unreasonable standard in Massachusetts

2005When a plaintiff is aware of a danger on a landowner’s premises, but chooses to proceed in spite of that danger, imposing liability on the defendant would “establish an unreasonable standard of perfection rather than . . . enforce the recognized duty of care.” Greenfield v. Friedman, 328 Mass. 272, 275 (1952).

2004Because the danger is seen and known, “[t]o impose liability upon the defendant in these circumstances ‘would be to establish an unreasonable standard of perfection rather than to enforce the recognized standard of due care.’” Greenfield v. Freedman, supra at 275 , quoting Rogers v. Cambridge Taxi Co., 317 Mass. 578 (1945) (plaintiff sat on ashtray in cab).

2004Because the danger is seen and known, “[t]o impose liability upon the defendant in these circumstances ‘would be to establish an unreasonable standard of perfection rather than to enforce the recognized standard of due care.’” Greenfield v. Freedman, supra at 275 , quoting Rogers v. Cambridge Taxi Co., 317 Mass. 578 (1945) (plaintiff sat on ashtray in cab).

2000Because the danger is seen and known, “ [t] o impose liability upon the defendant in these circumstances ‘would be to establish an unreasonable standard of perfection rather than to enforce the recognized standard of due care.’” Id. at 275 , quoting Rogers v. Cambridge Taxi Co., 317 Mass. 578, 580 (1945) (plaintiff sat on ashtray in cab).

2010See Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 272 (1991). 1.

2005A landowner is “not obliged to supply a place of maximum safety, but only one which would be safe to a person who exercises such minimum care as the circumstances reasonably indicate.” Lyon v. Morphew, 424 Mass. 828, 833 (1997), quoting Tobiana v. Priestly, 402 Mass. 84, 88 (1988).

2005A landowner is “not obliged to supply a place of maximum safety, but only one which would be safe to a person who exercises such minimum care as the circumstances reasonably indicate.” Lyon v. Morphew, 424 Mass. 828, 833 (1997), quoting Tobiana v. Priestly, 402 Mass. 84, 88 (1988).

2002To demonstrate that the Legislature’s choice of plan was an unreasonable violation of art. 101’s territorial integrity directive, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that “the constitutional requirement of equal representation ‘can be achieved [and other pertinent considerations satisfied] without dividing a municipality and [that] an entire municipality can be kept in one district without a “ripple effect” on other defined districts.’ ” Id. at 420-421 , quoting Merriam v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 246, 264 (1978) (Wilkins, L, dissenting).

1995“The duty of reasonable care does not make landowners . . . insurers of their property nor does it impose unreasonable maintenance burdens.” Aylward v. McCloskey, 412 Mass. 77, 80 (1992), quoting Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 709 (1973).

1995“The duty of reasonable care does not make landowners . . . insurers of their property nor does it impose unreasonable maintenance burdens.” Aylward v. McCloskey, 412 Mass. 77, 80 (1992), quoting Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 709 (1973).

1979See Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F.Supp. 806, 813-814 (E.D.

1979“Reasonable precautions against predatory eyes we may require, but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement, and we are not disposed to burden industrial inventors with such a duty in order to protect the fruits of their efforts.” E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).

1952See Towne v. Waltham Watch Co. 247 Mass. 390 ; Gagnon v. DiVittorio, 310 Mass. 475 ; Marengo v. Roy, 318 Mass. 719 ; Shaner v. Imperial Motor Sales, Inc. 323 Mass. 755 ; MacGillivray v. First National Stores Inc. 326 Mass. 678 .

1945See Finnegan v. Checker Taxi Co. 300 Mass. 62, 68 .