Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
51 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lombardigreen2 sentences2007See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 523 , 795 N.E.2d 208, 221 (2003) (“where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments”). “[T]he penalty contained in the armed violence statute is *** designed to achieve the legislature’s goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons during the commission of a felony.” People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 472 , 705 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1998), overruled on other grounds, People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 , 839 N.E.2d 492, 5 2007See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 523 , 795 N.E.2d 208, 221 (2003) (“where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments”). “[T]he penalty contained in the armed violence statute is *** designed to achieve the legislature’s goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons during the commission of a felony.” People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 472 , 705 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1998), overruled on other grounds, People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 , 839 N.E.2d 492, 5 | 12 | 39 |
People v. Mossgreen2 sentences2007See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 523 , 795 N.E.2d 208, 221 (2003) (“where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments”). “[T]he penalty contained in the armed violence statute is *** designed to achieve the legislature’s goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons during the commission of a felony.” People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 472 , 705 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1998), overruled on other grounds, People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 , 839 N.E.2d 492, 5 2007See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 523 , 795 N.E.2d 208, 221 (2003) (“where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments”). “[T]he penalty contained in the armed violence statute is *** designed to achieve the legislature’s goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons during the commission of a felony.” People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 472 , 705 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1998), overruled on other grounds, People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 , 839 N.E.2d 492, 5 | 4 | 5 |
People v. Koppagreen2 sentences1999As previously noted, where statutes serve different purposes, we presume the legislature considered different factors in determining the penalties and defer to its judgment (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 476 , 705 N.E.2d at 99 ), because the legislature “is more aware of the evils confronting our society [than the courts] and therefore is more capable of measuring the seriousness of various offenses.” People v. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d 159, 171 , 703 N.E.2d 91, 98 (1998). 1999As previously noted, where statutes serve different purposes, we presume the legislature considered different factors in determining the penalties and defer to its judgment (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 476 , 705 N.E.2d at 99 ), because the legislature “is more aware of the evils confronting our society [than the courts] and therefore is more capable of measuring the seriousness of various offenses.” People v. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d 159, 171 , 703 N.E.2d 91, 98 (1998). | 3 | 6 |
People v. Steppangreen2 sentences1995Because the statutes have different purposes, it is presumed that the legislature considered different factors in enacting each penalty provision. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389 , 92 Ill.Dec. 226 , 484 N.E.2d 1081 ; Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 321 , 85 Ill.Dec. 495 , 473 N.E.2d 1300 .) We believe the imposition of greater sentences for stalking reflects the seriousness of the offense and is reasonably designed to remedy the evils of stalking and its attendant social repercussions. 1995Because the statutes have different purposes, it is presumed that the legislature considered different factors in enacting each penalty provision. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389 , 92 Ill.Dec. 226 , 484 N.E.2d 1081 ; Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 321 , 85 Ill.Dec. 495 , 473 N.E.2d 1300 .) We believe the imposition of greater sentences for stalking reflects the seriousness of the offense and is reasonably designed to remedy the evils of stalking and its attendant social repercussions. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Sharpegreen2 sentences2007See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 523 , 795 N.E.2d 208, 221 (2003) (“where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments”). “[T]he penalty contained in the armed violence statute is *** designed to achieve the legislature’s goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons during the commission of a felony.” People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 472 , 705 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1998), overruled on other grounds, People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 , 839 N.E.2d 492, 5 2007See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 523 , 795 N.E.2d 208, 221 (2003) (“where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments”). “[T]he penalty contained in the armed violence statute is *** designed to achieve the legislature’s goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons during the commission of a felony.” People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 472 , 705 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1998), overruled on other grounds, People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 , 839 N.E.2d 492, 5 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Austingreen2 sentences2004See Austin, 349 Ill.App.3d at 772-73 , 285 Ill.Dec. 768 , 812 N.E.2d 588 ; see also Cosby, 305 Ill.App.3d at 226 , 238 Ill.Dec. 513 , 711 N.E.2d 1174 (legislature is more aware of evils confronting society and thus is more capable of measuring seriousness of particular offenses than is reviewing court); Townsend, 275 Ill.App.3d at 419 , 211 Ill.Dec. 286 , 654 N.E.2d 1096 (when offenses are distinct, legislature is "fully within its power to punish these offenses differently"). 2004See Austin, 349 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hickmangreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 170-73 (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravated 1998See, e.g. , Koppa , 184 Ill. 2d at ___ (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey , 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee , 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravate | 2 | 2 |
People v. Leegreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 170-73 (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravated 1998See, e.g. , Koppa , 184 Ill. 2d at ___ (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey , 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee , 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravate | 2 | 2 |
