detriment standard in California

2016(In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 .) When a juvenile court concludes that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and the court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the first issue on appeal is whether the evidence compels a finding for appellant as a matter of law.

2015We conclude Tiffany failed to carry her burden of proof at the section 366.26 hearing. “[T]he burden [of proof] is on the party seeking to establish the existence of one of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exceptions to produce that evidence.” (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 .) When a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the court’s rejection of the detriment claim but whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing.

2021It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’ It must mean what it says: that return presents a substantial risk of detriment to the child.” (Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505 .) In this writ proceeding, we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of detriment.

2014It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’ It must mean what it says: that return presents a substantial risk of detriment to the child.” (Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505 , original italics.) In making its determination, the court shall consider the “efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent,” as well as “the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself of 18 ser

2023(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 , 318–319.) The parents argue, and the Agency concedes, that when the juvenile court evaluated the harm of severing Mar.D.’s relationship with the parents, it erroneously attributed aspects of My.D.’s behavior to Mar.D.

2015(Id. at pp. 1567-1568.) As the California Supreme Court has recognized, “[i]n any custody determination, . . . ‘[w]hen custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability,’ ” as compared to a parent’s interest in caring for his or her child, “ ‘assumes an increasingly important role.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 , italics added.) 17 Moreover, despite father’s contentions, the fact the lack of visits was DPSS’s fault is irrelevant to the detriment analysis.

2017Code, § 1514, subd. (b) ; Guardianship of Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1123 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 , 202 P.3d 1089 .) As indicated above, the detriment standard used is the same standard applied in dependency proceedings.

2017Code, § 1514, subd. (b) ; Guardianship of Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1123 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 , 202 P.3d 1089 .) As indicated above, the detriment standard used is the same standard applied in dependency proceedings.

2021In general, under the detriment standard, . . . the party who is opposing placement has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed. . . .” (In re Jonathan P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1256 .) “The concept of best interest ‘is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition.

2016Instead, the party who is opposing placement has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed if the nonoffending parent is given custody.” (In re Jonathan P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1256 .) “A detriment evaluation requires that the court weigh all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net harm.” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 .) In doing so, the court has “broad discretion to evaluate not only the child’s physical safety but also his or her emotional well-being.

2017For instance, as the T.M. court, itself, acknowledged, its “reading of the statute is consistent with dependency law’s guiding principle of the well-being of the child: ‘While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ ” (T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1220 .) Under the C.C. test, in contrast, the juvenile court lacks the power to suspend visits harmful to a child’

2017For instance, as the T.M. court, itself, acknowledged, its “reading of the statute is consistent with dependency law’s guiding principle of the well-being of the child: ‘While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ ” (T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1220 .) Under the C.C. test, in contrast, the juvenile court lacks the power to suspend visits harmful to a child’

2017Finally, DPSS argues the California Supreme Court's 2009 companion probate decisions In re Guardianship of Ann S. and In re Charlotte D. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1140 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 , 202 P.3d 1109 ( Charlotte D. ) indicate a detriment analysis was unnecessary and all that due process required was a best interest analysis.

2017Finally, DPSS argues the California Supreme Court's 2009 companion probate decisions In re Guardianship of Ann S. and In re Charlotte D. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1140 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 , 202 P.3d 1109 ( Charlotte D. ) indicate a detriment analysis was unnecessary and all that due process required was a best interest analysis.

2017I agree that there are separate and distinct purposes of the juvenile, family, and probate courts ( In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953 , 961, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 744 ), but the principle that parenting is a fundamental right (see *740 Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645 , 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 [parenting is a basic civil right]; In re B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 688-689, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ) is a thread that runs through all three, applicable in Family Court, Probate Court, and Juvenile Court.

2017I agree that there are separate and distinct purposes of the juvenile, family, and probate courts ( In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953 , 961, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 744 ), but the principle that parenting is a fundamental right (see *740 Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645 , 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 [parenting is a basic civil right]; In re B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 688-689, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ) is a thread that runs through all three, applicable in Family Court, Probate Court, and Juvenile Court.

2015(Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54 .) This does not mean, however, that C.T.’s negative attitudes towards F., her desire to live apart from her younger sibling, and her general psychological instability were not all highly relevant to the juvenile court’s detriment analysis.

2015(Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54 .) When a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the court’s rejection of the detriment claim but whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing.

2013(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 .) When a court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing.

2013(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 .) When a court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing.

2013If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ (Id. at p. 575.)” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342 .) When a court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in doing so.

2013If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ (Id. at p. 575.)” (Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342 .) When a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing.

1986Judicial inclusion by our Supreme Court of the detriment requirement in subdivisions (a)(2) (neglect) and (a)(6) (parent mental illness), In re Carmaleta B., supra, 21 Cal.3d 482 , and in subdivision (a)(4) (parent conviction of felony) In re Richard E., supra, 21 Cal.3d 349 , is supported by citation to In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ] without even the slightest analysis of the question of legislative intent.

