unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Minnesota

2017The driver argued “that Minnesota’s implied-consent statute violates the unconstitutional- conditions doctrine because it imposes on a driver a choice between, on the one hand, relinquishing the Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and, on the other hand, relinquishing a license to drive a motor vehicle.” Id. at 723 .

2016We held that the “implied-consent statute does not violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine by authorizing the commissioner of public safety to revoke the driver’s license of a person who has been arrested for DWI and has refused to submit to chemical testing.” Id. at 731 .

2016State v. Bennett, 1 The district court apparently did not decide this issue, but appellant did argue in his trial brief that the statute violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 13 867 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 3496844 (U.S. June 28, 2016).

2016To the extent that appellant argues that the test-refusal statute violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, we recently held that “Minnesota’s test-refusal statute does not violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine by imposing a criminal penalty on a person who has been arrested for driving while impaired and has refused to submit to a breath test.” State v. Bennett, 867 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2015), cert. denied, No. 15-848 (U.S. June 28, 2016); see also Stevens v. Comm’r of Pub.

2015The supreme court observed that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine “is properly raised only when a party has successfully pleaded the merits of the underlying unconstitutional government infringement.” Netland, 762 N.W.2d at 211 .

2015Essentially, “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine reflects a limit on the state’s ability to coerce waiver of a constitutional right where the state may not impose on that right directly.” State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 211 (Minn. 2009), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), as recognized in State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 2013, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014).

2014The district court first says that the state supreme court and this court previously “skirted the issue of the constitutionality of the test refusal statute.” Then it maintains that it can apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because, it asserts, the supreme court nonetheless “has conceded that ‘the government may not grant a privilege on condition that the recipient forfeits a constitutional right,’” quoting Netland, 762 N.W.2d at 211 , which quoted Frost, 271 U.S. at 593–94, 46 S. Ct. at 606–07.

2014The district court first says that the state supreme court and this court previously “skirted the issue of the constitutionality of the test refusal statute.” Then it maintains that it can apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because, it asserts, the supreme court nonetheless “has conceded that ‘the government may not grant a privilege on condition that the recipient forfeits a constitutional right,’” quoting Netland, 762 N.W.2d at 211 , which quoted Frost, 271 U.S. at 593–94, 46 S. Ct. at 606–07.

2015The test-refusal statute does not violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine because “a driver’s decision to agree to take a test is not coerced simply because Minnesota has attached the penalty of making it a crime to refuse the test.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 570 .

2015Essentially, “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine reflects a limit on the state’s ability to coerce waiver of a constitutional right where the state may not impose on that right directly.” State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 211 (Minn. 2009), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), as recognized in State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 2013, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014).

2015Bennett, slip op. at 8 (citing Netland, 762 N.W.2d at 211 ); see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 286 , 118 S. 12 Ct. 1244, 1252 (1998) (stating that it was unnecessary to address the unconstitutional- conditions doctrine, as applied to the Fifth Amendment, where the challenged procedures did not violate the Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).

2009Tobacco Mfrs. of Am. v. State, 713 N.W.2d 300, 306 (Minn.2006) (“[T]o invoke this ‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine, appellants must first show the statute in question in fact denies them a benefit they could otherwise obtain by giving up their First Amendment rights.”); see also Rumsfeld v. Fo ram for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 , 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) (concluding that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply to Congress’ condition that law schools receiving federal funds may not deny access to ROTC program recruiters becau

2015State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

2015State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. 2013).

2016Because Bernard held that a warrantless breath test would have been constitutional under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, 859 N.W.2d at 767 , Minnesota’s test-refusal statute does not authorize an unconstitutional search and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does not apply.

2015Because Bernard held that a warrantless breath search would have been constitutional as a search incident to arrest, 859 N.W.2d at 767 , Bennett holds that the test-refusal statute does not authorize an unauthorized search and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does not apply. 2.

2015Essentially, “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine reflects a limit on the state’s ability to coerce waiver of a constitutional right where the state may not impose on that right directly.” State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 211 (Minn. 2009), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), as recognized in State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 2013, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014).

2014He argued that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is unconstitutional under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and, alternatively, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), precluded the state from criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test.

2015“Although refusing the test comes with criminal penalties . . . the [s]upreme [c]ourt has made [it] clear that while the choice to submit or refuse to take [a] chemical test ‘will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make,’ the criminal process ‘often requires suspects and defendants 6 to make difficult choices.’” Id. at 571 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 (1983)).

