locality rule in Tennessee

2015Id. at 722 (excluding the expert‟s testimony after concluding that he failed to satisfy the requirements of the locality rule).

2011Malp.3d § 3.5 (updated 2010), and from courts, see, e.g., Robinson, 83 S.W.3d at 724 ("[W]e encourage the General Assembly to reconsider the current statutory framework of the locality rule.”); Carpenter v. Klepper, 205 S.W.3d 474, 484 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) ("The legislatively mandated ‘similar locality rule’ has long since outlived its usefulness,” and "We ... implore the Legislature to relegate the ‘similar locality rule’ to the 'ash heap’ of history.”); see also Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.

2012Estate of French, 333 S.W.3d at 562 (quoting Sutphin v. Platt, 720 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1986); Conley v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 236 S.W.3d 713, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

2011See Conley, 236 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Sutphin, 720 S.W.2d at 457 (“The United States of America fails to qualify as ‘a particular geographic region.’ ”)); Hawkins v. Hendersonville Operating Co., 364 N.C. 434 , 690 S.E.2d 35, 40 (App.2010) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the standard of care under federal nursing home regulations, because to admit it would violate the locality rule in North Carolina medical malpractice actions).

2025The trial court also denied a request from Ms. Bowen to continue the case 4 As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, “the locality rule requires that the claimant [in a medical negligence claim] demonstrate ‘[t]he recognized standard of acceptable professional practice . . . in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community.’” Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527, 552 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (a)(1)). 5 The trial court stated that it relied on the defendants’ memorandum of law and “the entire record in this cause” when it determined the te

2025Thus, “[i]n evaluating an expert, the trial court must also consider the requirements of the locality rule.” Thibault, 2022 WL 14162828 at *4 (citing Shipley, 350 S.W.3d at 551 ). “[T]he locality rule requires that the claimant demonstrate ‘[t]he recognized standard of acceptable professional practice . . . in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community.’” Shipley, 350 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (a)(1)).

2011In Bravo v. Sumner Reg’l Health Sys., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 357 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003), the defendant, a doctor practicing in Galla-tin, argued that the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert, who practiced in Georgia, did not satisfy the requirements of the locality rule.

2011In Bravo v. Sumner Reg’l Health Sys., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), the defendant, a doctor practicing in Gallatin, argued that the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert, who practiced in Georgia, did not satisfy the requirements of the locality rule.

2011In Carpenter v. Klepper, 205 S.W.3d 474 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006), the court held that two expert medical witnesses called to testify by the defendants were not qualified under the locality rule.

2011Malp.3d § 3.5 (updated 2010), and from courts, see, e.g., Robinson, 83 S.W.3d at 724 ("[W]e encourage the General Assembly to reconsider the current statutory framework of the locality rule.”); Carpenter v. Klepper, 205 S.W.3d 474, 484 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) ("The legislatively mandated ‘similar locality rule’ has long since outlived its usefulness,” and "We ... implore the Legislature to relegate the ‘similar locality rule’ to the 'ash heap’ of history.”); see also Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.

2010If the plaintiff is attempting to prove the standard of care under the second option, that is, that the expert is familiar with the standard of care in a similar community, the 'similar community, must be “shown to he similar to the defendant’s community.” Id. at 724 (emphasis original); see also Mahon v. Jackson-Madison County General Hosp., 968 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (“A plaintiff who chooses to prove the standard of care in a similar community must prove that community is similar to the one in which the defendant practices.”) “Establishing the similarities in communities is as m

2010If the plaintiff is attempting to prove the standard of care under the second option, that is, that the expert is familiar with the standard of care in a similar community, the similar community, must be " shown to be similar to the defendant's community." Id. at 724 (emphasis original); see also Mabon v. Jackson-Madison County General Hosp., 968 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) ("A plaintiff who chooses to prove the standard of care in a similar community must prove that community is similar to the one in which the defendant practices.") "Establishing the similarities in communities is as m

2012Estate of French, 333 S.W.3d at 562 (quoting Sutphin v. Platt, 720 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1986); Conley v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 236 S.W.3d 713, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

2011See Conley, 236 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Sutphin, 720 S.W.2d at 457 (“The United States of America fails to qualify as ‘a particular geographic region.’ ”)); Hawkins v. Hendersonville Operating Co., 364 N.C. 434 , 690 S.E.2d 35, 40 (App.2010) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the standard of care under federal nursing home regulations, because to admit it would violate the locality rule in North Carolina medical malpractice actions).

2005Underwood v. Waterslides of Mid-America, Inc. 823 S.W.2d 171, 182-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Anthony v. Felknor & Cunningham, C.A.

1994The Dooley Court said that “once a duty is established, the scope of the duty or the standard of care is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.” This Court in Underwood v. WaterSlides of Mid-America, Inc., et al., 823 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn.App.1991) rejected a strict locality rule for establishing the standard of care for engineers.

2011In 1975, the Tennessee General Assembly codified what we now refer to as the “locality rule” when it enacted the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975. 23 As a result, the locality rule became a “creature of statute,” Chapman v. Bearfield, 207 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tenn.2006), and the “hallmark of medical malpractice cases.” Andrew T.

