Salladay doctrine in Arizona

1993See Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 170 Ariz. 256, 266 , 823 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1991) (the intent and viability of the Salladay doctrine and the interpretation of the recreational use statute have statewide significance). 2.

1993See Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 170 Ariz. 256, 266 , 823 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1991) (the intent and viability of the Salladay doctrine and the interpretation of the recreational use statute have statewide significance). 2.

2004See Salladay v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 12 Ariz. 124 , 100 P. 441 (1909) (precluding liability of flume owner in attractive nuisance claim); Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 223 , 564 P.2d 911, 912 (App.1977) (“[A] fireman has no cause of action against one whose negligence caused the fire in which he was injured.”); see also Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 178 Ariz. at 75 , 870 P.2d at 1171 (discussing application of Salladay doctrine to canals). ¶ 16 The Salladay doctrine and the fireman’s rule are based primarily on policy considerations, but those policy concerns do not ap

2004See Salladay v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 12 Ariz. 124 , 100 P. 441 (1909) (precluding liability of flume owner in attractive nuisance claim); Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 223 , 564 P.2d 911, 912 (App.1977) (“[A] fireman has no cause of action against one whose negligence caused the fire in which he was injured.”); see also Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 178 Ariz. at 75 , 870 P.2d at 1171 (discussing application of Salladay doctrine to canals). ¶ 16 The Salladay doctrine and the fireman’s rule are based primarily on policy considerations, but those policy concerns do not ap

2019In assessing whether a person is a trespasser, “[t]he determining fact is the presence or absence of a privilege to enter or to remain on the land, and the status of an accidental trespasser is still that of a trespasser.” Hersey v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 10 Ariz. App. 321, 325 (App. 1969). 2 On appeal Amsden argues the Salladay doctrine violates the Arizona Constitution.

2019In assessing whether a person is a trespasser, “[t]he determining fact is the presence or absence of a privilege to enter or to remain on the land, and the status of an accidental trespasser is still that of a trespasser.” Hersey v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 10 Ariz. App. 321, 325 (App. 1969). 2 On appeal Amsden argues the Salladay doctrine violates the Arizona Constitution.

1993The development of the Salladay doctrine has generally proceeded along two tracks; one upholding immunity from the attractive nuisance doctrine for open canals, waterways and power lines: Dombrowski, 108 Ariz. 275 , 496 P.2d 136 ; Lee v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 73 Ariz. 122 , 238 P.2d 945 (1951); the other finding exceptions to or narrowing Salladay: Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 118 Ariz. 498 , 578 P.2d 177 (1978); Partin v. Olney, 121 Ariz. 448 , 591 P.2d 74 (App. 1978); Clarke v. Edging, 20 Ariz. App. 267 , 512 P.2d 30 (1973).

1993The development of the Salladay doctrine has generally proceeded along two tracks; one upholding immunity from the attractive nuisance doctrine for open canals, waterways and power lines: Dombrowski, 108 Ariz. 275 , 496 P.2d 136 ; Lee v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 73 Ariz. 122 , 238 P.2d 945 (1951); the other finding exceptions to or narrowing Salladay: Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 118 Ariz. 498 , 578 P.2d 177 (1978); Partin v. Olney, 121 Ariz. 448 , 591 P.2d 74 (App. 1978); Clarke v. Edging, 20 Ariz. App. 267 , 512 P.2d 30 (1973).

2004It analogizes the state’s highways to water canals in that they are both “indispensable for maintaining life and prosperity,” see Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 70, 75 , 870 P.2d 1166, 1171 (App.1993), and asserts that the same policy considerations which justify the Salladay doctrine and the fireman’s rule preclude liability here.

2004It analogizes the state’s highways to water canals in that they are both “indispensable for maintaining life and prosperity,” see Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 70, 75 , 870 P.2d 1166, 1171 (App.1993), and asserts that the same policy considerations which justify the Salladay doctrine and the fireman’s rule preclude liability here.

2004See Salladay v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 12 Ariz. 124 , 100 P. 441 (1909) (precluding liability of flume owner in attractive nuisance claim); Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 223 , 564 P.2d 911, 912 (App.1977) (“[A] fireman has no cause of action against one whose negligence caused the fire in which he was injured.”); see also Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 178 Ariz. at 75 , 870 P.2d at 1171 (discussing application of Salladay doctrine to canals). ¶ 16 The Salladay doctrine and the fireman’s rule are based primarily on policy considerations, but those policy concerns do not ap

2004See Salladay v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 12 Ariz. 124 , 100 P. 441 (1909) (precluding liability of flume owner in attractive nuisance claim); Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 223 , 564 P.2d 911, 912 (App.1977) (“[A] fireman has no cause of action against one whose negligence caused the fire in which he was injured.”); see also Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 178 Ariz. at 75 , 870 P.2d at 1171 (discussing application of Salladay doctrine to canals). ¶ 16 The Salladay doctrine and the fireman’s rule are based primarily on policy considerations, but those policy concerns do not ap