People v. Balesgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 170-73 (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravated 1998See, e.g. , Koppa , 184 Ill. 2d at ___ (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey , 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee , 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravate | 2 | 2 |
People v. Baileygreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 170-73 (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravated 1998See, e.g. , Koppa , 184 Ill. 2d at ___ (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey , 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. Lee , 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravate | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cosbygreen2 sentences2004See Austin, 349 Ill.App.3d at 772-73 , 285 Ill.Dec. 768 , 812 N.E.2d 588 ; see also Cosby, 305 Ill.App.3d at 226 , 238 Ill.Dec. 513 , 711 N.E.2d 1174 (legislature is more aware of evils confronting society and thus is more capable of measuring seriousness of particular offenses than is reviewing court); Townsend, 275 Ill.App.3d at 419 , 211 Ill.Dec. 286 , 654 N.E.2d 1096 (when offenses are distinct, legislature is "fully within its power to punish these offenses differently"). 2004See Austin, 349 Ill.App.3d at 772-73 , 285 Ill.Dec. 768 , 812 N.E.2d 588 ; see also Cosby, 305 Ill.App.3d at 226 , 238 Ill.Dec. 513 , 711 N.E.2d 1174 (legislature is more aware of evils confronting society and thus is more capable of measuring seriousness of particular offenses than is reviewing court); Townsend, 275 Ill.App.3d at 419 , 211 Ill.Dec. 286 , 654 N.E.2d 1096 (when offenses are distinct, legislature is "fully within its power to punish these offenses differently"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Walden
red
2 sentences2004See Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 476 (explaining that with respect to offenses that are enacted for “different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the penalties for them, and we defer to [that legislative] judgment”); see also Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 523 ; Walden, 199 Ill. 2d at 395 . 2004See Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 476 , 235 Ill.Dec. 478 , 705 N.E.2d 91 (explaining that with respect to offenses that are enacted for "different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the penalties for them, and we defer to [that legislative] judgment"); see also Moss, 206 Ill.2d at 523 , 276 Ill.Dec. 855 , 795 N.E.2d 208 ; Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 395 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 . | 6 | 2003–2004 |
People v. Arnold
green
2 sentences2004Regarding the first prong, "it is well settled that if the statutory purposes are different, comparative proportionality review is inappropriate. [Citation.] This is true because, where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in crafting the respective punishments, and we therefore defer to the legislature's judgment." Arnold , 349 Ill. 2004Regarding the first prong, “it is well settled that if the statutory purposes are different, comparative proportionality review is inappropriate. [Citation.] This is true because, where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in crafting the respective punishments, and we therefore defer to the legislature’s judgment.” Arnold, 349 Ill. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2003It is well settled that if the statutory purposes are different, comparative proportionality review is inappropriate (Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 506 ) because, where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments, and we defer to the legislature’s judgment (Walden, 199 Ill. 2d at 395 ; Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 476 ). 2003It is well settled that if the statutory purposes are different, comparative proportionality review is inappropriate ( Davis , 177 Ill. 2d at 506 ) because, where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments, and we defer to the legislature's judgment ( Walden , 199 Ill. 2d at 395 ; Lombardi , 184 Ill. 2d at 476 ). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Wisslead
green
2 sentences1995Because the statutes have different purposes, it is presumed that the legislature considered different factors in enacting each penalty provision. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389 , 92 Ill.Dec. 226 , 484 N.E.2d 1081 ; Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 321 , 85 Ill.Dec. 495 , 473 N.E.2d 1300 .) We believe the imposition of greater sentences for stalking reflects the seriousness of the offense and is reasonably designed to remedy the evils of stalking and its attendant social repercussions. 1995Because the statutes have different purposes, it is presumed that the legislature considered different factors in enacting each penalty provision. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389 , 92 Ill.Dec. 226 , 484 N.E.2d 1081 ; Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 321 , 85 Ill.Dec. 495 , 473 N.E.2d 1300 .) We believe the imposition of greater sentences for stalking reflects the seriousness of the offense and is reasonably designed to remedy the evils of stalking and its attendant social repercussions. | 2 | 1993–1995 |
People v. Green
green
1 sentence2007Even assuming defendant was committing a felony when he drove his car without a license, the armed violence statute would not cause defendant to contemplate that he “better not do so while armed.” Cf. Green, 301 Ill. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Townsend
green
2 sentences2004See Austin, 349 Ill.App.3d at 772-73 , 285 Ill.Dec. 768 , 812 N.E.2d 588 ; see also Cosby, 305 Ill.App.3d at 226 , 238 Ill.Dec. 513 , 711 N.E.2d 1174 (legislature is more aware of evils confronting society and thus is more capable of measuring seriousness of particular offenses than is reviewing court); Townsend, 275 Ill.App.3d at 419 , 211 Ill.Dec. 286 , 654 N.E.2d 1096 (when offenses are distinct, legislature is "fully within its power to punish these offenses differently"). 2004See Austin, 349 Ill.App.3d at 772-73 , 285 Ill.Dec. 768 , 812 N.E.2d 588 ; see also Cosby, 305 Ill.App.3d at 226 , 238 Ill.Dec. 513 , 711 N.E.2d 1174 (legislature is more aware of evils confronting society and thus is more capable of measuring seriousness of particular offenses than is reviewing court); Townsend, 275 Ill.App.3d at 419 , 211 Ill.Dec. 286 , 654 N.E.2d 1096 (when offenses are distinct, legislature is "fully within its power to punish these offenses differently"). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. James
green
1 sentence1995One might easily conclude that it is more serious for the offender to intend to shoot at a victim, unexpectedly and without notice, than it is for the offender to intend to threaten or intimidate someone, even if the threat involves the firing of a weapon.” James, 246 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Wisslead
green
1 sentence1995Because the statutes have different purposes, it is presumed that the legislature considered different factors in enacting each penalty provision. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389 , 92 Ill.Dec. 226 , 484 N.E.2d 1081 ; Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 321 , 85 Ill.Dec. 495 , 473 N.E.2d 1300 .) We believe the imposition of greater sentences for stalking reflects the seriousness of the offense and is reasonably designed to remedy the evils of stalking and its attendant social repercussions. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.