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7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–1990 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hutchinsongreen2 sentences1988Further, the Court held in State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138, 143 (1986), that the Alexander instruction could not be recognized as plain error in those cases where it had not been properly preserved at trial. 5 The appellant in this case was convicted on November 17, 1980, and counsel made no objection to the Alexander instruction. 1988Further, the Court held in State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138, 143 (1986), that the Alexander instruction could not be recognized as plain error in those cases where it had not been properly preserved at trial. 5 The appellant in this case was convicted on November 17, 1980, and counsel made no objection to the Alexander instruction. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Alexandergreen2 sentences1988The Alexander instruction takes its name from the case in which it was first discussed, State v. Alexander, 161 W.Va. 776, 780-81 , 245 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1978), and is as follows: "The Court instructs the jury that where the state has established a prima facie case and the defendants rely upon the defense of alibi, the burden is upon them to prove it, not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence, but by such evidence, and to such a degree of certainty, as will, when the whole evidence is considered, create and leave in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the g 1988The Alexander instruction takes its name from the case in which it was first discussed, State v. Alexander, 161 W.Va. 776, 780-81 , 245 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1978), and is as follows: "The Court instructs the jury that where the state has established a prima facie case and the defendants rely upon the defense of alibi, the burden is upon them to prove it, not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence, but by such evidence, and to such a degree of certainty, as will, when the whole evidence is considered, create and leave in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the g | 1 | 2 |
Patterson v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences1986Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).” The Fourth Circuit in Adkins, 674 F.2d at 282 , observed that the burden of persuasion could be shifted to a defendant where he asserts an affirmative defense under Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2325 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 289-91 (1977), and then referred to Patterson’s definition of an affirmative defense as one that “ ‘does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of [the c 1986Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).” The Fourth Circuit in Adkins, 674 F.2d at 282 , observed that the burden of persuasion could be shifted to a defendant where he asserts an affirmative defense under Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2325 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 289-91 (1977), and then referred to Patterson’s definition of an affirmative defense as one that “ ‘does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of [the c | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Wardengreen2 sentences1986See Jones v. Warden, supra, 161 W.Va. at 173, 241 S.E.2d at 916 . 1986See Jones v. Warden, supra, 161 W.Va. at 173, 241 S.E.2d at 916 . | 1 | 1 |
Amos v. Carrgreen2 sentences1986Cf. Amos v. Carr, 170 W.Va. 150, 151 , 291 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1982): “[A] judge should [ordinarily] hear evidence at trial even if he anticipates directing a verdict[,]” rather than granting a motion for summary judgment. 1986Cf. Amos v. Carr, 170 W.Va. 150, 151 , 291 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1982): “[A] judge should [ordinarily] hear evidence at trial even if he anticipates directing a verdict[,]” rather than granting a motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Warden, WV Penitentiarygreen2 sentences1986See Jones v. Warden, supra, 161 W.Va. at 173, 241 S.E.2d at 916 . 1986See Jones v. Warden, supra, 161 W.Va. at 173, 241 S.E.2d at 916 . | 1 | 1 |
Michael Simmons v. Stephen Dalsheimgreen2 sentences1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. 1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Dalsheimgreen2 sentences1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. 1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 402091
green
2 sentences1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. 1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. | 5 | 1983–1988 |
Adkins v. Bordenkircher
green
2 sentences1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. 1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. | 5 | 1983–1988 |
Humphries v. City of Chesapeake
green
2 sentences1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. 1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. | 5 | 1983–1988 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences1983It appears that the court in Adkins , therefore, invalidated the Alexander instruction because it is contrary to the doctrines of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), inasmuch as the court concluded that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the defendant. 3 However, the court in Adkins also made reference in a footnote that the challenged instruction should be struck down, in any event, “[b]ecause t 1983It appears that the court in Adkins , therefore, invalidated the Alexander instruction because it is contrary to the doctrines of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), inasmuch as the court concluded that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the defendant. 3 However, the court in Adkins also made reference in a footnote that the challenged instruction should be struck down, in any event, “[b]ecause t | 3 | 1983–1990 |
State v. Kopa
green
2 sentences1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. 1988We may briefly address the merits of the alibi instruction argument arising from State’s Instruction No. 4. 14 While that instruction does contain some language that is similar to the Alexander instruction 15 condemned in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 , 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), and State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43 , 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), we believe it does have a significant difference. | 3 | 1986–1988 |
