assessment hearing in Pennsylvania

2016The factors are not a checklist with each one weighing in some necessary fashion for or against SVP designation.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 863 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 614 , 21 A.3d 1189 (2011).

2016The factors are not a -9- J-S24033-16 checklist with each one weighing in some necessary fashion for or against SVP designation.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 863 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 614 , 21 A.3d 1189 (2011).

1914Were it not for those statutes relating to the registration of titles in certain municipalities, the mention of the name of the owner in connection with the assessment of the land is only required as descriptive of the land, and when the assessment and the claim within themselves clearly and absolutely identify the land, that is all that is required: Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 ; Northern Liberties v. Coates’ Heirs, 15 Pa. 245 ; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 215 .

1905It must be remembered that this is a proceeding in rem and, whilst the registered owner is entitled to notice, it is only because his or her title is registered and not because notice to an owner is essential to the validity of .the proceedings upon a municipal lien, in case there is no registered owner, because, as we have said in the city of Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 : “ When the title has not been registered at the time the claim accrues as a lien of record, the mention of the name of the owner in connection with the assessment of the land is only required as descripti

2021J-A10027-20 submit to an assessment and hearing to determine whether they should be classified as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) and register as such. [Appellant] contend[s] that the recent revisions to SORNA that were enacted pursuant to the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 1952, No. 29 (“Act 29”) by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in response to the decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 , 1196- 98, 1201-04 ([Pa.] 2017), cert, denied sub nom.

2021J-A10026-20 Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), codified in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10, et seq., effective June 12, 2018, that require them to submit to an assessment and hearing to determine whether they should be classified as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) and register as such. [Appellant] contend[s] that the recent revisions to SORNA that were enacted pursuant to the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 1952, No. 29 (“Act 29”) by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in response to the decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 , 1196- 98, 1201-04 ([P

2021Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018), and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal granted, 47 WAL 2018 (Pa. July 31, 2018), did not cure the constitutional infirmities of the registration requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24 that were determined by the Courts to exist in those cases.

2021Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018), and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa, Super. 2017), appeal granted, 47 WAL 2018 (Pa. July 31, 2018), did not cure the constitutional infirmities of the registration requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24 that were determined by the [c]ourts to exist in those cases.

2021Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018), and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal granted, 47 WAL 2018 (Pa. July 31, 2018), did not cure the constitutional infirmities of the registration requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24 that were determined by the Courts to exist in those cases.

2021Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018), and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa, Super. 2017), appeal granted, 47 WAL 2018 (Pa. July 31, 2018), did not cure the constitutional infirmities of the registration requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24 that were determined by the [c]ourts to exist in those cases.

1914Were it not for those statutes relating to the registration of titles in certain municipalities, the mention of the name of the owner in connection with the assessment of the land is only required as descriptive of the land, and when the assessment and the claim within themselves clearly and absolutely identify the land, that is all that is required: Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 ; Northern Liberties v. Coates’ Heirs, 15 Pa. 245 ; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 215 .

1906The owner of land who has not registered his title may have his property sold under proceedings to which he is not made a party and of which he has no notice: Northern Liberties v. Coates’s Heirs, 15 Pa. 245 ; Delaney v. Gault, 30 Pa. 63 ; Soullier v. Kern, 69 Pa. 16 ; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 215 ; Emrick v. Dicken, 92 Pa. 78 ; White v. Ballantine, 96 Pa. 186 ; Philadelphia v. Unknown Owner, 148 Pa. 536 ; Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 .

1914Were it not for those statutes relating to the registration of titles in certain municipalities, the mention of the name of the owner in connection with the assessment of the land is only required as descriptive of the land, and when the assessment and the claim within themselves clearly and absolutely identify the land, that is all that is required: Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 ; Northern Liberties v. Coates’ Heirs, 15 Pa. 245 ; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 215 .

1906The owner of land who has not registered his title may have his property sold under proceedings to which he is not made a party and of which he has no notice: Northern Liberties v. Coates’s Heirs, 15 Pa. 245 ; Delaney v. Gault, 30 Pa. 63 ; Soullier v. Kern, 69 Pa. 16 ; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 215 ; Emrick v. Dicken, 92 Pa. 78 ; White v. Ballantine, 96 Pa. 186 ; Philadelphia v. Unknown Owner, 148 Pa. 536 ; Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 .

