7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paintiff v. City of Parkersburggreen2 sentences2020Thereafter, in Paintiff, this Court gave full voice to the injustice underlying application, strict or otherwise, of the locality rule: “The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert medical testimony] difficult or impossible to obtain.” 176 W. 2007In formally rejecting the locality rule, [6] this Court was emphatic in stating: "The trial court should not have excluded their testimony either because they were not general surgeons or because they were unfamiliar with the peculiarities of surgical practice in Parkersburg." Paintiff, 176 W.Va. at 471 , 345 S.E.2d at 566 . | 3 | 3 |
Thornton v. CAMC, ETC.green2 sentences2020Va. 360, 368-69 , 305 S.E.2d 316, 325 (1983), the Court noted in dicta that the locality rule had been “virtually abandoned” in Hundley. 1994Thornton uses the following language: "if an out-of-state physician testifies about a `standard [that] is uniform throughout the country; and, that he is familiar with that standard, his testimony is admissible in a malpractice case.'" Id. at 369 , 305 S.E.2d at 325-26 (footnote omitted and citing syl. pt. 6, Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977 , 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967) in which we virtually abandon the locality rule). | 2 | 3 |
Hundley v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2007As we explained in Paintiff , the locality rule was a means of exempting "`[d]octors living and practicing in rural areas'" of this state from being "`expected to possess the same degree of medical knowledge as . . . their urban counterparts.'" 176 W.Va. at 471 , 345 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Hundley, 151 W.Va. 977 [, 990], 158 S.E.2d 159 [167]). [6] We observed in Paintiff that the Court had "effectively emasculated the `locality rule' in the case of Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977 , 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967)." 176 W.Va. at 471 , 345 S.E.2d at 566 . [7] During oral argument, Appellant stated that 2007As we explained in Paintiff , the locality rule was a means of exempting "`[d]octors living and practicing in rural areas'" of this state from being "`expected to possess the same degree of medical knowledge as . . . their urban counterparts.'" 176 W.Va. at 471 , 345 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Hundley, 151 W.Va. 977 [, 990], 158 S.E.2d 159 [167]). [6] We observed in Paintiff that the Court had "effectively emasculated the `locality rule' in the case of Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977 , 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967)." 176 W.Va. at 471 , 345 S.E.2d at 566 . [7] During oral argument, Appellant stated that | 1 | 4 |
Dye v. Corbingreen2 sentences2020The locality rule, a fixture in our medical malpractice jurisprudence for close to a hundred years, held in relevant part that a physician was “only required to exercise such reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence as are ordinarily possessed and exercised by the average of the members of the profession in good standing, in similar localities[.]” Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. 2020The locality rule, a fixture in our medical malpractice jurisprudence for close to a hundred years, held in relevant part that a physician was “only required to exercise such reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence as are ordinarily possessed and exercised by the average of the members of the profession in good standing, in similar localities[.]” Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. | 1 | 1 |
Arbogast v. Mid-Ohio Valley Medical Corp.green2 sentences2007See Paintiff v. City of Parkersburg, 176 W.Va. 469 , 345 S.E.2d 564 (1986) (abolishing use of "locality rule" in medical malpractice cases); accord Arbogast v. Mid-Ohio Valley Medical Corp., 214 W.Va. 356, 360-61 , 589 S.E.2d 498, 502-03 (2003). 2007See Paintiff v. City of Parkersburg, 176 W.Va. 469 , 345 S.E.2d 564 (1986) (abolishing use of "locality rule" in medical malpractice cases); accord Arbogast v. Mid-Ohio Valley Medical Corp., 214 W.Va. 356, 360-61 , 589 S.E.2d 498, 502-03 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Finding that the abolition of the locality rule had been presaged in Thornton, see note 3 supra, and further that “we had 4 entirely abolished the locality rule for nursing malpractice” in Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W. 1986Our explicit overruling of the locality rule today was presaged in the case of Thornton v. CAMC, 172 W.Va. 360 , 305 S.E.2d 316 (1983) in which the plaintiff assigned as error several defense instructions on the medical standard of care which contained the phrase “in accord with reasonable care and diligence as practiced by accredited physicians and surgeons in a locality similar to that in which defendant Pushkin’s services were rendered.” In that case, Justice Miller pointed out that we had “virtually abandoned” the locality rule in Hundley, supra, and that we had entirely abolished the loca | 3 | 1983–2020 |
Hinkle v. Martin
green
2 sentences1983Both Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482 , 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979), and Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission, 167 W.Va. 318 , 280 S.E.2d 101 (1981), refer to Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400 , 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965), in which the similar locality rule is stated. 1983Both Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482 , 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979), and Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission, 167 W.Va. 318 , 280 S.E.2d 101 (1981), refer to Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400 , 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965), in which the similar locality rule is stated. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Schroeder v. Adkins
green
2 sentences1983Both Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482 , 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979), and Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission, 167 W.Va. 318 , 280 S.E.2d 101 (1981), refer to Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400 , 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965), in which the similar locality rule is stated. 1983Both Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482 , 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979), and Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission, 167 W.Va. 318 , 280 S.E.2d 101 (1981), refer to Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400 , 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965), in which the similar locality rule is stated. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission
green
2 sentences1983Both Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482 , 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979), and Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission, 167 W.Va. 318 , 280 S.E.2d 101 (1981), refer to Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400 , 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965), in which the similar locality rule is stated. 1983Both Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482 , 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979), and Brown v. Bluefield Municipal Building Commission, 167 W.Va. 318 , 280 S.E.2d 101 (1981), refer to Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400 , 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965), in which the similar locality rule is stated. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Charley v. Cameron
green
2 sentences1982The reasonable physician or national standard is exemplified in Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750 , 528 P.2d 1205 (1974), where in syllabus point 1 the court held: “Where disclosures of possible results of medical or surgical procedures have been made to a patient and are ascertainable, expert medical testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish that they were insufficient to accord with disclosures made by reasonable medical practitioners under the same or like circumstances.” *464 On the other hand, the community or local practice standard “... established the duty of the physician by the o 1982The reasonable physician or national standard is exemplified in Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750 , 528 P.2d 1205 (1974), where in syllabus point 1 the court held: “Where disclosures of possible results of medical or surgical procedures have been made to a patient and are ascertainable, expert medical testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish that they were insufficient to accord with disclosures made by reasonable medical practitioners under the same or like circumstances.” *464 On the other hand, the community or local practice standard “... established the duty of the physician by the o | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.