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences1986Subsequently, we decided the case of State v. Kopa, supra, and consistent with the holding in Adkins , we held the so-called Alexander instruction to be unconstitutional, as indicated in Syllabus Point 1: “Because of the holding in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 459 U.S. 853 ], 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), State v. Alexander, [ 161 W.Va. 776 ], 245 S.E.2d 633 (1978), is overruled to the extent that it permits the giving of an instruction that places the burden upon the defendant to prove his alibi defense sufficiently to create a reasonable doubt in 1986Subsequently, we decided the case of State v. Kopa, supra, and consistent with the holding in Adkins , we held the so-called Alexander instruction to be unconstitutional, as indicated in Syllabus Point 1: “Because of the holding in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 459 U.S. 853 ], 103 S.Ct. 119 , 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), State v. Alexander, [ 161 W.Va. 776 ], 245 S.E.2d 633 (1978), is overruled to the extent that it permits the giving of an instruction that places the burden upon the defendant to prove his alibi defense sufficiently to create a reasonable doubt in | 3 | 1986–1988 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1983It appears that the court in Adkins , therefore, invalidated the Alexander instruction because it is contrary to the doctrines of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), inasmuch as the court concluded that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the defendant. 3 However, the court in Adkins also made reference in a footnote that the challenged instruction should be struck down, in any event, “[b]ecause t 1983It appears that the court in Adkins , therefore, invalidated the Alexander instruction because it is contrary to the doctrines of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), inasmuch as the court concluded that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the defendant. 3 However, the court in Adkins also made reference in a footnote that the challenged instruction should be struck down, in any event, “[b]ecause t | 2 | 1983–1990 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1983It appears that the court in Adkins , therefore, invalidated the Alexander instruction because it is contrary to the doctrines of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), inasmuch as the court concluded that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the defendant. 3 However, the court in Adkins also made reference in a footnote that the challenged instruction should be struck down, in any event, “[b]ecause t 1983It appears that the court in Adkins , therefore, invalidated the Alexander instruction because it is contrary to the doctrines of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), inasmuch as the court concluded that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the defendant. 3 However, the court in Adkins also made reference in a footnote that the challenged instruction should be struck down, in any event, “[b]ecause t | 2 | 1983–1986 |
State v. Grubbs
green
2 sentences1988We have dealt with Alexander instructions since Kopa in the following cases: State v. Fisher, 179 W.Va. 516 , 370 S.E.2d 480 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811 , 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987); Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986); State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986); State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984). 17 . 1988We have dealt with Alexander instructions since Kopa in the following cases: State v. Fisher, 179 W.Va. 516 , 370 S.E.2d 480 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811 , 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987); Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986); State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986); State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984). 17 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Fisher
green
2 sentences1988We have dealt with Alexander instructions since Kopa in the following cases: State v. Fisher, 179 W.Va. 516 , 370 S.E.2d 480 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811 , 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987); Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986); State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986); State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984). 17 . 1988We have dealt with Alexander instructions since Kopa in the following cases: State v. Fisher, 179 W.Va. 516 , 370 S.E.2d 480 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811 , 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987); Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986); State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986); State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984). 17 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Morrison v. Holland
neutral
2 sentences1988We have dealt with Alexander instructions since Kopa in the following cases: State v. Fisher, 179 W.Va. 516 , 370 S.E.2d 480 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811 , 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987); Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986); State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986); State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984). 17 . 1988We have dealt with Alexander instructions since Kopa in the following cases: State v. Fisher, 179 W.Va. 516 , 370 S.E.2d 480 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811 , 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987); Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986); State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172 , 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986); State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984). 17 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences1983In Bowman , after an extensive historical survey of United States Supreme Court precedent, we utilized the retroactivity doctrine as set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and its progeny. 1983In Bowman , after an extensive historical survey of United States Supreme Court precedent, we utilized the retroactivity doctrine as set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and its progeny. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. O'CONNELL
