In Re Cc, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1481 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). · Go Syfert
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In Re Cc, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1481 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 10× by 10 distinct cases, 2013–2025→ Stable · …as a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. ✓
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2014–2024 · …as a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. however, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis. ⚠ not in text
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2021–2024 · …the critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error. ⚠ not in text
260 citation events (260 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re A.G. CA2/1 (calctapp, 2025-05-01) · Strongest negative: In re Jennifer C. CA2/7 (calctapp, 2022-09-19)
Treatment trajectory · 2009 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2009 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 44 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" In re Jennifer C. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: but see · confidence high
(See In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156 , 164, fn. 5; In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 654 ; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1493 ; but see In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1 , 15 1 Statutory references are to this code. 2 [although appeal of jurisdiction findings is moot when child is no longer subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, discretionary review is warranted if the alleged conduct reasonably places the parent at risk of inclusion in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI)].) Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court will soon decide whether termination of depend…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.G. CA2/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483.) The C.C. court rejected as “highly speculative” the mother’s contention that “the finding of detriment upon which the challenged order denying visitation was based create[d] the possibility of prejudice in subsequent family law proceedings.” (See id. at p. 1489.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal elected, “in an abundance of caution,” to reach the merits to “eliminate even the remote possibility of prejudice to [the mother] arising from the adverse [detriment] finding [that was] based on [an] incorrect standard . . . .” (See id. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re R.R. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 [“As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot”].) 9 DISPOSITION The December 13, 2021, exit order is affirmed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re D.P.
Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
Courts may consider whether the challenged jurisdictional finding “could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings,” or “ ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.’ ” (In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 762–763; see also In re Nathan E., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.) A prior jurisdictional finding can be considered by the Department in determining whether to file a dependency petition or by a juvenile court in subsequent depen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re R.P. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
The frequency and nature of visits “depends on a broad[] assessment by the court of the child’s ‘well-being.’” (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) We therefore review visitation orders for an abuse of discretion.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Eddy G. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Without a showing that a parent’s personal rights are affected by a ruling, the parent does not establish standing. [Citation.] To be aggrieved or affected, a parent must have a legally cognizable interest that is affected injuriously by the juvenile court’s decision.’” (In re C.C. (2009) 14 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489, fn. 4 ; see In re D.S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 671, 673-674 [“the ability to appeal does not confer standing to assert issues when [a party] is not aggrieved by the order from which the appeal is taken”].) Blanca has not shown she has a legally cognizable interest in …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Z.T. CA1/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488.) “Still a court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue when there remain ‘material questions for the court’s determination’ [citation], where a ‘pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur’ [citation], or where ‘there is a likelihood of recurrence of the controversy between the same parties or others.’ ” (N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 .) In this case, we can give no effective relief.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.P. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Although visitation orders are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion (see, e.g., Brittany C., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356; In re Daniel C.H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 837-838 (Daniel C.H.)), some courts have indicated that there must be substantial evidence to support the finding of detriment where visitation has been denied (see, e.g., C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580 , disapproved of on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.F. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489-90 [detriment required to deny visitation]; In re T.W. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 339, 346-48 ; Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425-27 [no reasonable services where visitation is unduly limited].)” Mother also relies on In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1508 , but her reliance on all the authorities cited in this context is misplaced.
examined Cited as authority (rule) In re S.G. (3×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Our understanding of the language in this way is consistent with how, in most cases citing such a “general rule,” the reviewing court goes on to consider whether the circumstances of the case prevent the court from granting effective relief (see, e.g., In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156 , 164 (Rashad D.); C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488)—something that would not be necessary, were we to take literally the rule’s pronouncement that termination of juvenile court jurisdiction renders moot an appeal of an earlier order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Matthew C.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(See T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1221 [collecting cases and applying a blended standard].) Not long ago, we noted that it is unclear “whether the two standards are so different in this context.” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092, fn. 7 .) And 17 reasoned that a “strict legislative limitation on suspending or denying all parental visitation during the reunification period is no accident: Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to achieve reunification.” (C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) It thus construed the language of th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Francisco Human Services Agency v. Stephanie M.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
First, “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Second, “[vjisitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” {Id., subd. (a)(1)(A).) According to the statute, these visitation requirements exist ‘“[i]n order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent.” {Id., subd. (a).) There is currently a split of authority as to whether section 362.1 mandates visitation ab…