2011In 1975, the Tennessee General Assembly codified what we now refer to as the “locality rule” when it enacted the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975.23 As a result, the locality rule became a “creature of statute,” Chapman v. Bearfield, 207 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tenn. 2006), and the “hallmark of medical malpractice cases.” Andrew T.

2011Cf. Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tenn.2010); Nichols v. Jack Cooper Transp.

2011Cf. Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tenn. 2010); Nichols v. Jack Cooper Transp.

2011A year later, in Stovall v. Clarke, this Court considered the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of two medical malpractice defendants and provided further guidance regarding the application of the locality rule. 113 S.W.3d 715, 722-23 (Tenn.2003).

2011A year later, in Stovall v. Clarke, this Court considered the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of two medical malpractice defendants and provided further guidance regarding the application of the locality rule. 113 S.W.3d 715, 722-23 (Tenn. 2003).

1986Although cases decided prior to the enactment of T.C.A. § 29-26-115(b) indicated that the locality rule had been somewhat eroded, McCay v. Mitchell, 62 Tenn.App. 424 , 463 S.W.2d 710 (1970), this statute reaffirmed that the locality rule was still the measure for the competency of a witness in a malpractice case.

1986Although cases decided prior to the enactment of T.C.A. § 29-26-115(b) indicated that the locality rule had been somewhat eroded, McCay v. Mitchell, 62 Tenn.App. 424 , 463 S.W.2d 710 (1970), this statute reaffirmed that the locality rule was still the measure for the competency of a witness in a malpractice case.

2012See Ward, 206 S.W.3d at 37 .

2011King, Jr., The Standard of Care and Informed Consent Under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, 44 Tenn. L.Rev. 225, 256-57 (1977); see, e.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880) (overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 , 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)). 6 As our society became more interconnected with improved transportation and communications, the strict locality rule gave way to a more relaxed modified locality rule in many states, including Tennessee.

2011King, Jr., The Standard of Care and Informed Consent Under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, 44 Tenn. L.Rev. 225, 256-57 (1977); see, e.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880) (overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 , 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)). 6 As our society became more interconnected with improved transportation and communications, the strict locality rule gave way to a more relaxed modified locality rule in many states, including Tennessee.

2011We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation in Totty v. Thompson, 121 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003), that “[f]ew areas of American Jurisprudence have been more challenging through the years than the development of the standard of care applicable in medical malpractice cases.” This Court first considered a challenge to the qualifications of a claimant’s expert under the locality rule in Searle v. Bryant, 713 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn.1986).

2011We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation in Totty v. Thompson, 121 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), that “[f]ew areas of American Jurisprudence have been more challenging through the years than the development of the standard of care applicable in medical malpractice cases.” This Court first considered a challenge to the qualifications of a claimant’s expert under the locality rule in Searle v. Bryant, 713 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. 1986).

2011King, Jr., The Standard of Care and Informed Consent Under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, 44 Tenn. L.Rev. 225, 256-57 (1977); see, e.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880) (overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 , 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)). 6 As our society became more interconnected with improved transportation and communications, the strict locality rule gave way to a more relaxed modified locality rule in many states, including Tennessee.

2011Rev. 225 , 256-57 (1977); see, e.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880) (overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793,798 (Mass. 1968)).6 As our society became more interconnected with improved transportation and communications, the strict locality rule gave way to a more relaxed modified locality rule in many states, including Tennessee.

2011Roberts v. Bicknell, 73 S.W.3d 106, 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added).

2011Id.; see also Roberts, 73 S.W.3d at 113 .

2011See Conley, 236 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Sutphin, 720 S.W.2d at 457 (“The United States of America fails to qualify as ‘a particular geographic region.’ ”)); Hawkins v. Hendersonville Operating Co., 364 N.C. 434 , 690 S.E.2d 35, 40 (App.2010) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the standard of care under federal nursing home regulations, because to admit it would violate the locality rule in North Carolina medical malpractice actions).

2011See Conley, 236 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Sutphin, 720 S.W.2d at 457 (“The United States of America fails to qualify as ‘a particular geographic region.’ ”)); Hawkins v. Hendersonville Operating Co., 364 N.C. 434 , 690 S.E.2d 35, 40 (App.2010) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the standard of care under federal nursing home regulations, because to admit it would violate the locality rule in North Carolina medical malpractice actions).

2011Ass’n, 276 Md. 187 , 349 A.2d 245, 252 (1975) (reviewing rationales for locality rules and a national standard of medical care, and concluding that "justification for the locality rules no longer exists”). .

2011Ass’n, 276 Md. 187 , 349 A.2d 245, 252 (1975) (reviewing rationales for locality rules and a national standard of medical care, and concluding that "justification for the locality rules no longer exists”). .

2010Grisham, 2009 WL 275667 at *3 (holding that the expert did not meet the locality requirement when he 6 There is an exception to the requirement for expert proof when the “alleged acts of negligence are so obvious that they come within the common knowledge of laymen.” Kennedy v. Holder, 1 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

2010To testify as a medical expert, “[e]xpert witnesses may not simply assert their familiarity with the standard of professional care in the defendant’s community without indicating the basis for their familiarity.” Williams v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 545, 553 (Tenn.2006) (citations omitted).