two assignments error in Tennessee

1975In Morton v. Martin Aviation Corporation, 205 Tenn. 41 , 325 S.W.2d 524 , it is said: “Our authorities generally hold that usages or customs of trade, to be effectively binding in law, must be imperative and compulsory in character and so well known as to affect the person to be bound with knowledge of them and raise the presumption that be dealt with reference to them.” It appears to be settled in instances where a custom is not involved, or if existing is not binding, that advances of construction funds to a builder are in discharge of the lender’s contract, and in absence of an express cont

1975In Morton v. Martin Aviation Corporation, 205 Tenn. 41 , 325 S.W.2d 524 , it is said: “Our authorities generally hold that usages or customs of trade, to be effectively binding in law, must be imperative and compulsory in character and so well known as to affect the person to be bound with knowledge of them and raise the presumption that be dealt with reference to them.” It appears to be settled in instances where a custom is not involved, or if existing is not binding, that advances of construction funds to a builder are in discharge of the lender’s contract, and in absence of an express cont

1970Validity of the general principle of executing a deed of trust to secure repayment of future advances was affirmed in Tennessee in the early case of McGavock v. Deery, et al. (1860), 41 Tenn. 265 , 266, and later reaffirmed in the comparatively recent case of Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Jones (1961), 50 Tenn.App. 431 , 362 S.W.2d 266 .

1970Validity of the general principle of executing a deed of trust to secure repayment of future advances was affirmed in Tennessee in the early case of McGavock v. Deery, et al. (1860), 41 Tenn. 265 , 266, and later reaffirmed in the comparatively recent case of Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Jones (1961), 50 Tenn.App. 431 , 362 S.W.2d 266 .

1970Validity of the general principle of executing a deed of trust to secure repayment of future advances was affirmed in Tennessee in the early case of McGavock v. Deery, et al. (1860), 41 Tenn. 265 , 266, and later reaffirmed in the comparatively recent case of Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Jones (1961), 50 Tenn.App. 431 , 362 S.W.2d 266 .

1961Or to state it differently, it was not held that he would be entitled to anything more than his $300 commission.” The two assignments of error are: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the criminal case of *226 Duncan v. State, 202 Tenn. 431 , 304 S.W.2d 625 , which it is alleged involved the same parties, the same facts and the same subject matter as the case at bar did not establish the law of the case; and (2) the Court erred in holding that the law of the case is limited to a ruling made in the particular case and is not applicable to a subsequent suit between the same parti

1961Or to state it differently, it was not held that he would be entitled to anything more than his $300 commission.” The two assignments of error are: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the criminal case of *226 Duncan v. State, 202 Tenn. 431 , 304 S.W.2d 625 , which it is alleged involved the same parties, the same facts and the same subject matter as the case at bar did not establish the law of the case; and (2) the Court erred in holding that the law of the case is limited to a ruling made in the particular case and is not applicable to a subsequent suit between the same parti

1956This conclusion of fact brings us to a consideration of the other two assignments of error which are referred to by propositions (b) and (c) supra. Since we hold that the business is unitary, the excise tax law, Code, sec. 1316 et seq., becomes applicable and the only inquiry is whether or not it was properly applied, for as said in Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 157, 169 , 213 S.W.2d 45 , 50: “It is only when application of the formula results in allocating to the taxing state an amount of earnings or net worth palpably disproportionate to the business done or property owned in the

1956This conclusion of fact brings us to a consideration of the other two assignments of error which are referred to by propositions (b) and (c) supra. Since we hold that the business is unitary, the excise tax law, Code, sec. 1316 et seq., becomes applicable and the only inquiry is whether or not it was properly applied, for as said in Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 157, 169 , 213 S.W.2d 45 , 50: “It is only when application of the formula results in allocating to the taxing state an amount of earnings or net worth palpably disproportionate to the business done or property owned in the

1956We are of opinion that the case of Ridley v. Haiman, 164 Tenn. 239 , 47 S.W.2d 750 , fully sustains the Chancellor’s action in sustaining the second ground of the demurrer.

1956We are of opinion that the case of Ridley v. Haiman, 164 Tenn. 239 , 47 S.W.2d 750 , fully sustains the Chancellor’s action in sustaining the second ground of the demurrer.

1956General Shoe Corp. v. Stokes, 181 Tenn. 286, 290 , 181 S.W.2d 146 .

1956General Shoe Corp. v. Stokes, 181 Tenn. 286, 290 , 181 S.W.2d 146 .

1952The authorities are cited in Jenkins v. Harris, 19 Tenn. App. 113 , 83 S. W. (2d) 562 .

1952The authorities are cited in Jenkins v. Harris, 19 Tenn. App. 113 , 83 S. W. (2d) 562 .

1926The remaining two assignments of error are directed toward the action of the court in making perpetual the temporary writ of injunction granted in the cause; and in decreeing specific performance of the contract for the remaining years of the contract period after the year 1923. “ Specific performance is an equitable remedy, which compels such substantial performance of the contract as will do justice between the parties. ’ ’ Sugar v. Froehlich, 229 Ill. 397 ; 14 Words and Phrases, pp. 654.