examined Cited as authority (rule) In re E.L. CA6 (4×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(See C.C., supra, 5 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 12 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.) Nevertheless, in recognition of the fact that the father’s relationship with the child was “subject to erosion” during the time the suspension order was in effect (see In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 ) and “in an abundance of caution” (C.C., supra, at p. 1489), we will proceed to consider the merits of the father’s claim.
examined Cited as authority (rule) In re Candice E. CA2/1 (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486 [court ordered “one ‘experimental’ monitored visit in a neutral setting” to determine if parental visitation could be beneficial].) We are not concluding visitation would be certainly beneficial to Daughter; in fact, it may well result in no benefit to her.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Anna S. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction moots an appeal from a previous order in the dependency, but “dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic,” and is decided on a “‘case-by-case basis.’” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 , quoting In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605 .) “[I]n an abundance of caution and because dismissal of the appeal operates as an affirmance of the underlying judgment or order [citations] we consider the merits of [the] appeal.” (In re C.C., supra, at p. 1488.) 5 Mother also had a histo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re T.P. CA2/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION “‘An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. [Citations.]’ (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054 .)” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498 .) “As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citations.]” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 .) “[N]o direct relief can be granted even were we to find revers…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. L.M.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rather, the risk of detriment must be substantial, such that [the proposed action] represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ].) The evidence that even supervised visitation with father presented some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being is as follows.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Tanner B. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487, fn. 3 .) At the review hearing on October 23 (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), the dependency court noted Kenneth was in compliance with his case plan but found continued jurisdiction necessary; the matter was continued to December 15 for a hearing pursuant to section 366.22.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Stephanie C. CA2/8 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but ‘must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’ [Citation.]” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488-1489 (C.C.); see also In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 .)3 In C.C., the juvenile court found continued visitation with the moth…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Andres A. CA2/7 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re C.C., supra, at pp. 1488-1489.) Armando argues that “[t]he most recent order of the juvenile court on October 7, 2014 appears to laid [sic] a series of steps that present a roadmap to father obtaining visits with his son.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re R.H. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(See In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 [“‘An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings’”].) For example, there is not a second child whose case may be affected by the jurisdiction findings in this case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Vanessa v. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459, subdivision (a), we take judicial notice of the minute order dated April 22, 2014 (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487, fn. 3 ), and note that on that date, the October 22, 2013 order for suitable placement was terminated, with Vanessa, Ver., Val. and J. ordered placed in the home of their parents Miriam and Raul under the Department’s supervision.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re H.T. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487, fn. 3 .) The March 13, 2013 order corrected the March 12 order nunc pro tunc to reflect the actual proceedings of March 12 (as stated above and as addressed in the briefing), and to add H.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Katherine B. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487, fn. 3 .) In April 2013, Katherine was declared a non-minor dependent and services for her were terminated, with a further hearing set for October 9, 2013.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Joseph C. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487, fn. 3 .) 18 a hearing, the parent must make a prima facie showing that there is a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence and that changing the existing order is in the child‘s best interests.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re D.Z. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(See In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 716 ; In re C.C., supra, at p. 1489.) Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j) The juvenile court declared the three younger siblings dependents after sustaining counts j-1 and j-2, alleged under section 300, subdivision (j), which provides for jurisdiction, as relevant here, where the “child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision . . . (b) [or] (d) . . . , and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. L.T.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re Albert G. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 132, 134-135 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 914 ]; In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1317 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 798 ]; In re Katherine R. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 354, 357 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]; In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 ]; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ].) “ ‘An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’ ” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ].) Mother urges that the appeal is not moot because the custo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.C. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426 , 1431-1432 [finding of sexual abuse]; In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 [order denying visitation].) Even if another dependency proceeding should commence, the issues of self-representation and visitation would be specific to that case and the juvenile court’s previous ruling on these matters would have no bearing on a new and different dependency case.
discussed Cited "see" In re S.G. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: accord · confidence high
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P., at p. 276.) “ ‘As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” ’ ” (In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206 , 214; accord, In re C.C. (2009) 13 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1488; accord, In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156 , 163 (Rashad D.).) E…
discussed Cited "see" In re Riley S. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: accord · confidence high
“An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156 , 163; accord, In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1488; cf. In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654 , 663 [appeal from juvenile court’s denial of restraining order was not moot despite termination of jurisdiction because an order directing juvenile court to issue restraining order would provide effective relief].) A dependency appeal “‘“becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it imp…
discussed Cited "see" In re King B. CA2/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
