catalyst test in Pennsylvania

2023The Board abuses its discretion only when “the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” 64 Then, the court reviewed Lucchino and Solebury, from which it concluded that Objectors were incorrect that the catalyst test was “the sole and exclusive standard that [the Board] may employ in disposing of a request for costs and fees against a permittee under Section 307(b).” 65 The court observed—as we did in Solebury—that “[the Board’s] ‘broad discretion includes the authority to adopt standards

2023The Board abuses its discretion only when “the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” 64 Then, the court reviewed Lucchino and Solebury, from which it concluded that Objectors were incorrect that the catalyst test was “the sole and exclusive standard that [the Board] may employ in disposing of a request for costs and fees against a permittee under Section 307(b).” 65 The court observed—as we did in Solebury—that “[the Board’s] ‘broad discretion includes the authority to adopt standards

2023The Board abuses its discretion only when “the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” 64 Then, the court reviewed Lucchino and Solebury, from which it concluded that Objectors were incorrect that the catalyst test was “the sole and exclusive standard that [the Board] may employ in disposing of a request for costs and fees against a permittee under Section 307(b).” 65 The court observed—as we did in Solebury—that “[the Board’s] ‘broad discretion includes the authority to adopt standards

2023The Board abuses its discretion only when “the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” 64 Then, the court reviewed Lucchino and Solebury, from which it concluded that Objectors were incorrect that the catalyst test was “the sole and exclusive standard that [the Board] may employ in disposing of a request for costs and fees against a permittee under Section 307(b).” 65 The court observed—as we did in Solebury—that “[the Board’s] ‘broad discretion includes the authority to adopt standards

2019Finally, but similar to the first question, the fourth question asks whether the EHB erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion by using an "overly strict application" of the catalyst test and the standards set forth in Kwalwasser v. Department of Environmental Resources , 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 77 , 569 A.2d 422 (1990), where the EHB is entitled to broad discretion in ruling on fee applications under Section 307(b) of The Clean Streams Law.

2019Finally, but similar to the first question, the fourth question asks whether the EHB erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion by using an "overly strict application" of the catalyst test and the standards set forth in Kwalwasser v. Department of Environmental Resources , 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 77 , 569 A.2d 422 (1990), where the EHB is entitled to broad discretion in ruling on fee applications under Section 307(b) of The Clean Streams Law.

2021Lucchino v. Department of Environmental Protection, 809 A.2d 264, 270 (Pa. 2002) (footnotes omitted). 8 As this Court has stated: Under the catalyst test, the applicant must demonstrate the following to be considered eligible for an award under Section 307(b) of The Clean Streams Law: (1) that the opposing party provided some of the benefits that the fee-requesting party sought in the (Footnote continued on next page…) 6 achieved some degree of success on the merits; and made a substantial contribution to the determination of the issues.

2015An absolute privilege is unlike a qualified privilege in that the latter does not protect the declarant against a charge of malice, see Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 538 Pa. 139, 145 , 646 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1994), and can be lost through abuse of the privilege "such as overly embellishing an account of a proceeding.” Binder, 442 Pa. at 324 , 275 A.2d at 56 . , In this regard, we do not endorse the district court’s "served as the catalyst for a hearing” standard.

2015An absolute privilege is unlike a qualified privilege in that the latter does not protect the declarant against a charge of malice, see Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 538 Pa. 139, 145 , 646 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1994), and can be lost through abuse of the privilege "such as overly embellishing an account of a proceeding.” Binder, 442 Pa. at 324 , 275 A.2d at 56 . , In this regard, we do not endorse the district court’s "served as the catalyst for a hearing” standard.