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7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lemoi v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence1985Compare Lemoi v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., R.I., 453 A.2d 758, 760 (1982) (denied “stacking” of medical-payment benefits under one policy covering two vehicles for which separate premiums were paid, where policy’s limitation of liability clause stated: “The affording of insurance to more than one person or to more than one automobile ... shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company’s liability.”), with Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 164-65 , 183 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1971) (allowed “stacking” of medical-payment benefits under one policy covering t | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Wolfegreen2 sentences1985Compare Lemoi v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., R.I., 453 A.2d 758, 760 (1982) (denied “stacking” of medical-payment benefits under one policy covering two vehicles for which separate premiums were paid, where policy’s limitation of liability clause stated: “The affording of insurance to more than one person or to more than one automobile ... shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company’s liability.”), with Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 164-65 , 183 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1971) (allowed “stacking” of medical-payment benefits under one policy covering t 1985Compare Lemoi v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., R.I., 453 A.2d 758, 760 (1982) (denied “stacking” of medical-payment benefits under one policy covering two vehicles for which separate premiums were paid, where policy’s limitation of liability clause stated: “The affording of insurance to more than one person or to more than one automobile ... shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company’s liability.”), with Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 164-65 , 183 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1971) (allowed “stacking” of medical-payment benefits under one policy covering t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2017Beginning with this Court’s decision in Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 175 W.Va. 337 , 332 S.E.2d 639 (1985), the validity of anti-stacking language in an insurance policy has been settled: A limitation of liability clause within an automobile liability insurance policy which limits coverage for any one occurrence, regardless of the number of covered vehicles, does not violate any applicable insurance statute or regulation, and there is no judicial policy that prevents an insurer from so limiting its liability and yet collecting a premium for each covered vehicle because each 2017Beginning with this Court’s decision in Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 175 W.Va. 337 , 332 S.E.2d 639 (1985), the validity of anti-stacking language in an insurance policy has been settled: A limitation of liability clause within an automobile liability insurance policy which limits coverage for any one occurrence, regardless of the number of covered vehicles, does not violate any applicable insurance statute or regulation, and there is no judicial policy that prevents an insurer from so limiting its liability and yet collecting a premium for each covered vehicle because each | 5 | 1994–2017 |
Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2017In Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, 188 W.Va. 81 , 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992), we resolved the related and specifically apposite issue of whether a policy providing for underinsurance coverage for two sep *303 arate vehicles that contained anti-stacking language was enforceable. 2017In Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, 188 W.Va. 81 , 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992), we resolved the related and specifically apposite issue of whether a policy providing for underinsurance coverage for two sep *303 arate vehicles that contained anti-stacking language was enforceable. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Payne v. Weston
green
2 sentences1997In the case at hand the policy issued to the plaintiff contained the following provision: “The insuring of more than one person or vehicle under this policy does not increase our Underinsured Motorists payment limits.” This provision “reasonably cannot be subject to divergent interpretations.” Payne 195 W.Va. at 509 , 466 S.E.2d at 168 . 1997In the case at hand the policy issued to the plaintiff contained the following provision: “The insuring of more than one person or vehicle under this policy does not increase our Underinsured Motorists payment limits.” This provision “reasonably cannot be subject to divergent interpretations.” Payne 195 W.Va. at 509 , 466 S.E.2d at 168 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1991Id. 345 N.W.2d at 426 . 1991Id. 345 N.W.2d at 426 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence1991Id. at 247 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1985The appellant's argument that two of his vehicles, not just one, were "involved in the accident” is, as shown above, not established factually and is invalid as a matter of law because only one vehicle was involved in the collision, the event which is the "accident" or "occurrence” for purposes of limitation of liability. 9 .Thus, Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 157 W.Va. 623 , 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974), is distinguishable. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People ex rel. Jackson v. Morhous
neutral
1 sentence1985The appellant’s reliance on Loerzel v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., 281 A.D. 735 , 118 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y.App. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Loerzel v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1985The appellant’s reliance on Loerzel v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., 281 A.D. 735 , 118 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y.App. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence1985The appellant's argument that two of his vehicles, not just one, were "involved in the accident” is, as shown above, not established factually and is invalid as a matter of law because only one vehicle was involved in the collision, the event which is the "accident" or "occurrence” for purposes of limitation of liability. 9 .Thus, Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 157 W.Va. 623 , 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974), is distinguishable. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.