1993Water Conservation Dist., 108 Ariz. 275, 276-77 , 496 P.2d 136, 137-38 (1972) and Hersey v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 10 Ariz. App. 321, 327 , 458 P.2d 525, 531 (1969), our appellate courts "recognized that [the] urbanization of Arizona ... may lead to the need to abandon Salladay . " Nevertheless, although plaintiffs may question the wisdom of the Salladay doctrine, we are, in the language of this court in Hersey , "bound by the prior decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court until changed by that court." Hersey, 10 Ariz. App. at 327 , 458 P.2d at 531 (citing McKay v. Industrial Comm

1993Water Conservation Dist., 108 Ariz. 275, 276-77 , 496 P.2d 136, 137-38 (1972) and Hersey v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 10 Ariz. App. 321, 327 , 458 P.2d 525, 531 (1969), our appellate courts "recognized that [the] urbanization of Arizona ... may lead to the need to abandon Salladay . " Nevertheless, although plaintiffs may question the wisdom of the Salladay doctrine, we are, in the language of this court in Hersey , "bound by the prior decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court until changed by that court." Hersey, 10 Ariz. App. at 327 , 458 P.2d at 531 (citing McKay v. Industrial Comm

2019City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985) (Rule 60); Mullin v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 2 (App. 2005) (Rule 59). ¶8 Amsden argues the superior court erred in granting BWCDD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the Salladay doctrine because he was a licensee upon the property and not a trespasser.

2019City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985) (Rule 60); Mullin v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 2 (App. 2005) (Rule 59). ¶8 Amsden argues the superior court erred in granting BWCDD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the Salladay doctrine because he was a licensee upon the property and not a trespasser.

2019City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985) (Rule 60); Mullin v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 2 (App. 2005) (Rule 59). ¶8 Amsden argues the superior court erred in granting BWCDD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the Salladay doctrine because he was a licensee upon the property and not a trespasser.

2019City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985) (Rule 60); Mullin v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 2 (App. 2005) (Rule 59). ¶8 Amsden argues the superior court erred in granting BWCDD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the Salladay doctrine because he was a licensee upon the property and not a trespasser.

1993Later, in Elkins v. Roosevelt Water Conservation Dist., 22 Ariz. App. 130, 131 , 524 P.2d 964, 965 (1974), this court held that because a conservation district's electrical transformer adjacent to an open trough was an essential component of the system for discharging water, it was covered by the Salladay doctrine.

1993Later, in Elkins v. Roosevelt Water Conservation Dist., 22 Ariz. App. 130, 131 , 524 P.2d 964, 965 (1974), this court held that because a conservation district's electrical transformer adjacent to an open trough was an essential component of the system for discharging water, it was covered by the Salladay doctrine.

1993The development of the Salladay doctrine has generally proceeded along two tracks; one upholding immunity from the attractive nuisance doctrine for open canals, waterways and power lines: Dombrowski, 108 Ariz. 275 , 496 P.2d 136 ; Lee v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 73 Ariz. 122 , 238 P.2d 945 (1951); the other finding exceptions to or narrowing Salladay: Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 118 Ariz. 498 , 578 P.2d 177 (1978); Partin v. Olney, 121 Ariz. 448 , 591 P.2d 74 (App. 1978); Clarke v. Edging, 20 Ariz. App. 267 , 512 P.2d 30 (1973).

1993The development of the Salladay doctrine has generally proceeded along two tracks; one upholding immunity from the attractive nuisance doctrine for open canals, waterways and power lines: Dombrowski, 108 Ariz. 275 , 496 P.2d 136 ; Lee v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 73 Ariz. 122 , 238 P.2d 945 (1951); the other finding exceptions to or narrowing Salladay: Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 118 Ariz. 498 , 578 P.2d 177 (1978); Partin v. Olney, 121 Ariz. 448 , 591 P.2d 74 (App. 1978); Clarke v. Edging, 20 Ariz. App. 267 , 512 P.2d 30 (1973).

1991Yet our courts have been more cautious in applying the Salladay doctrine outside the attractive nuisance arena and have done so only when policy reasons so required. 10 In City of Glendale v. Sutter, 54 Ariz. 326, 327 , 95 P.2d 569, 569-70 (1939), the plaintiff brought a negligence action after tripping and falling into an irrigation box located near her house and built by the city to divert irrigation water to individual lot owners, including the plaintiff.

1991Yet our courts have been more cautious in applying the Salladay doctrine outside the attractive nuisance arena and have done so only when policy reasons so required. 10 In City of Glendale v. Sutter, 54 Ariz. 326, 327 , 95 P.2d 569, 569-70 (1939), the plaintiff brought a negligence action after tripping and falling into an irrigation box located near her house and built by the city to divert irrigation water to individual lot owners, including the plaintiff.