green
2 sentences1983In Bowman , we held, inter alia, that the invalidation of instructions under the concepts contained in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, and State v. O’Connell, 163 W.Va. 366 , 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), was not to be given full retroactive application. 6 In so holding, the threshold step of the analysis in Bowman was to distinguish the type of instruction invalidated under Sandstrom with those instructions invalidated under the landmark cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, and State v. Pendry, supra. 7 The holdings of Mullaney and Pendry were given full retroactive effect in the cases of Hankerson v. N 1983In Bowman , we held, inter alia, that the invalidation of instructions under the concepts contained in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, and State v. O’Connell, 163 W.Va. 366 , 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), was not to be given full retroactive application. 6 In so holding, the threshold step of the analysis in Bowman was to distinguish the type of instruction invalidated under Sandstrom with those instructions invalidated under the landmark cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, and State v. Pendry, supra. 7 The holdings of Mullaney and Pendry were given full retroactive effect in the cases of Hankerson v. N | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hankerson v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1983In Bowman , we held, inter alia, that the invalidation of instructions under the concepts contained in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, and State v. O’Connell, 163 W.Va. 366 , 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), was not to be given full retroactive application. 6 In so holding, the threshold step of the analysis in Bowman was to distinguish the type of instruction invalidated under Sandstrom with those instructions invalidated under the landmark cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, and State v. Pendry, supra. 7 The holdings of Mullaney and Pendry were given full retroactive effect in the cases of Hankerson v. N 1983In Bowman , we held, inter alia, that the invalidation of instructions under the concepts contained in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, and State v. O’Connell, 163 W.Va. 366 , 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), was not to be given full retroactive application. 6 In so holding, the threshold step of the analysis in Bowman was to distinguish the type of instruction invalidated under Sandstrom with those instructions invalidated under the landmark cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, and State v. Pendry, supra. 7 The holdings of Mullaney and Pendry were given full retroactive effect in the cases of Hankerson v. N | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ronald Maurice Stump v. John Bennett, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, Fort Madison, Iowa
green
2 sentences1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. 1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bowman v. Leverette
green
2 sentences1983Inasmuch as the court in Adkins failed to address the retroactivity of its decision with respect to the Alexander instruction, we must determine whether our holding in the present case will be given full retroactive application. 5 The most recent pronouncement by this Court concerning the retroactivity of decisions invalidating instructions given in a *50 criminal trial is found in Bowman v. Leverette, 169 W.Va. 589 , 289 S.E.2d 435 (1982). 1983Inasmuch as the court in Adkins failed to address the retroactivity of its decision with respect to the Alexander instruction, we must determine whether our holding in the present case will be given full retroactive application. 5 The most recent pronouncement by this Court concerning the retroactivity of decisions invalidating instructions given in a *50 criminal trial is found in Bowman v. Leverette, 169 W.Va. 589 , 289 S.E.2d 435 (1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Younger v. Superior Court of California
green
2 sentences1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. 1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Johnson
red
2 sentences1983For a discussion by the United States Supreme Court of current retroactivity tenets see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). 10 Because the instruction in the case before us is distinguishable from the Mullaney v. Wilbur type instruction, the retroactivity principles as set forth in Bowman must be applied to determine whether our decision with respect to the invalidation of the Alexander instruction should be given full retroactive effect. 1983For a discussion by the United States Supreme Court of current retroactivity tenets see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). 10 Because the instruction in the case before us is distinguishable from the Mullaney v. Wilbur type instruction, the retroactivity principles as set forth in Bowman must be applied to determine whether our decision with respect to the invalidation of the Alexander instruction should be given full retroactive effect. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gadsden v. Home Fertilizer & Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. 1983See also Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1983); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 , 89 S.Ct. 483 , 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). 4 *49 The instructions in the case before us, when read as a whole, clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving every element of the crime with which the appellant was charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellant was presumed to be innocent. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.