1986Judicial inclusion by our Supreme Court of the detriment requirement in subdivisions (a)(2) (neglect) and (a)(6) (parent mental illness), In re Carmaleta B., supra, 21 Cal.3d 482 , and in subdivision (a)(4) (parent conviction of felony) In re Richard E., supra, 21 Cal.3d 349 , is supported by citation to In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ] without even the slightest analysis of the question of legislative intent.

1984If the Legislature did not wish the detriment standard to apply to section 7017, subdivision (d) custody proceedings, it *71 could have so indicated. ( In re William Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838 [ 186 P.2d 134 ], Estate of Carson (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 291 [ 344 P.2d 612 ], Estate of Fritz (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 385 [ 227 P.2d 539 ].) We are aware of the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill No. 649, vetoed by the Governor because he objected to certain financial provisions.

1984If the Legislature did not wish the detriment standard to apply to section 7017, subdivision (d) custody proceedings, it *71 could have so indicated. ( In re William Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838 [ 186 P.2d 134 ], Estate of Carson (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 291 [ 344 P.2d 612 ], Estate of Fritz (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 385 [ 227 P.2d 539 ].) We are aware of the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill No. 649, vetoed by the Governor because he objected to certain financial provisions.

1984If the Legislature did not wish the detriment standard to apply to section 7017, subdivision (d) custody proceedings, it *71 could have so indicated. ( In re William Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838 [ 186 P.2d 134 ], Estate of Carson (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 291 [ 344 P.2d 612 ], Estate of Fritz (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 385 [ 227 P.2d 539 ].) We are aware of the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill No. 649, vetoed by the Governor because he objected to certain financial provisions.

1984If the Legislature did not wish the detriment standard to apply to section 7017, subdivision (d) custody proceedings, it *71 could have so indicated. ( In re William Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838 [ 186 P.2d 134 ], Estate of Carson (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 291 [ 344 P.2d 612 ], Estate of Fritz (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 385 [ 227 P.2d 539 ].) We are aware of the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill No. 649, vetoed by the Governor because he objected to certain financial provisions.

1984If the Legislature did not wish the detriment standard to apply to section 7017, subdivision (d) custody proceedings, it *71 could have so indicated. ( In re William Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838 [ 186 P.2d 134 ], Estate of Carson (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 291 [ 344 P.2d 612 ], Estate of Fritz (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 385 [ 227 P.2d 539 ].) We are aware of the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill No. 649, vetoed by the Governor because he objected to certain financial provisions.

1984If the Legislature did not wish the detriment standard to apply to section 7017, subdivision (d) custody proceedings, it *71 could have so indicated. ( In re William Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838 [ 186 P.2d 134 ], Estate of Carson (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 291 [ 344 P.2d 612 ], Estate of Fritz (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 385 [ 227 P.2d 539 ].) We are aware of the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Bill No. 649, vetoed by the Governor because he objected to certain financial provisions.

1984She cannot be suddenly transplanted like a dogwood tree without running serious and dangerous risk of frustration and bewilderment. ’ ” (44 Cal.App.3d at p. 707, italics omitted.) In In re Reyna, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 288 , the court applied the detriment standard to the custodial rights of a natural father under procedures predating the Uniform Parentage Act.

1984She cannot be suddenly transplanted like a dogwood tree without running serious and dangerous risk of frustration and bewilderment.'" (44 Cal. App.3d at p. 707, italics omitted.) In In re Reyna, supra, 55 Cal. App.3d 288 , the court applied the detriment standard to the custodial rights of a natural father under procedures predating the Uniform Parentage Act.

2023(See id., subd. (c) [“a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child”]; id., subd. (d) [“Unless a court orders otherwise after making the determination specified in subdivision (c), a presumption under Section 7611 is rebutted by a judgment establishing parentage of the child by another person”].) As Stepfather concedes in his reply brief, the juvenile court’s finding that Stepfather did not qualify for presumed father status meant that a detriment analy

2023(See id., subd. (c) [“a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child”]; id., subd. (d) [“Unless a court orders otherwise after making the determination specified in subdivision (c), a presumption under Section 7611 is rebutted by a judgment establishing parentage of the child by another person”].) As Stepfather concedes in his reply brief, the juvenile court’s finding that Stepfather did not qualify for presumed father status meant that a detriment analy

2023While an adult witness might be able to differentiate between, ‘This will make me sad, but I can deal with it,’ and ‘This will devastate me; I can’t imagine life without my sibling and I don’t think I want to live without him or her,’ a child is likely to describe both as 15 making him, ‘sad.’ ” (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537 .) But “never” does not mean always, and whether a child’s sadness is indicative of substantial detriment is case-specific.