scope of the arbitration clause in California

2023(Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 744 [order compelling arbitration of sexual assault claim reversed].) “It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that the parties intended and agreed that causes of action arising from such an attack would be within the scope of the arbitration clause.” (Id. at p. 745.) “Where an arbitration clause is part of a contract of adhesion, courts will carefully scrutinize the agreement to assure that the arbitration provisions fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker, or ‘adhering’ party, and are not unduly oppressive or ‘unconscionable.’ ”

2015Thus, [the fact] that the complaint alleges [assault, 10 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and] battery is in itself immaterial; what must be determined is whether the tort claims ‘have their roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the contract.’ ” (Bigler, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 739 .) Relying on RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1511 (RN Solution), decided by our colleagues in Division One, and our Supreme Court’s decision in Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734 (Victoria), Hanson argues that, as a mat

2023Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1 , 24–25 [“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”]; see also Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 247 [“under state law as under federal law, when the allocation of a matter to arbitration or the courts is uncertain, we resolve all doubts in favor

2019(Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 247-248 .) But in the end, a party can be compelled to arbitrate only those issues it has agreed to arbitrate.

2024(Cf. Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157 [FAA demands arbitration notwithstanding possibility of inconsistent rulings involving third parties]; Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 386 [“Any doubts or ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”].) To undermine the preclusion clause, the Gaverts rely upon Civil Code section 3513, which states in part, “a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” “Consistent with this provision, [the Supreme Court has] explained that ‘a party may waive a stat

2017(See McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945 , 951-952, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 627 , 393 P.3d 85 [a provision in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that waives the right to seek public injunctive relief under the UCL and other laws in any forum is unenforceable under California law because it is contrary to public policy]; Sandquist, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 260 , 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 376 P.3d 506 [arbitrator has the power to determine whether an arbitration agreement allows for class arbitration if the agreement allocates the decision to the arbitrator].) Given this, we cannot simply affirm th

2025(Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 62 ; see Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287 , 301; but see Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176, 183, 189 [courts may not infer from an ambiguous agreement that parties have consented to class arbitration].) At the same time, arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion (Lamps Plus v. Varela, supra, 587 U.S. at p. 184 ), and “ ‘a party cannot be required to submit to 11 arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit’ ” (AT&T Techs. v. Communs.

2025(Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 62 ; see Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287 , 301; but see Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176, 183, 189 [courts may not infer from an ambiguous agreement that parties have consented to class arbitration].) At the same time, arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion (Lamps Plus v. Varela, supra, 587 U.S. at p. 184 ), and “ ‘a party cannot be required to submit to 11 arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit’ ” (AT&T Techs. v. Communs.

2014Code, § 1644; see also Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197-1198 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 ] [‘We interpret the intent and scope of the agreement by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was made’].)” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 ].) “Finally, ambiguities in standard form contracts are to be construed against the drafter. [Citations.] This court must apply [the above] basic pr

2014Code, § 1644; see also Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197-1198 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 ] [‘We interpret the intent and scope of the agreement by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was made’].)” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 ].) “Finally, ambiguities in standard form contracts are to be construed against the drafter. [Citations.] This court must apply [the above] basic pr

2014Code, § 1644; see also Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197-1198 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 ] [‘We interpret the intent and scope of the agreement by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was made’].)” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 ].) “Finally, ambiguities in standard form contracts are to be construed against the drafter. [Citations.] This court must apply [the above] basic pr

2014Code, § 1644; see also Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197-1198 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 ] [‘We interpret the intent and scope of the agreement by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was made’].)” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 ].) “Finally, ambiguities in standard form contracts are to be construed against the drafter. [Citations.] This court must apply [the above] basic pr

2023Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479 ; see id. at p. 470 [FAA did not preempt application of California statute where choice-of-law provision stated the contract “ ‘shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located,’ ” which was California].) However, when an agreement is ambiguous as to what law will govern an arbitration agreement otherwise covered by the FAA, “ ‘due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’ ” (Mastrobuono v. Shearson

2021As we pointed out in Volt, when a court interprets such provisions in an agreement covered by the FAA, ‘due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’” (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 62 .) “[T]he best way to harmonize the choice-of-law provision with the arbitration provision,” the Court continued, “is to read ‘the laws of the State of New York’ to encompass substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not to include special rules limiting the authority

2023It is well- established that, “in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, [citation], due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468 , 475–476; Moses H.