For example, In re A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154 , 158–159 reviewed an order entered pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), which provides that if a child is placed into permanent guardianship, the juvenile court “shall also make an order for visitation with the parents . . . unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (Italics added.) Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758 , 763 and In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960 , 962 considered orders entere…
discussed Cited "see" In re N.R. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
Prior to terminating reunification services, the court must make a determination that it would be detrimental to the child to be returned to the parent’s custody.’” (M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646 , 660 (M.G.).) “[T]he risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400 ; see In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1490 [same]; In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965 [same]; David B. v. Superior Court (2…
discussed Cited "see" In re K.J. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
But the fact of the matter is that we do not get ideal parents anywhere.” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789 ; accord, In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1490.) A court’s ruling that a child should not be placed with a noncustodial parent requires the finding of detriment to be made by clear and convincing evidence.
discussed Cited "see" V.A. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
Prior to terminating reunification services, the court must make a determination that it would be detrimental to the child to be returned to the parent’s custody.’” (M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646 , 660.) “[T]he risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400 ; see In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1490 [same]; In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965 [same]; David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 12…
discussed Cited "see" In re A.O. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: accord · confidence high
But the fact of the matter is that we do not get ideal parents anywhere.” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789 ; accord, In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1490.) Risk of harm to a child from a parent’s use of drugs is generally examined in the context of the dependency court’s jurisdiction.
discussed Cited "see" In re Samuel S. CA2/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: accord · confidence high
(Id. at p. 406; accord In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1488–1489 [juvenile court’s order restoring monitored visitation rendered parent’s appeal re earlier order denying such visitation moot].) This case is analogous to Dani R. and In re C.C.
discussed Cited "see" In re S.C. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
Analysis “Visitation is a necessary and integral component of any reunification plan.” (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317 ; see In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1491.) “It is the juvenile court’s responsibility to ensure regular parent-child visitation occurs while at the same time providing for flexibility in response to the changing needs of the child and to dynamic family circumstances. [Citations.] To sustain this balance the child’s social worker may be given responsibility to manage the actual details of the visits, including the power to determine the time, pl…
discussed Cited "see" In re N.F. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
Nevertheless, dismissal for mootness “is not automatic, but ‘must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ [Citations.]” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 ; see In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1055 [reviewing court must decide “[o]n a case-by-case basis . . . whether subsequent events in a dependency case have rendered the appeal moot and whether its decision would affect the outcome of the case in a subsequent proceeding”].) “‘An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’ [Citation.]” (In re C.C., supra,…
discussed Cited "see" In re Joshua G. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
(In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64 ].) However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but ‘must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ (In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605 [ 232 Cal. Rptr. 36 ]; In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504 , 517–518 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 ]; see In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 ].)” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 .) For example, where the dependency court’s jurisdictional findings have adversely affected custody rights or could …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re K.S. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see also · confidence low
(See A.C., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 46 [“the court’s inquiry properly is more comprehensive than simply whether a child will be physically safe with a noncustodial parent or whether that parent has behaved badly”]; see also In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1490–1491 [court has broad discretion to evaluate child’s emotional well-being; finding a placement 10 would impair the child’s emotional security may suffice in appropriate cases].) K.S.’s experience with mother and mother’s boyfriend’s methamphetamine abuse and domestic violence and her attachment to father in …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re A.G. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence low
(See A.C., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 46 [“the court’s inquiry properly is more comprehensive than simply whether a child will be physically safe with a noncustodial parent or whether that parent has behaved badly”]; see also In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1490–1491 [court has broad discretion to evaluate child’s emotional well-being; finding a placement would impair the child’s emotional security may suffice in appropriate cases].) As such, for the reasons we have stated above, the juvenile court’s finding was appropriate, despite father’s apparent capability as a p…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re A.C.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Id. at p. 1425; § 361.2, subd. (a); see also In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 10 1490–1491 [court has broad discretion to evaluate child’s emotional well-being; finding a placement would impair the child’s emotional security may suffice in appropriate cases].) There is substantial evidence Daughter would suffer significant emotional harm if she were forced to live with Father.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Schrage v. Schrage CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
Proc., § 913 [“The dismissal of an appeal shall be with prejudice to the right to file another appeal within the time permitted, unless the dismissal is expressly made without prejudice to another appeal.”]; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 100 [“order dismissing [the appellant’s] first appeal did not expressly say it was without prejudice, so by operation of law it was with prejudice”]; Patchett v. Bergamot Station, Ltd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396 [Code of Civil Procedure section 913 precluded a second appeal where the appellant failed to delineate the basis for a st…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re R.D. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
When reunification services are ordered, “[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion.” (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356; see also In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1491 [“The frequency of . . . visits . . . depends on a broader assessment by the court of the child’s ‘well-being.’ ”].) 5 The juvenile court’s order provided Mother with one in-person visit and two telephone contacts per week.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re C.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LISA M., Defendant and Appellant.
B208675.
California Court of Appeal.
Apr 13, 2009.
172 Cal. App. 4th 1481
Perluss.
Cited by 101 opinions  |  Published

