Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Washington opinions name it 1 courts 2006–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Mooregreen2 sentences2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wash.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 , 127 S.Ct. 2066 , 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context stating, *274 To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington's sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts "intimately related to [the] prior conviction" such as the defendant's community custody status. 159 Wash.2d at 241, 2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context, stating, To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington’s sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts “intimately related to [the] prior conviction” such as the defendant’s community custody status. 159 Wn.2d at 241 (alteration in original) (quoting United Sta | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wash.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 , 127 S.Ct. 2066 , 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context stating, *274 To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington's sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts "intimately related to [the] prior conviction" such as the defendant's community custody status. 159 Wash.2d at 241, 2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context, stating, To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington’s sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts “intimately related to [the] prior conviction” such as the defendant’s community custody status. 159 Wn.2d at 241 (alteration in original) (quoting United Sta | 1 | 4 |
State Oil Co. v. Khanred2 sentences2007See, e.g., id. at 239 n.7 (“Even if we were inclined to agree with the dissent’s unstated assertion that it is only a matter of time before that case is overruled, we are certainly not free to overrule or ignore established Supreme Court precedent.” “ ‘[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 , 118 S. Ct. 275 , 139 L. 2007See, e.g., id. at 239 n.7 (“Even if we were inclined to agree with the dissent’s unstated assertion that it is only a matter of time before that case is overruled, we are certainly not free to overrule or ignore established Supreme Court precedent.” “ ‘[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 , 118 S. Ct. 275 , 139 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortegagreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., State v. Ortega, 120 Wash. App. 165 , 84 P.3d 935 (2004). . . . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortegagreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., State v. Ortega, 120 Wash. App. 165 , 84 P.3d 935 (2004). . . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wash.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 , 127 S.Ct. 2066 , 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context stating, *274 To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington's sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts "intimately related to [the] prior conviction" such as the defendant's community custody status. 159 Wash.2d at 241, 2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context, stating, To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington’s sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts “intimately related to [the] prior conviction” such as the defendant’s community custody status. 159 Wn.2d at 241 (alteration in original) (quoting United Sta | 4 | 2007–2010 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2015The Apprendi Court based the prior- conviction exception to its general rule on Almendarez -Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L. 2015The Apprendi Court based the prior- conviction exception to its general rule on Almendarez -Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L. | 3 | 2007–2015 |
Thomas v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wash.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 , 127 S.Ct. 2066 , 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context stating, *274 To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington's sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts "intimately related to [the] prior conviction" such as the defendant's community custody status. 159 Wash.2d at 241, 2010In State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 (2007), our Supreme Court defined the scope of the prior-conviction exception to the Blakely/Apprendi jury trial requirement in the community custody context, stating, To give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington’s sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior conviction but also those facts “intimately related to [the] prior conviction” such as the defendant’s community custody status. 159 Wn.2d at 241 (alteration in original) (quoting United Sta | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Old Chief v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Ortega's stipulation would have eliminated the statutory language that he agreed was an element: that his convictions were for violating protection orders. ¶ 17 The statute construed in Old Chief made it a crime for a felon to be in possession of a firearm but did not require a specific kind of felony: The statutory language in which the prior-conviction requirement is couched shows no congressional concern with the specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the broad category of qualifying felonies, and Old Chief clearly meant to admit that his fe 2006Ortega’s stipulation would have eliminated the statutory language that he agreed was an element: that his convictions were for violating protection orders. ¶17 The statute construed in Old Chief made it a crime for a felon to be in possession of a firearm but did not require a specific kind of felony: The statutory language in which the prior-conviction requirement is couched shows no congressional concern with the specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the broad category of qualifying felonies, and Old Chief clearly meant to admit that his fel | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Ball
green
1 sentence2007Ball, 127 Wash.App. at 957 n. 1, 113 P.3d 520 . [14] State v. Jones, 159 Wash.2d 231, 241 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006). [15] The Jones Court addressed and concluded that under the prior-conviction exception, the sentencing court could determine, as a "matter of law," whether a defendant was on community custody at the time he committed the current offense because this fact was closely related to and flowed directly from the fact of the prior conviction. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Ball
green
1 sentence2007Ball, 127 Wash.App. at 957 n. 1, 113 P.3d 520 . [14] State v. Jones, 159 Wash.2d 231, 241 , 149 P.3d 636 (2006). [15] The Jones Court addressed and concluded that under the prior-conviction exception, the sentencing court could determine, as a "matter of law," whether a defendant was on community custody at the time he committed the current offense because this fact was closely related to and flowed directly from the fact of the prior conviction. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.