2023Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479 ; see id. at p. 470 [FAA did not preempt application of California statute where choice-of-law provision stated the contract “ ‘shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located,’ ” which was California].) However, when an agreement is ambiguous as to what law will govern an arbitration agreement otherwise covered by the FAA, “ ‘due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’ ” (Mastrobuono v. Shearson

2024(Cf. Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157 [FAA demands arbitration notwithstanding possibility of inconsistent rulings involving third parties]; Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 386 [“Any doubts or ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”].) To undermine the preclusion clause, the Gaverts rely upon Civil Code section 3513, which states in part, “a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” “Consistent with this provision, [the Supreme Court has] explained that ‘a party may waive a stat

2024(Cf. Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157 [FAA demands arbitration notwithstanding possibility of inconsistent rulings involving third parties]; Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 386 [“Any doubts or ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”].) To undermine the preclusion clause, the Gaverts rely upon Civil Code section 3513, which states in part, “a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” “Consistent with this provision, [the Supreme Court has] explained that ‘a party may waive a stat

2023(Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 744 [order compelling arbitration of sexual assault claim reversed].) “It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that the parties intended and agreed that causes of action arising from such an attack would be within the scope of the arbitration clause.” (Id. at p. 745.) “Where an arbitration clause is part of a contract of adhesion, courts will carefully scrutinize the agreement to assure that the arbitration provisions fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker, or ‘adhering’ party, and are not unduly oppressive or ‘unconscionable.’ ”

2004Street, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 323 , fn. omitted.) “[I]n applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the [Federal Arbitration Act], [citation], due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, *1112 and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Volt Info.

2022(Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 684 (Coast Plaza); Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 864 .) The trial court did not err because the 19 “items and issues” that Isaac identifies on appeal as being subject to arbitration are (1) items he seeks to relitigate and which are thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) outside the scope of the arbitration clause, or (3) not subject to arbitration because the parties’ designated arbitrator now has a conflict of interest that Daniel has refused to waive.4 4 Furthermore, nearly al

2019(Hayes Children Leasing Co. v. NCR Corp. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 775, 788 ; Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686 .) We resolve any ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause against the party who drafted the agreement.

2015As Pinnacle held, substantive unconscionability does not arise merely because an arbitration clause limits the type of claims subject to arbitration, even if those limitations mean that one party's claims are more likely to fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. ( Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 248-249.) The court did not err in finding the self-help and small claims court exclusions were not unconscionable.

2014“Where as here, the evidence is not in conflict, we review the trial court’s denial of arbitration de novo.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn.) If the allegations are covered by the arbitration clause, then the orders should be reversed and the parties directed to arbitrate their disputes.

2025(Sodexo Management, Inc. v. Detroit Public Schools (E.D.Mich. 2016) 200 F.Supp.3d 679, 689 [applying AAA Rule R-7(c)].) Jeff also lost the right to object to the arbitrator’s authority to grant equitable remedies “because he substantially invoked the machinery of the arbitral forum in asking the arbitrator for relief.” (Douglass v. Serenevision, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 376, 390 (Douglass).) Six days after the arbitrator 11 denied Jeff’s motion to terminate the arbitration, Jeff filed counterclaims in which he requested remedies including reformation of the Operating Agreement.

2025(Sodexo Management, Inc. v. Detroit Public Schools (E.D.Mich. 2016) 200 F.Supp.3d 679, 689 [applying AAA Rule R-7(c)].) Jeff also lost the right to object to the arbitrator’s authority to grant equitable remedies “because he substantially invoked the machinery of the arbitral forum in asking the arbitrator for relief.” (Douglass v. Serenevision, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 376, 390 (Douglass).) Six days after the arbitrator 11 denied Jeff’s motion to terminate the arbitration, Jeff filed counterclaims in which he requested remedies including reformation of the Operating Agreement.

2024(Cf. Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157 [FAA demands arbitration notwithstanding possibility of inconsistent rulings involving third parties]; Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 386 [“Any doubts or ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”].) To undermine the preclusion clause, the Gaverts rely upon Civil Code section 3513, which states in part, “a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” “Consistent with this provision, [the Supreme Court has] explained that ‘a party may waive a stat