[*1483] Donna Balderston Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jeanette Cauble, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

PERLUSS, P. J.

Lisa M. appeals from an order made by the juvenile court at the June 9, 2008 disposition hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361)[1] denying her visitation and conjoint therapy with her 12-year-old son, C.C. Since this appeal was filed, the juvenile court has restored monthly monitored visitation through a family law "exit order" and terminated its jurisdiction. (§ 362.4.) The issues raised in this appeal are effectively moot. However, because the court's finding of detriment and visitation order were not made in accordance with the proper standard, to avoid any possible collateral prejudice to Lisa we reverse the challenged order denying visitation without a remand for further proceedings rather than simply dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) detained C.C. from his mother on July 5, 2007 after a month-long investigation, based on allegations of serious physical harm (§ 300,[*1484] subd. (a)) and failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)). Before his detention C.C. split his time equally between Lisa and his father, Patrick C. According to C.C., then 10 years old, his mother had frequently struck him, grabbed him by the neck or chin and verbally abused him. C.C. was afraid Lisa would hurt him more seriously if he was forced to stay with her; he wanted to live exclusively with his father, his father's girlfriend and her two daughters. C.C.'s allegations were largely substantiated by other family members and acquaintances, including his mother's roommate. At the detention hearing the juvenile court ordered monitored visits for Lisa and directed the Department to provide both parents with referrals and to secure individual counseling for C.C.

On July 26, 2007 the Department filed an amended petition including additional allegations of physical and emotional abuse by Lisa. The Department also filed a jurisdiction/disposition report containing multiple witness accounts of unstable, violent conduct by Lisa. In one instance Lisa physically attacked Patrick's girlfriend, Jackie, at Jackie's hair salon when Lisa showed up unexpectedly and tried to drag C.C. into her car. In another instance recounted by Lisa's roommate, when C.C. locked the door to his room to escape his mother, she removed the door with a screwdriver and screamed at him for 40 minutes while throwing things at him. The roommate, a counselor at a mental health center, described Lisa as an "unstable, unmedicated bipolar," who was more "unstable than some of [her] most severe patients." The roommate's coworker, who was coincidentally Lisa's ex-sister-in-law, concurred, describing Lisa as "borderline, bipolar or narcissistic." The Department also reported C.C. had refused to engage with his mother during a monitored visit that was terminated by the social worker when C.C. became extremely upset.

At the subsequent jurisdiction/disposition hearing the court ordered the Department to facilitate visits between Lisa and C.C. in a therapeutic setting. A week later, the court ordered Lisa to undergo an Evidence Code section 730 psychological evaluation focusing on Lisa's relationship with her son and his refusal to see her, as well as Lisa's own psychological health.

On September 7, 2007 the Department filed an ex parte request seeking suspension of visitation between Lisa and C.C. The application was based on a letter from C.C.'s therapist, Patricia Correa, indicating his level of distress had escalated after each of the three previous monitored visits. C.C. had stated he did not want to have contact with Lisa, a position Dr. Correa viewed as justified, and had threatened to harm himself and Lisa if forced to visit her. The court suspended visitation pending an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing both Dr. Correa and the visitation monitor testified. According to the monitor, who acknowledged Lisa's conduct at the visits had been appropriate, C.C.[*1485] had refused to engage with Lisa and had stated repeatedly he did not want to see her. During the third visit, after C.C. left the room but was required to come back in, he sat on the floor behind the couch, banging his head on the wall and crying. The monitor corroborated Dr. Correa's view further visits would be detrimental and C.C. harbored a lot of anger he would need to work through before he could be expected to have a relationship with Lisa.