2015“Although refusing the test comes with criminal penalties . . . the [s]upreme [c]ourt has made [it] clear that while the choice to submit or refuse to take [a] chemical test ‘will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make,’ the criminal process ‘often requires suspects and defendants 6 to make difficult choices.’” Id. at 571 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 (1983)).

2014Rev. 1595 , 1596 (1960); cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 , 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (“In evaluating petitioner’s [unconstitutional condition] claim, we must first determine whether the essential nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition exacted by the city.” (quotations omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 , 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795 (1963) (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the [challenged] statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendme

2014Rev. 1595 , 1596 (1960); cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 , 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (“In evaluating petitioner’s [unconstitutional condition] claim, we must first determine whether the essential nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition exacted by the city.” (quotations omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 , 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795 (1963) (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the [challenged] statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendme

2018See State v. Thompson , 886 N.W.2d 224 , 234 n.9 (Minn. 2016).

2018See Thompson , 886 N.W.2d at 234 n.9.

2016See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172, 2186 (stating that “[i]f . . . warrantless [breath tests] comport with the Fourth Amendment, it follows that a State may criminalize the refusal to comply with a demand to submit to the required 10 testing,” and concluding that a warrantless breath test is a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest for DWI); State v. Bennett, 867 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. App. 2015) (concluding that “[appellant] cannot proceed with his claim that the [test]-refusal statute violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine,” reasoning that “[t]he warrantless breath test th

2015Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Minn. 1991), forecloses the argument that the criminalization of test refusal violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, as applied to the Fifth Amendment.

2015Appellant also argues that the implied consent statute is unconstitutional because it violates substantive due-process guarantees. “[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999) (quotations omitted). “[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neit

2015Appellant also argues that the implied consent statute is unconstitutional because it violates substantive due-process guarantees. “[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999) (quotations omitted). “[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neit

2015Appellant also argues that the implied consent statute is unconstitutional because it violates substantive due-process guarantees. “[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999) (quotations omitted). “[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neit

2014Rev. 1595 , 1596 (1960); cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 , 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (“In evaluating petitioner’s [unconstitutional condition] claim, we must first determine whether the essential nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition exacted by the city.” (quotations omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 , 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795 (1963) (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the [challenged] statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendme

2014Rev. 1595 , 1596 (1960); cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 , 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (“In evaluating petitioner’s [unconstitutional condition] claim, we must first determine whether the essential nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition exacted by the city.” (quotations omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 , 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795 (1963) (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the [challenged] statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendme

2014See State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006) (“An assignment of error in a brief based on ‘mere assertion’ and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007).

2014We of course must look to the supreme court’s interpretation and application of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as the governing law on the issue. 10 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 , 118 & n.4, 122 S. Ct. 587 , 591 & n.4 (2001) (upholding condition of probation that required probationer to consent to warrantless searches of home).

2014We of course must look to the supreme court’s interpretation and application of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as the governing law on the issue. 10 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 , 118 & n.4, 122 S. Ct. 587 , 591 & n.4 (2001) (upholding condition of probation that required probationer to consent to warrantless searches of home).

2014See State v. Netland, 742 N.W.2d 207, 213-14 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 762 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 2009).

2014See State v. Netland, 742 N.W.2d 207, 213-14 (Minn.App.2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 762 N.W.2d 202 (Minn.2009).

2014See State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006) (“An assignment of error in a brief based on ‘mere assertion’ and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007).

2014This body of caselaw suggests that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does not invalidate state laws that authorize warrantless searches as a reasonable means of exercising control over a highly regulated activity.5 The caselaw is relevant because, in Minnesota, operating a motor vehicle “is in the nature of a license or privilege,” which “depends upon compliance with conditions prescribed by law.” Anderson v. State, Comm’r of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 317 , 126 N.W.2d 778, 784 (1964).

2014This body of caselaw suggests that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does not invalidate state laws that authorize warrantless searches as a reasonable means of exercising control over a highly regulated activity.5 The caselaw is relevant because, in Minnesota, operating a motor vehicle “is in the nature of a license or privilege,” which “depends upon compliance with conditions prescribed by law.” Anderson v. State, Comm’r of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 317 , 126 N.W.2d 778, 784 (1964).