scope of governmental immunity in California

2014“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) The first reason for rejecting the county’s argument, then, is that Dinuba simply does not stand for the proposition the county advocates. *1480 Even if we construe the county’s argument to be that the Supreme Court merely implied that the type of remedy at issue here is not damages for purposes of prejudgment in

2014“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) The first reason for rejecting the county’s argument, then, is that Dinuba simply does not stand for the proposition the county advocates. *1480 Even if we construe the county’s argument to be that the Supreme Court merely implied that the type of remedy at issue here is not damages for purposes of prejudgment in

1997Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [ 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 ].) “For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm

1997Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [ 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 ].) “For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm

1997Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [ 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 ].) “For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm

1997Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [ 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 ].) “For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm

1997Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [ 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 ].) “For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm

1997Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [ 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 ].) “For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm

1997(Tower v. Glover (1984) 467 U.S. 914, 920 [ 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2825 , 81 L.Ed.2d 758 ].) The scope of governmental immunity available in a section 1983 action, therefore, depends upon the nature of the governmental duties performed by the defendant.

1997(Tower v. Glover (1984) 467 U.S. 914, 920 [ 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2825 , 81 L.Ed.2d 758 ].) The scope of governmental immunity available in a section 1983 action, therefore, depends upon the nature of the governmental duties performed by the defendant.

1976In Connelly v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 744, 751 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], this court held that the determination by the state Department of Water Resources “to issue flood forecasts is a policy- *792 making function, a discretionary activity within the scope of governmental immunity, while gathering, evaluating and disseminating flood forecast information are administrative or ministerial activities outside the scope of governmental immunity.” Though some time has transpired since the decision in Connelly , we cannot improve upon the accurate description therein of the rationale of

1976In Connelly v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 744, 751 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], this court held that the determination by the state Department of Water Resources “to issue flood forecasts is a policy- *792 making function, a discretionary activity within the scope of governmental immunity, while gathering, evaluating and disseminating flood forecast information are administrative or ministerial activities outside the scope of governmental immunity.” Though some time has transpired since the decision in Connelly , we cannot improve upon the accurate description therein of the rationale of