After hearing the testimony of Dr. Correa and the monitor, the court found by clear and convincing evidence continued visitation between C.C. and Lisa would be detrimental to C.C. and suspended visitation. Adjudication of the petition was continued to November 1, 2007.

On October 11, 2007 the psychiatrist retained to complete the Evidence Code section 730 evaluation, Timothy Collister, submitted his report to the court. Dr. Collister concluded, based on testing and interviews of Lisa, Patrick and C.C., Lisa's psychological profile was within normal range; C.C.'s distress was largely a product of the parents' own conflicts; and C.C. should be required to have regular visits with Lisa. In a written response to the section 730 evaluation, the Department challenged Dr. Collister's characterization of Lisa's abuse of C.C. as mild and his conclusion Patrick was contributing to C.C.'s anxiety. Dr. Correa similarly disagreed with the evaluation's conclusions, noting that, since visits had been suspended, C.C. was much happier and was receiving "straight A's" in school. She believed C.C. would eventually be willing to try visits again if allowed to first work through his anger. Nonetheless, in light of Dr. Collister's conclusions, the court granted the Department discretion to allow visits between C.C. and Lisa in a therapeutic environment.

The jurisdiction hearing on the amended petition began on November 1, 2007. Two allegations were sustained: the first relating to Lisa's use of inappropriate physical discipline (§ 300, subd. (a)); and the second relating to her emotional abuse of C.C. (§ 300, subd. (c)). The court then considered visitation issues. Dr. Correa reiterated her opinion it was premature to force C.C. to visit with Lisa. Pending completion of the hearing, the court suspended those visits. The court also granted Patrick's request that Dr. Collister's raw data be sent to a different psychiatrist for reevaluation.

At the continued hearing on December 17, 2007 Dr. Collister testified regarding his conclusions, stating in part his opinion C.C. had been inappropriately allowed to control visitation, a position that was contributing to his "turmoil." He also restated his concern Patrick had fostered the conflict between Lisa and C.C., even though he acknowledged Patrick's concern C.C. might harm himself or commit suicide. Nonetheless, he discounted Patrick's concerns based on his assessment Patrick demonstrated "passive-aggressive[*1486] personality disorder with paranoid traits." Based on Dr. Collister's testimony, the court ordered a monitored therapeutic visit between Lisa and C.C.

Two weeks later, on January 2, 2008, the Department filed a section 388 petition requesting the court suspend the order for a therapeutic monitored visit, citing Dr. Correa's concern the visit was not in C.C.'s best interest and would seriously undermine the progress he had made with her. The Department submitted an interim report recounting C.C.'s opposition to the visit and his statement that no one believed how much his mother had hurt him. He stated he was happy with his father and his father's new family. On January 16, 2008 the court denied the section 388 petition and ordered therapeutic visitation be set up and implemented at the discretion of Dr. Bruce Derman. On March 6, 2008 the court also ordered conjoint therapy between Lisa and C.C. under the direction of Dr. Derman and, based on what the court understood to be the recommendation of Dr. Derman, authorized the Department to conduct a monitored visit between Lisa and C.C. in a neutral location.

In a report dated April 4, 2008, however, the Department advised the court Dr. Derman had not recommended the Department arrange a monitored visit between Lisa and C.C. In Dr. Derman's view such a visit would be counterproductive absent his participation. Instead, C.C. had made the request, having believed he would not have to talk to his mother if he opted for the monitored visit instead of conjoint therapy. In keeping with this request, the Department recommended one "experimental" monitored visit in a neutral setting to be continued only at the recommendation of Dr. Derman.

By all accounts, the experimental monitored visit was a disaster. The social worker reported Lisa had been resistant and uncooperative during scheduling of the visit and C.C. had participated under protest. Once inside the restaurant (the neutral setting selected by C.C.), he had demanded Lisa admit "all the ways you hurt me" and the names she had called him. Although Lisa tried to answer, C.C. rejected her attempts and asked to leave the restaurant after 15 minutes. He refused to participate in any further visits, even if supervised by Dr. Derman. C.C. had already participated in six conjoint therapy sessions with Lisa and stated he no longer trusted Dr. Derman could change his mother. Based on C.C.'s age, intelligence and consistency, the Department recommended visitation be suspended and C.C. return to individual therapy with Dr. Correa.

