omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Perez v. Laney
neutral
1 sentence2022And if unsuccessful at that point, somehow filing a post-conviction petition earlier would’ve been a much better argument for Petitioner than it is having raised it at this point.” The court memorialized its decision in a written order granting the superintendent’s motion for summary judg- ment, because “this matter is controlled by the decisional authority which holds that a subsequent post-conviction proceeding may not be brought for purposes of complaining about the performance of prior post-conviction counsel.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 321 Or App 196 (2022) 199 Petitioner assigns error to | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cunio v. Premo
green
1 sentence2017“In light of petitioner’s earlier challenges to his sentence, his Article I, section 16, claim” that the sentence is cruel and unusual, which is based on his Eighth Amendment claim, “could have also been raised earlier” and does “not fall within the statutory escape clause.” Cunio, 284 Or App at 710 n 8. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.