7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zap v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626-27 , 66 S. Ct. 1277 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). 2015See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626-27 , 66 S. Ct. 1277 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
Zap v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626-27 , 66 S. Ct. 1277 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). 2015See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626-27 , 66 S. Ct. 1277 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
Acosta v. Stategreen2 sentences2011In order for a defendant to establish a violation of his right to the reasonably effective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, ―he must show (1) that defense counsel was actively representing conflicting interests, and (2) that the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel‘s performance.‖ Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)). 2011See Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 356 (holding that Cuyler standard is proper standard to analyze claims of ineffective assistance because of conflict of interest). ―[A] defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.‖ Cuyler, 446 U.S. 349 -50. ―But until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.‖ Id. at 350. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Younggreen2 sentences1995"A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such a judgment." Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)). 1995“A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such a judgment.” Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Tuan Van Truonggreen2 sentences1995"A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such a judgment." Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)). 1995“A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such a judgment.” Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2011In order for a defendant to establish a violation of his right to the reasonably effective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, ―he must show (1) that defense counsel was actively representing conflicting interests, and (2) that the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel‘s performance.‖ Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Hill
neutral
2 sentences1920Co. v. Hill, 95 Tex. 629 , 69 S. W. 136 , the Supreme Court, in answering certified questions from the First district, said that it was improper for the court to charge the jury that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish the defense of contributory negligence, because such charge was calculated to lead the jury to believe that they should consider alone the evidence offered by defendant upon that issue. 1920Co. v. Hill, 95 Tex. 629 , 69 S. W. 136 , the Supreme Court, in answering certified questions from the First district, said that it was improper for the court to charge the jury that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish the defense of contributory negligence, because such charge was calculated to lead the jury to believe that they should consider alone the evidence offered by defendant upon that issue. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Boswell v. Pannell
green
2 sentences1917Boswell v. Pannell, 107 Tex. 433 , 180 S.W. 593 . 1917Boswell v. Pannell, 107 Tex. 433 , 180 S.W. 593 . | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Phillips v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
green
1 sentence1905A. Anglin, Jr., was guilty of contributory negligence under the law by the court, and herein defined.” In passing upon a • similar charge in the case of the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Hill, 95 Texas, 638 , this court in answer to a certified question said: “If the plaintiffs’ evidence made it necessary that they should explain the conduct of the deceased to exculpate him from the charge of contributory negligence, it was improper for the court to charge the jury that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish the defense of contributory negligence, because such c | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Howard
neutral
1 sentence1905Citing Texas & Pacific Railway v. Reed, 88 Texas, 447 .” But the case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Howard ( 96 Texas, 582 ), is authority for the proposition that such a charge, though erroneous, is not prejudicial provided it be corrected by other parts of the same charge. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Shieder
green
1 sentence1900Even in the Shieder case, 88 Texas, 152 , in which it was finally and distinctly decided that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant to establish the defense of contributory negligence, this language was used: “To the general rule imposing upon the defendant the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence there appear to be, in the very nature of things, two well defined exceptions: First. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.