Meanwhile, Patrick had submitted Dr. Collister's raw data to a different psychologist for interpretation and review. According to the second psychologist's report, Dr. Collister had misinterpreted and manipulated data. In particular, his assessments of Patrick's and C.C.'s mental states were flawed[*1487] and unduly negative. This different assessment of Patrick's effect on C.C. was supported by Dr. Derman's assertion he had "see[n] no evidence at this time there is any parent alienation being facilitated by the father . . . ."

At the April 16, 2008 hearing, after Dr. Derman acknowledged conjoint therapy would be effective only if C.C. was willing to participate,[2] the court suspended conjoint therapy and set a date for the contested disposition hearing.

On June 9, 2008 the court heard extensive testimony from Dr. Correa. According to Dr. Correa, C.C., then almost 12 years old, intelligent and articulate, was performing well at school and happy with his father's family. He continued to state he did not want to see his mother and did not believe she had changed. Nonetheless, Dr. Correa perceived less hostility from C.C. and more willingness to discuss possible visitation in the future now that he was not being forced to engage with her. She expressed her opinion C.C. would be better equipped and more receptive to reestablishing a relationship with his mother as he aged. Pushed at this point, he was likely to choose resistance and hostility. Based on Dr. Correa's assessment, C.C.'s counsel requested the court find further visitation to be detrimental to C.C. The Department also requested that visitation be terminated.

Based on C.C.'s age, Dr. Derman's ambivalent prognosis and Dr. Correa's testimony, the court found further visitation with Lisa would be detrimental to C.C. and suspended visitation pending a review hearing set for September 26, 2008. The court also expressed doubt about the extent of Lisa's therapeutic progress and ordered Lisa to continue individual therapy and to complete the Department-recommended parenting and anger management programs. Lisa appealed.

While Lisa's appeal was pending, C.C.'s dependency case continued with periodic review hearings until March 11, 2009. At the hearing on that date, the juvenile court entered a family law exit order pursuant to section 362.4 awarding sole legal and physical custody of C.C. to Patrick, authorized monitored visitation between C.C. and Lisa in a therapeutic setting at least once per month and terminated juvenile court jurisdiction.[3]

[*1488] CONTENTIONS

Lisa contends the trial court erred in finding continued visitation with her would be detrimental to C.C. and, in essence, improperly permitted C.C. himself to preclude or veto visitation. She also contends the court erred in failing to order conjoint therapy and reasonable efforts were not made to avoid C.C.'s removal from her home.

Based on the March 11, 2009 order restoring monitored visitation and terminating juvenile court jurisdiction, we asked the parties to advise the court whether the instant appeal has become moot. The Department contends it has. Lisa agrees "the primary issues raised in the appeal" are now moot, but urges us to decide the case nonetheless because of the possibility she will be prejudiced by the court's finding of detriment and order terminating visitation in some collateral proceeding.

DISCUSSION

1. The Termination of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Renders the Case Moot Unless a Potential Exists for Adverse Collateral Consequences

(1) As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. (In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 64].) However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but "must be decided on a case-by-case basis." (In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605 [232 Cal.Rptr. 36]; In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 517-518 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 443]; see In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 747].)

(2) "An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings." (In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684].) In Dylan T. the appellate court concluded the erroneous denial of visitation to an incarcerated parent jeopardized the parent's interests in subsequent proceedings and declined to dismiss the appeal as moot, even though the parent was no longer incarcerated. (Id. at pp. 769-770; see also In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 740 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 448] [servicemember's appeal of court's refusal to stay dependency proceeding not moot even though jurisdiction terminated because his rights had been adversely affected by award of sole custody to mother].)

In this case, not only has the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, but also, in its family law exit order, the court restored Lisa's right to monitored[*1489] visitation with C.C., the very relief she seeks by her appeal.[4] Although the March 11, 2009 exit order would thus seem to doubly moot Lisa's appeal, Lisa contends the finding of detriment upon which the challenged order denying visitation was based creates the possibility of prejudice in subsequent family law proceedings. Lisa's concern is highly speculative. However, in an abundance of caution and because dismissal of the appeal operates as an affirmance of the underlying judgment or order (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 85, 878 P.2d 1297]; County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1005 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 272]), we consider the merits of her appeal.