1906The owner of land who has not registered his title may have his property sold under proceedings to which he is not made a party and of which he has no notice: Northern Liberties v. Coates’s Heirs, 15 Pa. 245 ; Delaney v. Gault, 30 Pa. 63 ; Soullier v. Kern, 69 Pa. 16 ; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 215 ; Emrick v. Dicken, 92 Pa. 78 ; White v. Ballantine, 96 Pa. 186 ; Philadelphia v. Unknown Owner, 148 Pa. 536 ; Philadelphia v. Peyton, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 .

1902When the owner has not availed himself of the protection afforded by the registration of his title, the mention of his name in connection with the assessment of the land, is only required as descriptive of the land, and when the assessment and claim within themselves clearly and absolutely identify the land, that is all that is required: Delaney v. Gault, supra. We are of opinion that this claim sufficiently described the property, and that the assessment was valid.

2024Id. at 131 .

2021As to Part III(F), i.e., the reviewability of Appellant’s claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), I join Part II of Justice Wecht’s dissenting opinion, since it recognizes that the imposition of capital punishment upon an intellectually disabled person exacts an illegal sentence, and therefore, rejects the majority’s assessment that the claim is waived.

2021As to Part III(F), i.e., the reviewability of Appellant’s claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), I join Part II of Justice Wecht’s dissenting opinion, since it recognizes that the imposition of capital punishment upon an intellectually disabled person exacts an illegal sentence, and therefore, rejects the majority’s assessment that the claim is waived.

2021Our Supreme Court has discussed the standard for the assessment of a claim concerning the cumulative errors of counsel as follows: - 26 - J-A01013-21 We have often held that “no number of failed [IAC] claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.” Johnson, supra at 532 (quoting Commonwealth v. Washington, … 927 A.2d 586, 617 ([Pa.] 2007)).

2016I am not here to review the merits of whether the professor should have been granted tenure or not, and I think the cases are pretty clear and I'd like to quote from the Shepard case, Shepard [v.] Temple University, [ 948 A.2d 852 (Pa.Super. 2008)], which says that while a professor is free to assert in the court of law that the process of [tenure] that was afforded to her did not comply with the contract terms or letters or whatever it was that was incorporated in the contract, she is not free to demand that a jury reconsider and re-decide the merits of the case. -4- J-A24014-16 And I think t

2014We granted allowance of appeal to address three issues: (1) “whether a sentencing court has the authority to sentence an individual for a violation of 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3802 (DUI) prior to the completion of a full drug and alcohol assessment under the requirements of [75 Pa.C.S. § 3814(2) ];” (2) whether “the language of 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3814 [is] a mandatory sentencing provision requiring a sentencing court to comply with its requirements prior to the imposition of a sentence for a DUI violation, or [whether] § 3814 [is] an optional provision that can be disregarded at the court’s discretion;” and

2014We granted allowance of appeal to address three issues: (1) “whether a sentencing court has the authority to sentence an individual for a violation of 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3802 (DUI) prior to the completion of a full drug and alcohol assessment under the requirements of [75 Pa.C.S. § 3814(2) ];” (2) whether “the language of 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3814 [is] a mandatory sentencing provision requiring a sentencing court to comply with its requirements prior to the imposition of a sentence for a DUI violation, or [whether] § 3814 [is] an optional provision that can be disregarded at the court’s discretion;” and

2014We granted allowance of appeal to address three issues: (1) “whether a sentencing court has the authority to sentence an individual for a violation of 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3802 (DUI) prior to the completion of a full drug and alcohol assessment under the requirements of [75 Pa.C.S. § 3814(2)];” (2) whether “the language of 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3814 [is] a mandatory sentencing provision requiring a sentencing court to comply with its requirements prior to the imposition of a sentence for a DUI violation, or [whether] § 3814 [is] an optional provision that can be disregarded at the court’s discretion;” and

2011A court may not substitute its own judgment for that of a defendant who knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his right to counsel. [13] In Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 , 128 S.Ct. 2379 , 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), the United States Supreme Court considered whether there was a legally meaningful distinction between competency to stand trial and competency to represent oneself at trial.

2011A court may not substitute its own judgment for that of a defendant who knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his right to counsel. [13] In Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 , 128 S.Ct. 2379 , 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), the United States Supreme Court considered whether there was a legally meaningful distinction between competency to stand trial and competency to represent oneself at trial.