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6 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Britagreen2 sentences2005See also State v. Brita, 154 Ariz. 517, 521 , 744 P.2d 429, 433 (App.1987), approved in part and vacated in part, 158 Ariz. 121 , 761 P.2d 1025 (1988) ("defendant's blood was not part of a sample taken for medical reasons in accordance with [former] A.R.S. § 28-692(M)"). [6] Nor does the state contend Blakely does not apply to Arizona's treatment of aggravating sentencing factors under A.R.S. § 13-702 in noncapital cases. 2005See also State v. Brita, 154 Ariz. 517, 521 , 744 P.2d 429, 433 (App.1987), approved in part and vacated in part, 158 Ariz. 121 , 761 P.2d 1025 (1988) ("defendant's blood was not part of a sample taken for medical reasons in accordance with [former] A.R.S. § 28-692(M)"). [6] Nor does the state contend Blakely does not apply to Arizona's treatment of aggravating sentencing factors under A.R.S. § 13-702 in noncapital cases. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Britagreen2 sentences2005See also State v. Brita, 154 Ariz. 517, 521 , 744 P.2d 429, 433 (App.1987), approved in part and vacated in part, 158 Ariz. 121 , 761 P.2d 1025 (1988) ("defendant's blood was not part of a sample taken for medical reasons in accordance with [former] A.R.S. § 28-692(M)"). [6] Nor does the state contend Blakely does not apply to Arizona's treatment of aggravating sentencing factors under A.R.S. § 13-702 in noncapital cases. 2005See also State v. Brita, 154 Ariz. 517, 521 , 744 P.2d 429, 433 (App.1987), approved in part and vacated in part, 158 Ariz. 121 , 761 P.2d 1025 (1988) ("defendant's blood was not part of a sample taken for medical reasons in accordance with [former] A.R.S. § 28-692(M)"). [6] Nor does the state contend Blakely does not apply to Arizona's treatment of aggravating sentencing factors under A.R.S. § 13-702 in noncapital cases. | 2 | 2 |
Collins v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000Id. at 286-87 , 709 P.2d at 1345-46 . ¶ 52 The supreme court reiterated the narrowness of the medical purposes exception in Collins v. Superior Court , holding that the implied consent statute did not even authorize police to obtain a warrant for the seizure of blood from drunk driving suspects. 158 Ariz. 145, 146 , 761 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1988). 2000Id. at 286-87 , 709 P.2d at 1345-46 . ¶ 52 The supreme court reiterated the narrowness of the medical purposes exception in Collins v. Superior Court , holding that the implied consent statute did not even authorize police to obtain a warrant for the seizure of blood from drunk driving suspects. 158 Ariz. 145, 146 , 761 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Lind v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998See A.R.S. § 28-692(J) (1994); see also Lind v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 233, 236 , 954 P.2d 1058, 1061 (App.1998). ¶ 15 The state argues for the first time on appeal that the warrantless seizure of Flannigan’s blood was constitutionally permissible because he consented to it. 1998See A.R.S. § 28-692(J) (1994); see also Lind v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 233, 236 , 954 P.2d 1058, 1061 (App.1998). ¶ 15 The state argues for the first time on appeal that the warrantless seizure of Flannigan’s blood was constitutionally permissible because he consented to it. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1992See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801 (1987) (certified psychologist treating child for psychological problems stemming from sexual abuse was treating the child for “medical” purposes within meaning of exception to hearsay rule); Matter of Juvenile Dep. Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601 , 785 P.2d 121 (App.1990) (psychiatric social worker was treating child for “medical” purposes within the meaning of exception to hearsay rule). 1992See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801 (1987) (certified psychologist treating child for psychological problems stemming from sexual abuse was treating the child for “medical” purposes within meaning of exception to hearsay rule); Matter of Juvenile Dep. Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601 , 785 P.2d 121 (App.1990) (psychiatric social worker was treating child for “medical” purposes within the meaning of exception to hearsay rule). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Flannigan
green
2 sentences2015Indeed, the court specifically noted, citing Lind , that “because [Flannigan] did not sustain any injuries in the accident that required medical personnel to draw his blood, this case does not involve the medical purposes exception of A.R.S. section 28-692(J), which would have entitled the police to receive a sample of his blood regardless of his consent.” 3 Flannigan, 194 Ariz. 150, ¶ 14 , 978 P.2d at 130 . 2015Indeed, the court specifically noted, citing Lind , that “because [Flannigan] did not sustain any injuries in the accident that required medical personnel to draw his blood, this case does not involve the medical purposes exception of A.R.S. section 28-692(J), which would have entitled the police to receive a sample of his blood regardless of his consent.” 3 Flannigan, 194 Ariz. 150, ¶ 14 , 978 P.2d at 130 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Cocio
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 286-87 , 709 P.2d at 1345-46 . ¶ 52 The supreme court reiterated the narrowness of the medical purposes exception in Collins v. Superior Court , holding that the implied consent statute did not even authorize police to obtain a warrant for the seizure of blood from drunk driving suspects. 158 Ariz. 145, 146 , 761 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1988). 2000Id. at 286-87 , 709 P.2d at 1345-46 . ¶ 52 The supreme court reiterated the narrowness of the medical purposes exception in Collins v. Superior Court , holding that the implied consent statute did not even authorize police to obtain a warrant for the seizure of blood from drunk driving suspects. 158 Ariz. 145, 146 , 761 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1988). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Dependency Action No. 96290
green
2 sentences1992See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801 (1987) (certified psychologist treating child for psychological problems stemming from sexual abuse was treating the child for “medical” purposes within meaning of exception to hearsay rule); Matter of Juvenile Dep. Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601 , 785 P.2d 121 (App.1990) (psychiatric social worker was treating child for “medical” purposes within the meaning of exception to hearsay rule). 1992See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801 (1987) (certified psychologist treating child for psychological problems stemming from sexual abuse was treating the child for “medical” purposes within meaning of exception to hearsay rule); Matter of Juvenile Dep. Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601 , 785 P.2d 121 (App.1990) (psychiatric social worker was treating child for “medical” purposes within the meaning of exception to hearsay rule). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.