7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.green2 sentences2012See Greenhaigh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) (holding that the UGIA did not displace the common law distinction between proprietary and governmental functions), superseded by statute as stated in Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1238 . 146 In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court refined the methodology for determining the scope of governmental immunity by considering whether "the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity." See Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37 . 2012See Greenhaigh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) (holding that the UGIA did not displace the common law distinction between proprietary and governmental functions), superseded by statute as stated in Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1238 . 146 In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court refined the methodology for determining the scope of governmental immunity by considering whether "the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity." See Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37 . | 4 | 5 |
DeBry v. Noblegreen2 sentences2016Thus while the Act has in some ways "limited Utah's sovereign immunity," Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 2014 UT 53 , ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 243 , it has in others "extended the scope of governmental immunity far beyond the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity," DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah 1995). 2016Thus while the Act has in some ways ‚limited Utah’s sovereign immunity,‛ Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 2014 UT 53 , ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 243 , it has in others ‚extended the scope of governmental immunity far beyond the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity,‛ DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah 1995). | 4 | 4 |
Greenhalgh v. Payson Citygreen2 sentences2012See Greenhaigh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) (holding that the UGIA did not displace the common law distinction between proprietary and governmental functions), superseded by statute as stated in Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1238 . 146 In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court refined the methodology for determining the scope of governmental immunity by considering whether "the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity." See Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37 . 2012See Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) (holding that the UGIA did not displace the common law distinction between proprietary and governmental functions), superseded by statute as stated in Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1238 . ¶46 In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court refined the methodology for determining the scope of governmental immunity by considering whether “the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity.” See Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236‐37. | 2 | 2 |
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp.green1 sentence2000See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). [4] See, e.g., Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574-76 (Utah 1996) (interpreting discretionary function exception found in subsection 63-30-10(1) and natural condition exception found in subsection 63-30-10(11)); Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502-03 (Utah 1996) (interpreting assault and battery exception found in subsection 63-30-10(2)); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995) (interpreting inspection exception found in subsection 63-30-10(4)). [5] The conclusion that subsection (15) governs this case is also man | 1 | 1 |
NELSON BY AND THROUGH STUCKMAN v. Salt Lake Citygreen1 sentence2000See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). [4] See, e.g., Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574-76 (Utah 1996) (interpreting discretionary function exception found in subsection 63-30-10(1) and natural condition exception found in subsection 63-30-10(11)); Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502-03 (Utah 1996) (interpreting assault and battery exception found in subsection 63-30-10(2)); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995) (interpreting inspection exception found in subsection 63-30-10(4)). [5] The conclusion that subsection (15) governs this case is also man | 1 | 1 |
Tiede v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). [4] See, e.g., Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574-76 (Utah 1996) (interpreting discretionary function exception found in subsection 63-30-10(1) and natural condition exception found in subsection 63-30-10(11)); Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502-03 (Utah 1996) (interpreting assault and battery exception found in subsection 63-30-10(2)); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995) (interpreting inspection exception found in subsection 63-30-10(4)). [5] The conclusion that subsection (15) governs this case is also man | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Schackelgreen2 sentences1999As we stated in DeBry , "the restriction or abolition of an immunity raises no constitutional issue under article I, section 11 because a restriction or an abolition serves only to enhance, not diminish, the rights protected by that provision." 889 P.2d at 436; see also Ross, 920 P.2d at 1169 & n. 4 (Stewart, Assoc. 1999As we stated in DeBry , "the restriction or abolition of an immunity raises no constitutional issue under article I, section 11 because a restriction or an abolition serves only to enhance, not diminish, the rights protected by that provision.” 889 P.2d at 436; see also Ross, 920 P.2d at 1169 & n. 4 (Stewart, Assoc.C.J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Wichita State Universitygreen2 sentences1999See DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440 . [25] Madsen relied on Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 8-12 , 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24 (1976), for the proposition that Article I, section 11 does not make sovereign immunity, as such, unconstitutional under an "open courts" clause. 1999See DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440 . [25] Madsen relied on Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 8-12 , 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24 (1976), for the proposition that Article I, section 11 does not make sovereign immunity, as such, unconstitutional under an "open courts" clause. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Gaufingreen2 sentences1995Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993); J.J.N.P. 1995Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993); J.J.N.P. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Asset Acceptance LLC v. Utah State Treasurer
green
1 sentence2016These pronouncements suggest that the Act has wholly supplanted the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 20140686-CA 18 2016 UT App 25 Asset Acceptance v. Utah State Treasurer garnishment seeking funds belonging to a third party—Asset Acceptance has not sued the State Treasurer. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cope v. Utah Valley State College
green
2 sentences2016Thus while the Act has in some ways ‚limited Utah’s sovereign immunity,‛ Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 2014 UT 53 , ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 243 , it has in others ‚extended the scope of governmental immunity far beyond the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity,‛ DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah 1995). 2016Thus while the Act has in some ways ‚limited Utah’s sovereign immunity,‛ Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 2014 UT 53 , ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 243 , it has in others ‚extended the scope of governmental immunity far beyond the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity,‛ DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah 1995). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Madsen v. Borthick
green
1 sentence1995Madsen I also held that the general principle of governmental immunity did not violate article I, section 11, but the Court did not purport to define the line between governmental immunity and article I, section 11. 658 P.2d at 629 . *434 Parenthetically, we note that in 1987 the Legislature amended the Act by adding § 63-30-2(4)(a), which vastly expanded the scope of the term "governmental function" and therefore the scope of governmental immunity by making all government acts subject to immunity, regardless of whether the actions were deemed "essential," "core," or "uniquely governmental" ac | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Johnson Ex Rel. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp.
green
2 sentences1995The Act did not, however, define the term “governmental function.” See Johnson, 629 P.2d at 433 ; Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980). 1995The Act did not, however, define the term "governmental function." See Johnson, 629 P.2d at 433 ; Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.