routine defense in Texas

2018Id. at 335 ; see also Torres v. State, 804 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, pet. ref'd) (denying appellant's request for abatement to hold hearing on question of effectiveness of counsel's assistance and stating, “. . . we are not disposed to encourage a practice of disrupting the orderly and prompt flow of direct appeals by what could well become a routine defense practice of seeking such abatement for random trolling of the record for signs of ineffective 2 assistance.”).

2002Id. at 335 ; see also Torres v. State, 804 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990, pet. ref'd) (denying appellant’s request for abatement to hold hearing on question of effectiveness of counsel’s assistance and stating, “... we are not disposed to encourage a practice of disrupting the orderly and prompt flow of direct appeals by what could well become a routine defense practice of seeking such abatement for random trolling of the record for signs of ineffective assistance.”).

2018Id. at 335 ; see also Torres v. State, 804 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, pet. ref'd) (denying appellant's request for abatement to hold hearing on question of effectiveness of counsel's assistance and stating, “. . . we are not disposed to encourage a practice of disrupting the orderly and prompt flow of direct appeals by what could well become a routine defense practice of seeking such abatement for random trolling of the record for signs of ineffective 2 assistance.”).

2002Id. at 335 ; see also Torres v. State, 804 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990, pet. ref'd) (denying appellant’s request for abatement to hold hearing on question of effectiveness of counsel’s assistance and stating, “... we are not disposed to encourage a practice of disrupting the orderly and prompt flow of direct appeals by what could well become a routine defense practice of seeking such abatement for random trolling of the record for signs of ineffective assistance.”).

2018See Pettway v. State, 4 S.W.3d 390 , 391—92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2012Sept. 25, 1997) (stating that a provider’s routine waiver of Medicare copayments may violate the Anti-Kickback Statute because when providers “forgive financial obligations for reasons other than genuine financial hardship of the particular patient, they unlawfully may be inducing the patient to purchase items or services in violation of the anti-kickback statute’s proscription against offering or paying something of value as an inducement to generate business payable by” Medicare). [40] See United States v. Miles , 360 F.3d 472, 480 (5th Cir. 2004). [41] See id. at 480 n.3 (noting the appella

2012Sept. 25, 1997) (stating that a provider’s routine waiver of Medicare copayments may violate the Anti-Kickback Statute because when providers “forgive financial obligations for reasons other than genuine financial hardship of the particular patient, they unlawfully may be inducing the patient to purchase items or services in violation of the anti-kickback statute’s proscription against offering or paying something of value as an inducement to generate business payable by” Medicare). [40] See United States v. Miles , 360 F.3d 472, 480 (5th Cir. 2004). [41] See id. at 480 n.3 (noting the appella

2012Rental Serv., Inc. , 874 F.2d 20 , 29 (1st Cir. 1989). [44] See also United States v. Greber , 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The statute is aimed at the inducement factor.”). [45] See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed.