chosen standard in Arizona

1983The majority of the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), relying upon Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), makes it clear that a state's chosen standard must be measured against the federal "fundamental fairness" doctrine embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

1983The majority of the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), relying upon Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), makes it clear that a state's chosen standard must be measured against the federal "fundamental fairness" doctrine embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

2023Therefore, “there is no violation of due process . . . and no cause to claim that channeling evidence on mental disease and capacity offends any ‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). ¶41 Here, as in Clark, the trial court had “good reasons” to preclude expert and lay witness testimony about Cruz’s intellectual disability as irrelevant or alternatively as inadmissible because of a danger of confusion under Rule 403, see supra ¶¶ 19–28.

2017We cannot say the prosecutor’s comments did more than criticize the plausibility of Risner’s chosen defense. ¶12 Finally, while a prosecutor cannot “convey his personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431 , 441, ¶ 54 (2003) (citing State v. White, 115 Ariz. 199, 204 (1977)), he may certainly comment on a witness’s bias or prejudice, or lack thereof, see, e.g., State v. Herrera, 203 Ariz. 131, 137, ¶ 17 (App. 2002); State v. Nilsen, 134 Ariz. 433, 435 (App. 1982).

2017We cannot say the prosecutor’s comments did more than criticize the plausibility of Risner’s chosen defense. ¶12 Finally, while a prosecutor cannot “convey his personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431 , 441, ¶ 54 (2003) (citing State v. White, 115 Ariz. 199, 204 (1977)), he may certainly comment on a witness’s bias or prejudice, or lack thereof, see, e.g., State v. Herrera, 203 Ariz. 131, 137, ¶ 17 (App. 2002); State v. Nilsen, 134 Ariz. 433, 435 (App. 1982).

2017We cannot say the prosecutor’s comments did more than criticize the plausibility of Risner’s chosen defense. ¶12 Finally, while a prosecutor cannot “convey his personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431 , 441, ¶ 54 (2003) (citing State v. White, 115 Ariz. 199, 204 (1977)), he may certainly comment on a witness’s bias or prejudice, or lack thereof, see, e.g., State v. Herrera, 203 Ariz. 131, 137, ¶ 17 (App. 2002); State v. Nilsen, 134 Ariz. 433, 435 (App. 1982).

2007They may either obtain with probable cause a sample of blood drawn for another reason, as for example, blood drawn for a suspect’s medical treatment, or they may draw a suspect’s blood pursuant to a search warrant. 196 Ariz. at 612, ¶ 12 , 2 P.3d at 1257 (emphasis added).

2007They may either obtain with probable cause a sample of blood drawn for another reason, as for example, blood drawn for a suspect’s medical treatment, or they may draw a suspect’s blood pursuant to a search warrant. 196 Ariz. at 612, ¶ 12 , 2 P.3d at 1257 (emphasis added).