fraudulent claim in Wisconsin

2025See Baysal, 78 F.4th at 978 (concluding that the alleged fraudulent applications for unemployment benefits did not confer standing in federal court because the appellants did not “contend that knowledge of a driver’s-license number could facilitate such a bogus claim, or indeed that New York State asked for a claimant’s driving information”); see also Greenstein v. Noblr Reciprocal Exch., No. 22-17023, 2024 WL 3886977 , at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2024) (relying on the reasoning that we rely on here under substantively identical facts). ¶13 The insurers also argue that, because the appellants do

2013The Kellner court expressly recognized that Wisconsin law punishes falsely swearing to a notice of claim under Wis. Stat. § 946.32 , the false swearing statute. 16 After its discussion illustrating the solemnity required of an oath or affirmation, the Kellner court stated that a "claimant who makes a fraudulent claim while under oath can be charged with false swearing." 197 Wis. 2d at 194 (emphasis added). ¶ 39.

2007Smith, 239 Wis.2d 646, ¶ 25 , 619 N.W.2d 882 ; Theis, 232 Wis.2d 749, ¶ 30 , 606 N.W.2d 162 ("[T]he purpose for interpreting a `hit-and-run accident' as requiring physical contact between the insured and the unidentified motor vehicle is to prevent a fraudulent claim about a phantom motor vehicle when *406 the insured's loss of control causes the accident.") ¶ 37 The DeHarts argue that since Wisconsin Mutual does not allege that Wendy is guilty of fraud, the purpose of the statute is satisfied without requiring a "hit" to Wendy's vehicle.

2007Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶ 25 ; Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, ¶ 30 ("[T]he purpose for interpreting a 'hit-and-run accident' as requiring physical contact between the insured and the unidentified motor vehicle is to prevent a fraudulent claim about a. phantom motor vehicle when the insured's loss of control causes the accident.") ¶ 37.

1981In this case, however, the two, coupled with substantial evidence of both Mrs. Hawes’ fear for her own safety, see Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, supra, 47 Wis. 2d at 224 , 177 N.W.2d at 85 (discussing Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935)), and a direct causal relationship between the emotional distress and the traumatic collapse of the wall, see Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis.2d 129, 143 , 201 N.W.2d 580, 588 (1972), provide a sufficient basis for the trial court to determine that this was not a fraudulent claim.

1981In this case, however, the two, coupled with substantial evidence of both Mrs. Hawes’ fear for her own safety, see Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, supra, 47 Wis. 2d at 224 , 177 N.W.2d at 85 (discussing Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935)), and a direct causal relationship between the emotional distress and the traumatic collapse of the wall, see Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis.2d 129, 143 , 201 N.W.2d 580, 588 (1972), provide a sufficient basis for the trial court to determine that this was not a fraudulent claim.

1981In this case, however, the two, coupled with substantial evidence of both Mrs. Hawes’ fear for her own safety, see Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, supra, 47 Wis. 2d at 224 , 177 N.W.2d at 85 (discussing Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935)), and a direct causal relationship between the emotional distress and the traumatic collapse of the wall, see Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis.2d 129, 143 , 201 N.W.2d 580, 588 (1972), provide a sufficient basis for the trial court to determine that this was not a fraudulent claim.

1981In this case, however, the two, coupled with substantial evidence of both Mrs. Hawes’ fear for her own safety, see Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, supra, 47 Wis. 2d at 224 , 177 N.W.2d at 85 (discussing Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935)), and a direct causal relationship between the emotional distress and the traumatic collapse of the wall, see Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis.2d 129, 143 , 201 N.W.2d 580, 588 (1972), provide a sufficient basis for the trial court to determine that this was not a fraudulent claim.