unreasonable error in North Carolina

2026“The fact that counsel made an error, even an unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). 1.

2024“The fact that counsel made an error, even an unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 , 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985).

2026“The fact that counsel made an error, even an unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). 1.

2020Even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, however, “[t]he fact that counsel made an error, even an unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563 , 324 S.E.2d at 248 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 80 L.

2016The client must show that "counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... [and that had] counsel [not] made [the alleged] error [in question], even [if it was] an unreasonable error, ... there is a reasonable probability ... there would have been a different result in the proceedings." State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553 , 561-63, 324 S.E.2d 241 , 248 (1985). "[T]he burden to show that counsel's *214 performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for [the client] to bear." State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455 , 482, 555 S.E.2d 534 , 551 (2001).

2016The client must show that "counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... [and that had] counsel [not] made [the alleged] error [in question], even [if it was] an unreasonable error, ... there is a reasonable probability ... there would have been a different result in the proceedings." State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553 , 561-63, 324 S.E.2d 241 , 248 (1985). "[T]he burden to show that counsel's *214 performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for [the client] to bear." State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455 , 482, 555 S.E.2d 534 , 551 (2001).

2016To establish that counsel was ineffective, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 . *886 "[E]ven if counsel made an unreasonable error, [a defendant must show that] there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings." State v. Banks, 210 N.C.App. 30 , 49, 706 S.E.2d 807 , 821 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016To establish that counsel was ineffective, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 . *886 "[E]ven if counsel made an unreasonable error, [a defendant must show that] there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings." State v. Banks, 210 N.C.App. 30 , 49, 706 S.E.2d 807 , 821 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011“The first element requires a showing that counsel made serious errors; and the latter requires a showing that, even if counsel made an unreasonable error, ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.’ ” Id. at 563 , 324 S.E.2d at 248 ; see State v. Pate, 187 N.C.

2011App. 442, 448-49 , 653 S.E.2d 212, 217 (2007) (“A ‘reasonable possibility’ of a different result at trial is a much lower standard than that a different result ‘probably’ would have been reached at trial. . . .”).

2011The general rule is “that the incompetency (or one of its many synonyms) of counsel for the defendant in a criminal prosecution is not a Constitutional denial of his right to effective counsel unless the attorney’s representation is so lacking that the trial has become a farce and a mockery of justice.” State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612 , 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974).

2011The general rule is “that the incompetency (or one of its many synonyms) of counsel for the defendant in a criminal prosecution is not a Constitutional denial of his right to effective counsel unless the attorney’s representation is so lacking that the trial has become a farce and a mockery of justice.” State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612 , 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974).

2008On appeal, defendants contend that the Full Commission erred by concluding that plaintiff’s right carpel tunnel syndrome is compensable, and plaintiff contends that the Full Commission erred by (1) finding that plaintiff did not suffer a shoulder injury as a result of the *281 28 May 2003 incident; (2) denying plaintiff disability benefits after 3 May 2004; and (3) failing to award plaintiff attorneys’ fees as a result of defendants’ unreasonable defense of his claim. “[A]ppellate review of an award from the Commission is generally limited to two issues: (1) whether the findings of fact are su

2008On appeal, defendants contend that the Full Commission erred by concluding that plaintiff’s right carpel tunnel syndrome is compensable, and plaintiff contends that the Full Commission erred by (1) finding that plaintiff did not suffer a shoulder injury as a result of the *281 28 May 2003 incident; (2) denying plaintiff disability benefits after 3 May 2004; and (3) failing to award plaintiff attorneys’ fees as a result of defendants’ unreasonable defense of his claim. “[A]ppellate review of an award from the Commission is generally limited to two issues: (1) whether the findings of fact are su

2000"Trial counsel [are] necessarily given wide latitude in these matters." State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 68 , 347 S.E.2d 729, 739 (1986).

2000"Trial counsel [are] necessarily given wide latitude in these matters." State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 68 , 347 S.E.2d 729, 739 (1986).

2000Moreover, “[t]he question becomes whether a reasonable probability exists that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Moorman, 320 N.C. 387, 399 , 358 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1987).

2000Moreover, “[t]he question becomes whether a reasonable probability exists that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Moorman, 320 N.C. 387, 399 , 358 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1987).