defendant waives error in Texas

2024See Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] pet. ref’d) (“Absent an objection, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental— that is, the error creates egregious harm.”); see also Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim.

2021“Absent an objection, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental—that is, the 3 error creates egregious harm.” Powell, 252 S.W.3d at 744–45 (citing Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d)); see Texas R.

2021“Absent an objection, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental—that is, the 3 error creates egregious harm.” Powell, 252 S.W.3d at 744–45 (citing Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d)); see Texas R.

2014See Powell v. State, 252 S.W.3d 742, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (When no objection regarding an improper judicial comment is made at trial, “a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental—that is, the error creates egregious harm.”).

2021Evid. 103(d); Villareal v. State, 116 S.W.3d 74, 85 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2015Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. refd); Villareal v. State, 116 S.W.3d 74, 85 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2008Ganther v. State , 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref = d); see Beltran v. State , 99 S.W.3d 807 , 811 B 12 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref = d).

2006See Villareal , 116 S.W.3d at 85 ; see also Beltran v. State , 99 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist. 2003, pet. ref = d).

1983Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and cases cited.” (Emphasis ours.) (from opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing). 3 See also Stiggers v. State, 506 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

1982Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and cases cited.

2020See Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tex. Crim.

2016App. P. 33.1(a); Moore v. State, 275 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (noting that the contemporaneous objection requirement encompasses a complaint about a trial court’s remarks that amount to a comment on the evidence); Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (noting that absent an objection to the trial court’s comments, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental).

2013App. P. 33.1(a); Moore v. State, 275 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (noting that the contemporaneous objection requirement encompasses a complaint about a trial court’s remarks that amount to a comment on the evidence); Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (noting that absent an objection to the trial court’s comments, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental).

2014Soliz v. State, 432 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Tex. Crim.

2014Soliz v. State, 432 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Tex. Crim.

2010See, e.g. , Ratsavong v. Menevilay , 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, pet. denied) ("Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed verdict, and proceeds with her own case, waives her motion for directed verdict unless the motion is reurged at the close of her case."); Humes v. Hallmark , 895 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ) (appellant defendant waived complaint that trial court erred in denying directed-verdict motion "because she did not re-

2010See, e.g., Ratsavong v. Menevilay, 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (“Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed 3 The grounds for this motion were that (1) evidence regarding various contracts between Naeem and Majeed established that Naeem controlled the premises and would have any duty to provide security (a contention that Majeed has not brought forward on appeal); and (2) even if Majeed controlled the premises, a third-party criminal act w

2010See, e.g. , Ratsavong v. Menevilay , 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, pet. denied) ("Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed verdict, and proceeds with her own case, waives her motion for directed verdict unless the motion is reurged at the close of her case."); Humes v. Hallmark , 895 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ) (appellant defendant waived complaint that trial court erred in denying directed-verdict motion "because she did not re-

2010See, e.g., Ratsavong v. Menevilay, 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (“Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed 3 The grounds for this motion were that (1) evidence regarding various contracts between Naeem and Majeed established that Naeem controlled the premises and would have any duty to provide security (a contention that Majeed has not brought forward on appeal); and (2) even if Majeed controlled the premises, a third-party criminal act w

2010See, e.g. , Ratsavong v. Menevilay , 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, pet. denied) ("Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed verdict, and proceeds with her own case, waives her motion for directed verdict unless the motion is reurged at the close of her case."); Humes v. Hallmark , 895 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ) (appellant defendant waived complaint that trial court erred in denying directed-verdict motion "because she did not re-

2010See, e.g., Ratsavong v. Menevilay, 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (“Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed 3 The grounds for this motion were that (1) evidence regarding various contracts between Naeem and Majeed established that Naeem controlled the premises and would have any duty to provide security (a contention that Majeed has not brought forward on appeal); and (2) even if Majeed controlled the premises, a third-party criminal act w

2010See, e.g. , Ratsavong v. Menevilay , 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, pet. denied) ("Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed verdict, and proceeds with her own case, waives her motion for directed verdict unless the motion is reurged at the close of her case."); Humes v. Hallmark , 895 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ) (appellant defendant waived complaint that trial court erred in denying directed-verdict motion "because she did not re-

