scope of the arbitration clause in Alabama

2012Consequently, ‘in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the [Federal Arbitration] Act [ (‘FAA’) ], due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’ Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted).

2012Consequently, ‘in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the [Federal Arbitration] Act [ (‘FAA’) ], due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’ Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted).

2013Only by rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, do we ‘give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind the FAA.’ Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 , 109 S.Ct. at 1256 .” (Footnote omitted.) As Ford articulates, the fundamental reasoning behind this principle is that arbitration agreements are essentially just a species of contract and, “ ‘as with any other contract, the par ties’ intentions control.’ ” 141 F.3d at 247 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 , 105

2013Only by rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, do we ‘give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind the FAA.’ Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 , 109 S.Ct. at 1256 .” (Footnote omitted.) As Ford articulates, the fundamental reasoning behind this principle is that arbitration agreements are essentially just a species of contract and, “ ‘as with any other contract, the par ties’ intentions control.’ ” 141 F.3d at 247 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 , 105

2013Only by rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, do we ‘give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind the FAA.’ Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 , 109 S.Ct. at 1256 .” (Footnote omitted.) As Ford articulates, the fundamental reasoning behind this principle is that arbitration agreements are essentially just a species of contract and, “ ‘as with any other contract, the par ties’ intentions control.’ ” 141 F.3d at 247 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 , 105

2010It is well settled that “ ‘ “[a]rbi-tration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” ’ ” Ex parte Cain, 838 So.2d 1020, 1026 (Ala.2002) (quoting AT & T Techns., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 , 106 S.Ct. 1415 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting in turn United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960))).

2010It is well settled that “ ‘ “[a]rbi-tration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” ’ ” Ex parte Cain, 838 So.2d 1020, 1026 (Ala.2002) (quoting AT & T Techns., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 , 106 S.Ct. 1415 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting in turn United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960))).

2010Scis., 489 U.S. at 475-76 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 ). “ ‘[A]s with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.’ ” McCollough, 776 So.2d at 746 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 , 105 S.Ct. 3346 , 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).

2010However, “ ‘in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the [Federal Arbitration] Act, due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’ ” McCollough, 776 So.2d at 745 (quoting Volt Info.

2010It is well settled that “ ‘ “[a]rbi-tration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” ’ ” Ex parte Cain, 838 So.2d 1020, 1026 (Ala.2002) (quoting AT & T Techns., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 , 106 S.Ct. 1415 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting in turn United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960))).

2010It is well settled that “ ‘ “[a]rbi-tration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” ’ ” Ex parte Cain, 838 So.2d 1020, 1026 (Ala.2002) (quoting AT & T Techns., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 , 106 S.Ct. 1415 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting in turn United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960))).

2007Polaris Sales, 879 So.2d at 1133 . "`When a court construes a contract, "the clear and plain meaning of the terms of the contract are to be given effect, and the parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state."'" H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. Shaner, 940 So.2d 981, 988 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Polaris Sales, 879 So.2d at 1133 , quoting in turn Strickland v. Rahaim, 549 So.2d 58, 60 (Ala.1989)). "`[I]n applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard must be given to the federal po

2007Polaris Sales, 879 So.2d at 1133 . "`When a court construes a contract, "the clear and plain meaning of the terms of the contract are to be given effect, and the parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state."'" H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. Shaner, 940 So.2d 981, 988 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Polaris Sales, 879 So.2d at 1133 , quoting in turn Strickland v. Rahaim, 549 So.2d 58, 60 (Ala.1989)). "`[I]n applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard must be given to the federal po

2006"The scope of the arbitration clause is a question of the intent of the parties." Larkin , 857 So.2d at 103 .

2006"The scope of the arbitration clause is a question of the intent of the parties." Larkin, 857 So.2d at 103 .

2003The Smiths cite United Wisconsin Life Insurance Co. v. Beaty , 775 So.2d 191 (Ala. 2000), to support the proposition that their action falls beyond the scope of the arbitration clause in their insurance policies.

2001The inquiry must, therefore, focus on whether the facts alleged in the complaint as the basis for IMS's tort claims have their "roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the ... agreement." Merrick, 130 Cal.App.3d at 219 , 181 Cal.Rptr. at 534 .

2001The inquiry must, therefore, focus on whether the facts alleged in the complaint as the basis for IMS's tort claims have their "roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the ... agreement." Merrick, 130 Cal.App.3d at 219 , 181 Cal.Rptr. at 534 .

2000Finally, the Morrises cite this Court's opinion in Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc. , 711 So.2d 992 (Ala.), cert. denied sub nom Supervalu Inc. v. Discount Foods, Inc. , 525 U.S. 825 (1998), for the proposition that arbitration provisions in a contract do not extend to disputes that the parties did not agree to arbitrate.

2000Finally, the Morrises cite this Court's opinion in Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 711 So.2d 992 (Ala.), cert. denied sub nom Supervalu Inc. v. Discount Foods, Inc., 525 U.S. 825 , 119 S.Ct. 71 , 142 L.Ed.2d 56 (1998), for the proposition that arbitration provisions in a contract do not extend to disputes that the parties did not agree to arbitrate.

2000Finally, the Morrises cite this Court's opinion in Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc. , 711 So.2d 992 (Ala.), cert. denied sub nom Supervalu Inc. v. Discount Foods, Inc. , 525 U.S. 825 (1998), for the proposition that arbitration provisions in a contract do not extend to disputes that the parties did not agree to arbitrate.

2000Finally, the Morrises cite this Court's opinion in Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 711 So.2d 992 (Ala.), cert. denied sub nom Supervalu Inc. v. Discount Foods, Inc., 525 U.S. 825 , 119 S.Ct. 71 , 142 L.Ed.2d 56 (1998), for the proposition that arbitration provisions in a contract do not extend to disputes that the parties did not agree to arbitrate.

1999The language of the Allstar Court, which confused a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract in general and a claim alleging the nonexistence of an agreement to arbitrate, also seemed to merge the issue of the scope of the arbitration clause and the question of " First Options arbitrability," and it applied the "clear and unmistakable evidence" standard of First Options to both issues, by defining the question of the enforcement of arbitration agreements as equivalent to the question of who determines " First Options arbitrability:" "This view of Prima Paint is the better means of reco

1999The language of the Allstar Court, which confused a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract in general and a claim alleging the nonexistence of an agreement to arbitrate, also seemed to merge the issue of the scope of the arbitration clause and the question of " First Options arbitrability," and it applied the "clear and unmistakable evidence" standard of First Options to both issues, by defining the question of the enforcement of arbitration agreements as equivalent to the question of who determines " First Options arbitrability:" "This view of Prima Paint is the better means of reco

1999Second, by arguing that they were not signatories to the Construction Contract between Beaver and Lakehouse, their corporation, they have conceded that they have no viable individual claims based on the transactions between Beaver and Lakehouse. [4] This argument *166 is substantially the same as the one we rejected in Ex parte Warren, 718 So.2d 45 (Ala.1998), where we stated: "Although the Warrens brought their claims as co-parties to the contract, Mrs. Warren concedes in her brief that she is `not a party to the contract containing the arbitration agreement,' Warren reply brief at 4, and tha