6 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., Inc.green1 sentence2017See, e.g., Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co. , 680 So.2d 245 , 249 (Ala. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2006As our recent opinion in Madix, Inc. v. Champion, 927 So.2d 838 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), holds, a judgment awarding workers’ compensation benefits based upon a cumulative-stress disorder or a gradual deterioration cannot properly be affirmed when the testimony of the pertinent medical experts establishes “no more than a ‘possibility’ that [an employee’s] employment contributed to [the employee’s] injuries” so as to simply “ ‘ “guess” the employer into liability.’ ” 927 So.2d at 838 (quoting Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc., 547 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)). 2006As our recent opinion in Madix, Inc. v. Champion, 927 So.2d 833 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), holds, a judgment awarding workers' compensation benefits based upon a cumulative-stress disorder or a gradual deterioration cannot properly be affirmed when the testimony of the pertinent medical experts establishes "no more than a `possibility' that [an employee's] employment contributed to [the employee's] injuries" so as to simply "`"guess" the employer into liability.'" 927 So.2d at 838 (quoting Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc., 547 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)). | 1 | 1 |
West v. Rambogreen2 sentences2004See generally West v. Rambo, 786 So.2d 1138 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (applying appellate review standard of "plain and palpable" error as to a trial court's findings of fact based on its receipt of ore tenus testimony); Hinds v. Hinds, 887 So.2d 267, 272-73 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (note 2 and accompanying text). 2004See generally West v. Rambo , 786 So.2d 1138 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (applying appellate review standard of "plain and palpable" error as to a trial court's findings of fact based on its receipt of ore tenus testimony); Hinds v. Hinds , 887 So.2d 267 , 272-73 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (note 2 and accompanying text). | 1 | 1 |
Hinds v. Hindsgreen2 sentences2004See generally West v. Rambo, 786 So.2d 1138 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (applying appellate review standard of "plain and palpable" error as to a trial court's findings of fact based on its receipt of ore tenus testimony); Hinds v. Hinds, 887 So.2d 267, 272-73 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (note 2 and accompanying text). 2004See generally West v. Rambo , 786 So.2d 1138 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (applying appellate review standard of "plain and palpable" error as to a trial court's findings of fact based on its receipt of ore tenus testimony); Hinds v. Hinds , 887 So.2d 267 , 272-73 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (note 2 and accompanying text). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Braswell v. Braswell
green
2 sentences2008Frequent disruptions are to be condemned."' Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d at 865 -66 (quoting Wood v. Wood , 333 So.2d 826 , 828 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976)). 6 In his special writing in Smith v. Smith , 865 So.2d 1207 , 1211 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., concurring specially), Justice Murdock, then serving as a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals, discussed how the overwhelming-necessity standard began in the Court of Civil Appeals "merely as the appellate-review standard that must be met to overcome the `ore tenus presumption' in favor of a trial court's judgment where the evidence is presented 2003The court then proceeded to articulate a truncated version of the standard explained in more detail in Ex parte McLendon , asserting something that was not stated in Ex parte McLendon , namely, that the Ex parte McLendon standard was merely the "overwhelming-necessity" standard "[p]ut another way." Braswell , 460 So.2d at 1341 . | 2 | 2003–2008 |
Smith v. Smith
green
2 sentences2008Frequent disruptions are to be condemned."' Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d at 865 -66 (quoting Wood v. Wood , 333 So.2d 826 , 828 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976)). 6 In his special writing in Smith v. Smith , 865 So.2d 1207 , 1211 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., concurring specially), Justice Murdock, then serving as a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals, discussed how the overwhelming-necessity standard began in the Court of Civil Appeals "merely as the appellate-review standard that must be met to overcome the `ore tenus presumption' in favor of a trial court's judgment where the evidence is presented 2008Frequent disruptions are to be condemned."' Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d at 865 -66 (quoting Wood v. Wood , 333 So.2d 826 , 828 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976)). 6 In his special writing in Smith v. Smith , 865 So.2d 1207 , 1211 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., concurring specially), Justice Murdock, then serving as a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals, discussed how the overwhelming-necessity standard began in the Court of Civil Appeals "merely as the appellate-review standard that must be met to overcome the `ore tenus presumption' in favor of a trial court's judgment where the evidence is presented | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wood v. Wood
green
1 sentence2008Frequent disruptions are to be condemned."' Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d at 865 -66 (quoting Wood v. Wood , 333 So.2d 826 , 828 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976)). 6 In his special writing in Smith v. Smith , 865 So.2d 1207 , 1211 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., concurring specially), Justice Murdock, then serving as a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals, discussed how the overwhelming-necessity standard began in the Court of Civil Appeals "merely as the appellate-review standard that must be met to overcome the `ore tenus presumption' in favor of a trial court's judgment where the evidence is presented | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ex Parte McLendon
green
1 sentence2008Frequent disruptions are to be condemned."' Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d at 865 -66 (quoting Wood v. Wood , 333 So.2d 826 , 828 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976)). 6 In his special writing in Smith v. Smith , 865 So.2d 1207 , 1211 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Murdock, J., concurring specially), Justice Murdock, then serving as a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals, discussed how the overwhelming-necessity standard began in the Court of Civil Appeals "merely as the appellate-review standard that must be met to overcome the `ore tenus presumption' in favor of a trial court's judgment where the evidence is presented | 1 | 2008–2008 |
KGS Steel, Inc. v. McInish
green
1 sentence2006"Assuming, without deciding, that the holding in Melton is consistent with the evidentiary standard set forth in § 25-5-81(c) and the appellate-review standard indicated in Ex parte Russell Corp., supra , the expert evidence upon which McInish urges reliance plainly does not amount to evidence of `probable' causation." 47 So.3d at 754 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lamar International, Inc. v. Atlantic Thread & Supply Co.
