cause for a new hearing in Illinois

2016Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189 , 464 N.E.2d at 1049 .

2016Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189 , 464 N.E.2d at 1049 .

2007In People v. Stark, 33 Ill. 2d 616 (1966), the supreme court remanded the cause for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress when, through no fault of the defendant, there was no transcript of the suppression hearing available in the record on appeal.

2007In People v. Stark, 33 Ill.2d 616 , 213 N.E.2d 503 (1966), the supreme court remanded the cause for a new hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress when, through no fault of the defendant, there was no transcript of the suppression hearing available in the record on appeal.

2009Therefore, "[i]f the court remands the cause for a new hearing, the rights of the parties have not yet been fully and finally adjudicated." Lippert, 273 Ill.App.3d at 153 , 209 Ill.Dec. 921 , 652 N.E.2d 461 , citing Wilkey, 96 Ill.2d at 249-50 , 70 Ill.Dec. 496 , 449 N.E.2d 843 .

2009Therefore, "[i]f the court remands the cause for a new hearing, the rights of the parties have not yet been fully and finally adjudicated." Lippert, 273 Ill.App.3d at 153 , 209 Ill.Dec. 921 , 652 N.E.2d 461 , citing Wilkey, 96 Ill.2d at 249-50 , 70 Ill.Dec. 496 , 449 N.E.2d 843 .

2009Therefore, “[i]f the court remands the cause for a new hearing, the rights of the parties have not yet been fully and finally adjudicated.” Lippert, 273 Ill.

2009Therefore, “[i]f the court remands the cause for a new hearing, the rights of the parties have not yet been fully and finally adjudicated.” Lippert, 273 Ill.

2019In any event, the State did not raise this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) * * * may not raise it in arguing for rehearing." Id. ¶ 23 The State, relying on Vázquez , 2011 IL App (2d) 091155 , 352 Ill.Dec. 996 , 955 N.E.2d 172 , argues that we should remand the cause for a new hearing on the petition to revoke supervision.

2019In any event, the State did not raise this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) *** may not raise it in arguing for rehearing.” Id. ¶ 23 The State, relying on Vázquez, 2011 IL App (2d) 091155 , argues that we should remand the cause for a new hearing on the petition to revoke supervision.

2019In any event, the State did not raise this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) * * * may not raise it in arguing for rehearing." Id. ¶ 23 The State, relying on Vázquez , 2011 IL App (2d) 091155 , 352 Ill.Dec. 996 , 955 N.E.2d 172 , argues that we should remand the cause for a new hearing on the petition to revoke supervision.

2019In any event, the State did not raise this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) *** may not raise it in arguing for rehearing.” Id. ¶ 23 The State, relying on Vázquez, 2011 IL App (2d) 091155 , argues that we should remand the cause for a new hearing on the petition to revoke supervision.

2019Id. at 659, 249 Ill.Dec. 974 , 737 N.E.2d 364 . ¶ 28 We are not immune to the frustration caused by respondent's absence.

2019Id. at 659, 249 Ill.Dec. 974 , 737 N.E.2d 364 . ¶ 28 We are not immune to the frustration caused by respondent's absence.

2015In light of the prior confusion in this case, we remind both the trial court and the parties that, as we have previously vacated the trial court’s August 15, 2012, order, the trial court’s reduction of defendant’s sentence contained in that order is “nullified, canceled, and void.” See In re K.S., 365 Ill.

2015In light of the prior confusion in this case, we remind both the trial court and the parties that, as we have previously vacated the trial court’s August 15, 2012, order, the trial court’s reduction of defendant’s sentence contained in that order is “nullified, canceled, and void.” See In re K.S., 365 Ill.

2007A.V., 285 Ill.

2007A.V., 285 Ill.

2005Evans II, 174 Ill. 2d at 324 .

2005Evans II , 174 Ill. 2d at 324 .

2004The appellate court remanded the cause for a new hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, directing the circuit court to conduct a new discharge hearing thereafter. 335 Ill.

2004The appellate court remanded the cause for a new hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, directing the circuit court to conduct a new discharge hearing thereafter. 335 Ill.