2. The Juvenile Court's Order Denying Visitation Is Not Supported by the Necessary Finding That Visitation Would Jeopardize C.C.'s Safety

(3) As we emphasized in In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 465] (S.H.), "Visitation is a necessary and integral component of any reunification plan. [Citations.] `An obvious prerequisite to family reunification is regular visits between the noncustodial parent or parents and the dependent children "as frequent[ly] as possible, consistent with the well-being of the minor."'" (Id. at p. 317, fn. omitted.) "[T]he power to decide whether any visitation occurs belongs to the court alone." (Ibid.; accord, In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 861] ["The juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur and may not delegate its power to grant or deny visitation to the [department of social services]."].) "It is the juvenile court's responsibility to ensure regular parent-child visitation occurs while at the same time providing for flexibility in response to the changing needs of the child and to dynamic family circumstances." (S.H., at p. 317.)

Visitation orders made at the time of the dispositional hearing are governed by section 362.1. Subdivision (a)(1)(A) of that section provides, "In order to maintain ties between the parent or guardian and any siblings and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent or guardian, . . . any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall provide as[*1490] follows: [¶] . . . Subject to subparagraph (B), for visitation between the parent or guardian and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child." Subdivision (a)(1)(B) provides, "No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child. . . ."

The juvenile court premised its order suspending visitation on its finding by clear and convincing evidence that further visitation with Lisa would be detrimental to C.C. In the words of the court, "My best judgment is that I am very convinced it would be detrimental to him and not contribute to his well-being or to his making progress in having a relationship with his mother. I don't think I need to find that he'll act out or whether there will be a tantrum or flunking school to find detriment. You have to look at the person . . . [and] the fact that he seems to have . . . regressed in his willingness to consider that mother is changing."

(4) Detriment is a familiar standard in child welfare determinations; but, as several courts have acknowledged, the notion of detriment is at best a nebulous standard that depends on the context of the inquiry. For example, in David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 336], in which the court reversed a finding of detriment based on concerns a parent was too poor to afford housing and lacked appropriate parenting skills, the court explained, "that standard, while vaguely worded to be sure, must be construed as a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member." Rather, the risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child's physical or emotional well-being. (Id. at p. 789; Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 157]; see also In re Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1402 [reversing order based on finding of detriment when agency failed to present evidence child would suffer serious psychological or emotional injury].)

(5) The underpinnings of a finding of detriment should also reflect the particular statutory context in which the finding is made. For instance, under section 361.2, subdivision (a), a child who has been removed from one parent's custody "shall" be placed with the noncustodial parent (if requested) "unless [the court] finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." Clearly, under this statute a court has broad discretion to evaluate not only the child's physical safety but also his or her emotional well-being. In an appropriate case, all that might be required is a finding such a placement would impair the emotional security of the child. (Cf. In re Jacob P. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 819, 829 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 817] ["`The two standards [best[*1491] interest and detriment] are basically two sides of the same coin. What is in the best interests of the child is essentially the same as that which is not detrimental to the child.'"].)

(6) Under section 362.1, subdivision (a), however, visitation with the parent is a mandatory element of the reunification plan with the single exception that "[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B); see S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317 & fn. 9.) In other words, when reunification services have been ordered and are still being provided, as they were in this case, some visitation is mandatory unless the court specifically finds any visitation with the parent would pose a threat to the child's safety.[5] The frequency of such visits, in contrast, depends on a broader assessment by the court of the child's "well-being." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); but see In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 [court may deny parent visitation "if visitation would be harmful to the child's emotional well-being"].)

By way of comparison to the standard set forth in section 362.1, subdivision (a), a dependent child of the juvenile court may be removed from his or her parent's physical custody only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor ..." (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)), a much more comprehensive test for evaluating the parent-child relationship than simply the issue of safety. A comparable standard governs the issue of parental visitation when reunification services are terminated. Although the legislative preference remains for continued parent-child visitation until the hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan pursuant to section 366.26, such visitation may be terminated if the court finds "that visitation would be detrimental to the child." (§§ 366.21, subd. (h), 366.22. subd. (a), 3d par.) Similarly, during the reunification period, sibling visitation may be denied on a finding by the court, based on clear and convincing evidence, "that sibling interaction is detrimental to either child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(2).)

