period prescribed rule in Alabama

1989In Pharr Beck v. Bachelor , 3 Ala. 237 , 244 (1841), it was stated: "In an action upon a verbal contract, time is considered in general as forming no material part of the issue; it is therefore allowable for the pleader to assign one time to a given fact, and prove another.

1989In McDade v. State , 20 Ala. 81 , 82 (1852), our Supreme Court stated: "The general rule requires the pleader to state some time when the offence was committed, within the period prescribed as a bar to the prosecution; but it is too well settled now to be questioned, that where the time is averred under a videlicet, the prosecutor is not held to proof of it as laid, but may prove that the offense was committed at any time before the finding of the indictment, and within the period prescribed as a bar." In this case, the indictment alleged that the robbery occurred "on or about January 17, 1988

1952To rationalize further, “the law of charitable uses does not protect a gift for a charitable purpose, made to take effect after a gift to an individual, upon a condition not necessarily to be fulfilled within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities.” In re Potts’ Will, 205 App.Div. 147 , 199 N.Y.S. 880, 883 ; Attorney General v. Gill, 2 P.Wms. 369; In re Johnson’s Trusts, 2 L.R.Eq. 716; Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 ; Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414 , 62 A. 647 , 3 L.R.A., N.S., 1143, 111 Am.St.Rep. 632 , 6 Ann.Cas. 646; Perry on Trusts(6th Ed.), 736.

1952To rationalize further, “the law of charitable uses does not protect a gift for a charitable purpose, made to take effect after a gift to an individual, upon a condition not necessarily to be fulfilled within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities.” In re Potts’ Will, 205 App.Div. 147 , 199 N.Y.S. 880, 883 ; Attorney General v. Gill, 2 P.Wms. 369; In re Johnson’s Trusts, 2 L.R.Eq. 716; Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 ; Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414 , 62 A. 647 , 3 L.R.A., N.S., 1143, 111 Am.St.Rep. 632 , 6 Ann.Cas. 646; Perry on Trusts(6th Ed.), 736.

1952To rationalize further, “the law of charitable uses does not protect a gift for a charitable purpose, made to take effect after a gift to an individual, upon a condition not necessarily to be fulfilled within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities.” In re Potts’ Will, 205 App.Div. 147 , 199 N.Y.S. 880, 883 ; Attorney General v. Gill, 2 P.Wms. 369; In re Johnson’s Trusts, 2 L.R.Eq. 716; Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 ; Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414 , 62 A. 647 , 3 L.R.A., N.S., 1143, 111 Am.St.Rep. 632 , 6 Ann.Cas. 646; Perry on Trusts(6th Ed.), 736.

1952To rationalize further, “the law of charitable uses does not protect a gift for a charitable purpose, made to take effect after a gift to an individual, upon a condition not necessarily to be fulfilled within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities.” In re Potts’ Will, 205 App.Div. 147 , 199 N.Y.S. 880, 883 ; Attorney General v. Gill, 2 P.Wms. 369; In re Johnson’s Trusts, 2 L.R.Eq. 716; Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 ; Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414 , 62 A. 647 , 3 L.R.A., N.S., 1143, 111 Am.St.Rep. 632 , 6 Ann.Cas. 646; Perry on Trusts(6th Ed.), 736.

1952To rationalize further, “the law of charitable uses does not protect a gift for a charitable purpose, made to take effect after a gift to an individual, upon a condition not necessarily to be fulfilled within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities.” In re Potts’ Will, 205 App.Div. 147 , 199 N.Y.S. 880, 883 ; Attorney General v. Gill, 2 P.Wms. 369; In re Johnson’s Trusts, 2 L.R.Eq. 716; Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 ; Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414 , 62 A. 647 , 3 L.R.A., N.S., 1143, 111 Am.St.Rep. 632 , 6 Ann.Cas. 646; Perry on Trusts(6th Ed.), 736.

1952To rationalize further, "the law of charitable uses does not protect a gift for a charitable purpose, made to take effect after a gift to an individual, upon a condition not necessarily to be fulfilled within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities." In re Potts' Will, 205 App.Div. 147 , 199 N.Y.S. 880, 883 ; Attorney General v. Gill, 2 P.Wms. 369; In re Johnson's Trusts, 2 L.R.Eq. 716; Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 ; Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414 , 62 A. 647 , 3 L.R.A., N.S., 1143, 111 Am.St.Rep. 632 , 6 Ann.Cas. 646; Perry on Trusts (6th Ed.), 736.

1894Whenever such manifest inequity does not appear, “a case does not fall within the operation of the rule, if the suit is for the recovery of property, real or personal, unless it is apparent on the face of the bill, that for the period prescribed as a bar to the corresponding legal remedies, there has been a possession hostile to the title the complainants asserts.” — Shorter v. Smith, 56 Ala. 208 ; Scruggs v. Decatur M. & L.

1894Co., 86 Ala. 173 . 2.

1878So it has also been decided, that a charge is erroneous based upon a hypothetical state of facts, not including proof of venue, and the commission of the offense, within the period prescribed as a bar to its prosecution. — Farrall v. The State, 32 Ala. 557 ; Henry v. The State, 36 Ala. 268 . 2.

1878So it has also been decided, that a charge is erroneous based upon a hypothetical state of facts, not including proof of venue, and the commission of the offense, within the period prescribed as a bar to its prosecution. — Farrall v. The State, 32 Ala. 557 ; Henry v. The State, 36 Ala. 268 . 2.

1876A case does not fall within the operation of this rule, if the suit is for the recovery of property, real or personal, unless it is apparent, on the face of the bill, that for the period prescribed as a bar to corresponding legal remedies there has been a possession hostile to the title the complainants assert. — Edsell v. Buchanan, 2 Vesey, 83; Brooks v. Gibbons, 4 Paige, 374 . 2.

1860The modern English doctrine, authorizing the presumption of a right to lights after an undisturbed enjoyment of them for the period prescribed as a bar to actions for the recovery of land, must not be confounded with the common-law title by prescription, which depended on immemorial usage.— 19 Wend. 312 ; 16 Ill. 217, 221 .