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7 Tennessee opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Muslergreen2 sentences2011In determining whether a default judgment should be set aside, Tennessee courts also must consider, in addition to the justifications provided under Rule 60.02, the following three criteria: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866 (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 ; Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Assocs. 2010In determining whether a default judgment should be vacated, Tennessee courts also must consider, in addition to the justifications provided under Rule 60.02, the following three criteria: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 ; Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Assocs. | 2 | 2 |
Henry v. Goinsgreen2 sentences2011In determining whether a default judgment should be set aside, Tennessee courts also must consider, in addition to the justifications provided under Rule 60.02, the following three criteria: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866 (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 ; Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Assocs. 2010In determining whether a default judgment should be vacated, Tennessee courts also must consider, in addition to the justifications provided under Rule 60.02, the following three criteria: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 ; Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Assocs. | 2 | 2 |
Tennessee Department of Human Services v. Barbeegreen2 sentences2011In determining whether a default judgment should be set aside, Tennessee courts also must consider, in addition to the justifications provided under Rule 60.02, the following three criteria: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866 (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 ; Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Assocs. 2010In determining whether a default judgment should be vacated, Tennessee courts also must consider, in addition to the justifications provided under Rule 60.02, the following three criteria: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 ; Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Assocs. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patterson v. Rockwell International
green
2 sentences2021Defendant asserts that “she was denied the opportunity to appear and present evidence in support of an accurate accounting of the Lambert-Babcock Partnership.” This statement is conclusory and does not “constitute the assertion of a meritorious defense.” See Patterson, 665 S.W.2d at 100 . 2012Moreover, “an assertion of a meritorious defense is not required where ‘the default judgment was procured in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure.’” Reynolds v. Battles, 108 S.W.2d 249, 252-53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Churney v. Churney, No. 02A01-9211-CV-00326, 1993 WL 273891 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 1993)) (citing Patterson v. Rockwell Int’l, 665 S.W.2d 96 , 99- 100 (Tenn. 1984)). -3- On appeal, Father argues the trial court applied the “wrong legal standard” when considering his motion for Rule 60.02 relief. | 7 | 2002–2021 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.