This strict legislative limitation on suspending or denying all parental visitation during the reunification period is no accident: Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to achieve reunification. (See S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317; see generally Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 258, fn. 6 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 511] ["`[a] court construing[*1492] a statute is not authorized to insert qualifying provisions or exceptions not included by the Legislature or to rewrite the statute to conform to some assumed intention that does not appear from its language'"].)

(7) The record in this case reveals the juvenile court made extraordinary efforts to reconcile C.C.'s well-being with Lisa's interest in the "care, custody and companionship" of her child, repeatedly postponing the disposition hearing to allow further therapeutic assessment of the impact of visitation. This is most certainly not a case in which the court improperly delegated the power to grant or deny visitation to the child, as Lisa contends. (Cf. S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317.) To the contrary, the court carefully considered the expert reports and testimony of not only C.C.'s therapist, Dr. Correa, but also Drs. Collister and Derman and the psychologist who reviewed Dr. Collister's report, as well as the reports from Lisa's own therapist and program managers. What is painfully clear from the record is Lisa so impaired the parent-child relationship during the first 10 years of C.C.'s life she is now left with the unenviable task of rebuilding it over the course of many years to come. Moreover, the court circumscribed its order by directing the issue to be revisited three months later at the 12-month review hearing. Presented with a seemingly intractable situation, the juvenile court directed the Department to suspend visitation pending future review hearings and additional therapeutic intervention. Were section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B), to permit a suspension of visitation based on a finding of detriment to the child's overall well-being, we would certainly conclude the court's order was supported by substantial evidence.

It does not, however; and, notwithstanding the court's effort, we cannot tell from the record whether the court's reasoning was properly tethered to the statutory directive mandating parental visitation unless there exists substantial evidence of a threat to the child's safety. There is a reference in the record to Patrick's concern C.C. might harm himself, but this isolated reference does not appear to have been central to the court's reasoning. Nor is there any evidence in the record Lisa presented a threat to C.C.'s physical safety during monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting.

Having concluded the court applied an incorrect standard in making its visitation order at disposition, had visitation not been restored and jurisdiction terminated, we would remand for further findings in accordance with the correct statutory standard. No such remand is necessary under the circumstances here. However, to eliminate even the remote possibility of prejudice to Lisa arising from the adverse finding based on the incorrect standard, we reverse the visitation order of June 9, 2008. (See Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134 [41 Cal.Rptr. 468, 396 P.2d 924] ["Since the basis for that judgment has now disappeared we should `dispose of the case, not[*1493] merely of the appellate proceeding which brought it here.' [Citation.] That result can be achieved by reversing the judgment solely for the purpose of restoring the matter to the jurisdiction of the superior court, with directions to the court to dismiss the proceeding."]; Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 229 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 735]; see generally Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 5:34, p. 5-15.)

DISPOSITION

The June 9, 2008 order of the juvenile court denying visitation is reversed. In light of the subsequent order restoring monitored visitation and terminating juvenile court jurisdiction, no remand for further proceedings is necessary.

Woods, J., and Zelon, J., concurred.

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 In a February 21, 2008 letter to the court, before five of the six conjoint therapy sessions had occurred, Dr. Derman had opined his prognosis would be extremely guarded if he were not able to therapeutically improve C.C.'s negative attitude toward his mother within the next five sessions.
3 Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459, subdivision (a), we take judicial notice of the March 11, 2009 minute order.
4 To the extent Lisa complains the juvenile court's June 9, 2008 disposition order failed to direct Patrick to participate in counseling or parenting programs, she is not an aggrieved party and has no standing to appeal. (See In re D.S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 671, 674 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 450] ["Standing to challenge an adverse ruling is not established merely because a parent takes a position on an issue that affects the minor [citation]; nor can a parent raise the minor's best interest as a basis for standing [citation]. Without a showing that a parent's personal rights are affected by a ruling, the parent does not establish standing. [Citation.] To be aggrieved or affected, a parent must have a legally cognizable interest that is affected injuriously by the juvenile court's decision."].)
5 In a number of situations—for example, if the child has been adjudicated a dependent as a result of severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6))— reunification services, and with them mandatory parental visitation, will be ordered only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c), 2d par.)