neutral
2 sentences2006As our recent opinion in Madix, Inc. v. Champion, 927 So.2d 838 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), holds, a judgment awarding workers’ compensation benefits based upon a cumulative-stress disorder or a gradual deterioration cannot properly be affirmed when the testimony of the pertinent medical experts establishes “no more than a ‘possibility’ that [an employee’s] employment contributed to [the employee’s] injuries” so as to simply “ ‘ “guess” the employer into liability.’ ” 927 So.2d at 838 (quoting Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc., 547 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)). 2006As our recent opinion in Madix, Inc. v. Champion, 927 So.2d 838 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), holds, a judgment awarding workers’ compensation benefits based upon a cumulative-stress disorder or a gradual deterioration cannot properly be affirmed when the testimony of the pertinent medical experts establishes “no more than a ‘possibility’ that [an employee’s] employment contributed to [the employee’s] injuries” so as to simply “ ‘ “guess” the employer into liability.’ ” 927 So.2d at 838 (quoting Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc., 547 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Madix, Inc. v. Champion
green
2 sentences2006As our recent opinion in Madix, Inc. v. Champion, 927 So.2d 833 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), holds, a judgment awarding workers' compensation benefits based upon a cumulative-stress disorder or a gradual deterioration cannot properly be affirmed when the testimony of the pertinent medical experts establishes "no more than a `possibility' that [an employee's] employment contributed to [the employee's] injuries" so as to simply "`"guess" the employer into liability.'" 927 So.2d at 838 (quoting Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc., 547 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)). 2006As our recent opinion in Madix, Inc. v. Champion, 927 So.2d 833 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), holds, a judgment awarding workers' compensation benefits based upon a cumulative-stress disorder or a gradual deterioration cannot properly be affirmed when the testimony of the pertinent medical experts establishes "no more than a `possibility' that [an employee's] employment contributed to [the employee's] injuries" so as to simply "`"guess" the employer into liability.'" 927 So.2d at 838 (quoting Hammons v. Roses Stores, Inc., 547 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ex Parte Russell Corporation
green
2 sentences2006Assuming, without deciding, that the holding in Melton is consistent with the evidentiary standard set forth in § 25-5-81(c) and the appellate-review standard indicated in Ex parte Russell Corp., supra, the expert evidence upon which Mclnish urges reliance plainly does not amount to evidence of “probable” causation. 2006Assuming, without deciding, that the holding in Melton is consistent with the evidentiary standard set forth in § 25-5-81(c) and the appellate-review standard indicated in Ex parte Russell Corp., supra , the expert evidence upon which McInish urges reliance plainly does not amount to evidence of "probable" causation. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gray v. Gray
neutral
2 sentences2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). 2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bianco v. Graham
green
2 sentences2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). 2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Snead v. Snead
neutral
2 sentences2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). 2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Skipper v. Skipper
green
2 sentences2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). 2003Gray , 45 Ala. App. at 332 , 230 So.2d 243 (relying upon Skipper v. Skipper , 280 Ala. 506 , 195 So.2d 797 (Ala. 1967), Snead v. Snead , 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1966), and Bianco v. Graham , 268 Ala. 385 , 106 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1958)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Mashatt v. Mashatt
green
1 sentence1987Mashatt v. Mashatt , 469 So.2d 607 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.