2003In Willis , this court in remanding the cause for a new hearing observed that an attorney forced to argue his own ineffectiveness "must be seen as laboring under divided loyalties." Willis , 134 Ill.

2003In Willis, this court in remanding the cause for a new hearing observed that an attorney forced to argue his own ineffectiveness “must be seen as laboring under divided loyalties.” Willis, 134 Ill.

2023Id. at 826-27 . ¶ 35 In contrast, the record here is devoid of any suggestion that the conduct of the State or the ALJ somehow “lulled” Funk into giving up the right to subpoena witnesses that triggered the court’s waiver review in Ullrich.

2022In re Commitment of Snapp, 2021 IL 126176, ¶ 23 .

2020Id.

2019In any event, the State did not raise this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) * * * may not raise it in arguing for rehearing." Id. ¶ 23 The State, relying on Vázquez , 2011 IL App (2d) 091155 , 352 Ill.Dec. 996 , 955 N.E.2d 172 , argues that we should remand the cause for a new hearing on the petition to revoke supervision.

2019In any event, the State did not raise this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) * * * may not raise it in arguing for rehearing." Id. ¶ 23 The State, relying on Vázquez , 2011 IL App (2d) 091155 , 352 Ill.Dec. 996 , 955 N.E.2d 172 , argues that we should remand the cause for a new hearing on the petition to revoke supervision.

2012Defendant, however, argues in his reply brief that our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590 , 962 N.E.2d 437 , requires us to vacate the fee without remanding the cause for a new hearing. ¶ 39 In Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 3 , 962 N.E.2d at 438 , the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison, and the circuit clerk imposed a $250 public-defender fee.

2012Defendant, however, argues in his reply brief that our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590 , 962 N.E.2d 437 , requires us to vacate the fee without remanding the cause for a new hearing. ¶ 39 In Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 3 , 962 N.E.2d at 438 , the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison, and the circuit clerk imposed a $250 public-defender fee.

2012Defendant, however, argues in his reply brief that our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590 , 962 N.E.2d 437 , requires us to vacate the fee without remanding the cause for a new hearing. ¶ 39 In Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 3 , 962 N.E.2d at 438 , the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison, and the circuit clerk imposed a $250 public-defender fee.

2012Defendant, however, argues in his reply brief that our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590 , 962 N.E.2d 437 , requires us to vacate the fee without remanding the cause for a new hearing. ¶ 39 In Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 3 , 962 N.E.2d at 438 , the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison, and the circuit clerk imposed a $250 public-defender fee.

1994(Tyson, 221 Ill.

1994Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 34-35 , citing People v. Dickerson (1991), 212 Ill.

1994Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 34-35 , citing People v. Dickerson (1991), 212 Ill.

1991It is incumbent upon counsel and courts alike to follow them.” (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 103 , 529 N.E.2d at 221 .) Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas and remand the cause for a new hearing on the motion.

1991It is incumbent upon counsel and courts alike to follow them.” (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 103 , 529 N.E.2d at 221 .) Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas and remand the cause for a new hearing on the motion.

1991(See People v. Nicholl (1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1013-14 , 155 Ill.Dec. 423 , 569 N.E.2d 604 .) We therefore remand this cause for a new hearing on restitution.

1991(See People v. Nicholl (1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1013-14 , 155 Ill.Dec. 423 , 569 N.E.2d 604 .) We therefore remand this cause for a new hearing on restitution.

1990(People v. Hansen (1989), 185 Ill.

1981As in People v. McTush (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 513 , 410 N.E.2d 861 , the crux of the issue here is whether Hill’s in-court identification of defendants was based on an out-of-court line-up identification which was so impermissibly suggestive as to create a substantial risk of irreparable misidentification.

1981As in People v. McTush (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 513 , 410 N.E.2d 861 , the crux of the issue here is whether Hill’s in-court identification of defendants was based on an out-of-court line-up identification which was so impermissibly suggestive as to create a substantial risk of irreparable misidentification.

1981This is precisely the question posited in People v. Puckett (1979), 70 Ill.

1978Of similar import to Samuels are People v. Moore (4th Dist.), 45 Ill.

1978Of similar import to Samuels are People v. Moore (4th Dist.), 45 Ill.