2010See, e.g., Ratsavong v. Menevilay, 176 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (“Texas law is well settled that a defendant who moves for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rests, but thereafter elects not to stand on its motion for instructed 3 The grounds for this motion were that (1) evidence regarding various contracts between Naeem and Majeed established that Naeem controlled the premises and would have any duty to provide security (a contention that Majeed has not brought forward on appeal); and (2) even if Majeed controlled the premises, a third-party criminal act w

2009See Jones v. State , 962 S.W.2d 158, 167 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); Tuffiash v. State , 948 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. ref’d).

2009See Jones v. State, 962 S.W.2d 158, 167 (Tex. App.— Fort W orth 1998, no pet.); 9 Tuffiash v. State, 948 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. ref’d).

2009See Jones v. State, 962 S.W.2d 158, 167 (Tex. App.— Fort W orth 1998, no pet.); 9 Tuffiash v. State, 948 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. ref’d).

2009See Jones v. State , 962 S.W.2d 158, 167 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); Tuffiash v. State , 948 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. ref’d).

2008See Moody v. State , 827 S.W.2d 875, 889 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 889 (Tex. Crim.

1990DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1990DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

2025See Trevino v. State, 470 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (“a defendant waives this error [in amending the indictment] by failing to object to the amendment”); Adams v. State, 179 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (defendant must make timely objection to amended indictment to preserve claim of erroneous amendment on appeal). “[A] defendant cannot fail to object to a defective charging instrument, then be convicted, then later claim that there was error going to trial upon the defective instrument.” State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim

2015Sodipo, 815 S.W.2d at 556 (citing State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Trevino v. State, 470 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (“a defendant waives this error [in amending the indictment] by failing to object to the amendment”); Adams v. State, 179 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (defendant must make timely objection to amended indictment to preserve claim of erroneous amendment on appeal). “[A] defendant cannot fail to object to a defective charging instrument, then be convicted, then later claim that there was error going to trial upon the defective instrument.” State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim

2025See Trevino v. State, 470 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (“a defendant waives this error [in amending the indictment] by failing to object to the amendment”); Adams v. State, 179 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (defendant must make timely objection to amended indictment to preserve claim of erroneous amendment on appeal). “[A] defendant cannot fail to object to a defective charging instrument, then be convicted, then later claim that there was error going to trial upon the defective instrument.” State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim

2024See Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] pet. ref’d) (“Absent an objection, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental— that is, the error creates egregious harm.”); see also Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim.

2020Trejo v. State, 594 S.W.3d 790 , 804 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) citing Taylor v. State, 109 S.W.3d 443 , 449 n.25 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (no reversible error exists where the same evidence or argument is presented elsewhere during trial without objection), and Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 610 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2010), aff’d, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013).

2020See Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622-23 ; see also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 303 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (indicating that the defendant must move for mistrial to preserve error if the State’s argument was so egregious that no instruction to disregard could cure the error). 5 And as the State argues here, a defendant waives error by failing to object to the State’s argument that is substantially the same as that to which the defendant complains of.

2020See Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622-23 ; see also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 303 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (indicating that the defendant must move for mistrial to preserve error if the State’s argument was so egregious that no instruction to disregard could cure the error). 5 And as the State argues here, a defendant waives error by failing to object to the State’s argument that is substantially the same as that to which the defendant complains of.

2019Cf. Drake, 465 S.W.3d at 763 (“Absent an objection, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental--that is, the error creates egregious harm.”) with Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 795-96 (“That Marin leaves no room for a harm-based doctrine of error-preservation is further bolstered by our subsequent caselaw on this subject. . . .

2019Cf. Drake, 465 S.W.3d at 763 (“Absent an objection, a defendant waives error unless the error is fundamental--that is, the error creates egregious harm.”) with Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 795-96 (“That Marin leaves no room for a harm-based doctrine of error-preservation is further bolstered by our subsequent caselaw on this subject. . . .