late claim in New Jersey

2025"Generally, we examine more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits . . . ." Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (quoting Feinberg v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 135 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A]n attorney's inattention, or even an attorney's malpractice, [does not] constitute[] an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse failure to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline." D.D., 213 N.J. at 156, 158 .

2025A-2363-23 9 Generally, we examine "more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application." [Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (quoting Feinberg v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 135 (1994)).] "However, the Legislature left . . . 'extraordinary circumstances' undefined." O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 346 .

2025"Generally, we examine more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits . . . ." Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (quoting Feinberg v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 135 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A]n attorney's inattention, or even an attorney's malpractice, [does not] constitute[] an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse failure to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline." D.D., 213 N.J. at 156, 158 .

2025A-2363-23 9 Generally, we examine "more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application." [Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (quoting Feinberg v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 135 (1994)).] "However, the Legislature left . . . 'extraordinary circumstances' undefined." O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 346 .

1988There, this Court expressly adopted the approach of the California courts insofar as they “have examined more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, ‘to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application.’ ” Id. at 122 (quoting Viles v. California, 66 Cal.2d 24 , 423 P.2d 818, 821 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 669 (1967)); see also Dyer v. Newark, 174 N.J.Super. 297, 300 (App.Div.1980) (following Supreme Court’s directive in S.E.W.

1988There, this Court expressly adopted the approach of the California courts insofar as they “have examined more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, ‘to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application.’ ” Id. at 122 (quoting Viles v. California, 66 Cal.2d 24 , 423 P.2d 818, 821 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 669 (1967)); see also Dyer v. Newark, 174 N.J.Super. 297, 300 (App.Div.1980) (following Supreme Court’s directive in S.E.W.

1983Friel, supra, the Supreme Court expressed its desire that, in cases in which permission to file a late claim is sought, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant, and -the case should be heard on its merits. 73 N.J. at 122 .

1983Friel, supra, the Supreme Court expressed its desire that, in cases in which permission to file a late claim is sought, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant, and -the case should be heard on its merits. 73 N.J. at 122 .

2025"Generally, we examine more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits . . . ." Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (quoting Feinberg v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 135 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A]n attorney's inattention, or even an attorney's malpractice, [does not] constitute[] an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse failure to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline." D.D., 213 N.J. at 156, 158 .

2020Although we review "more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits" and resolve "any A-1028-18T3 10 doubts" as to whether extraordinary circumstances exist "in favor of the application," id. at 169 (Lavecchia, J. dissenting) (quoting Lowe, 158 N.J. at 629 ), we are convinced the court correctly determined plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of presenting evidence establishing the requisite extraordinary circumstances to allow the requested late filing

1988The court said: Our Tort Claims Act is modeled on the California Tort Claims Act of 1963. [Citation omitted.] The courts of that state have examined more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, "to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application." Viles v. Cal., 66 Cal.2d 24 , 56 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 , 423 P.2d 818, 821 (Sup.Ct. 1967); see e.g., Thompson v. Fresno Cty., 59 Cal.2d 686 , 31 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 381 P.2d 924 (Sup.Ct.

1988The court said: Our Tort Claims Act is modeled on the California Tort Claims Act of 1963. [Citation omitted.] The courts of that state have examined more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, "to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application." Viles v. Cal., 66 Cal.2d 24 , 56 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 , 423 P.2d 818, 821 (Sup.Ct. 1967); see e.g., Thompson v. Fresno Cty., 59 Cal.2d 686 , 31 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 381 P.2d 924 (Sup.Ct.

1988The court said: Our Tort Claims Act is modeled on the California Tort Claims Act of 1963. [Citation omitted.] The courts of that state have examined more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, "to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application." Viles v. Cal., 66 Cal.2d 24 , 56 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 , 423 P.2d 818, 821 (Sup.Ct. 1967); see e.g., Thompson v. Fresno Cty., 59 Cal.2d 686 , 31 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 381 P.2d 924 (Sup.Ct.

1977The courts of that state have examined more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, “to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application.” Viles v. Cal., 66 Cal. 2d 24 , 56 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 , 423 P. 2d 818, 821 (Sup. Ct. 1967); see, e. g., Thompson v. Fresno Cty., 59 Cal. 2d 686 , 31 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 381 P. 2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1963).

1974However, in Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468 , 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 (1967), the California Supreme Court declined to reverse the trial court which had denied plaintiff the right to file a late claim based on, among *294 other things, the ground of excusable neglect, mistake, surprise or inadvertence.

1974However, in Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468 , 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 (1967), the California Supreme Court declined to reverse the trial court which had denied plaintiff the right to file a late claim based on, among *294 other things, the ground of excusable neglect, mistake, surprise or inadvertence.

2019Escalante, 283 N.J.

1995Super. 244 , 661 A. 2d 837 (App.Div. 1995): The granting or denial of permission to file a late claim within the one year period is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge which will be sustained on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse thereof.

2025A-2363-23 9 Generally, we examine "more carefully cases in which permission to file a late claim has been denied than those in which it has been granted, to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application." [Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (quoting Feinberg v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 135 (1994)).] "However, the Legislature left . . . 'extraordinary circumstances' undefined." O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 346 .

2020See O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 351-52 (finding extraordinary circumstances where plaintiff's counsel served a timely notice of claim on the wrong party, notwithstanding D.D., because of the additional circumstances of another party injured in the same accident having served a timely notice of claim on the correct party "listing the exact circumstances surrounding the accident and the same theory of liability" and plaintiff having sought permission to file a late claim notice within one year of the accident).

2010"The granting or denial of permission to file a late claim . . . is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be sustained on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse thereof." Id. at 146 , 543 A. 2d 443 .

2010"The granting or denial of permission to file a late claim . . . is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be sustained on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse thereof." Id. at 146 , 543 A. 2d 443 .

2025In considering a late claim of error in a jury instruction, plain error requires demonstration of "'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to A-3265-22 15 justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that . . . the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'" State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182-83 (2012) (quoting State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).

2012In respect of a late claim of error in a jury instruction, “plain error requires demonstration of ‘legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.’ ” State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 , 901 A.2d 351 (2006) (quoting State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 , 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 , 90 S.Ct. 2254 , 26 L.Ed.2d 797 (1970)).

1988Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575 (App.Div.1977); Lutz v. Gloucester Township, 153 N.J.Super. 461 (App.Div.1977); In re Roy, 142 N.J.Super. 594 (App.Div.), certif. den., 71 N.J. 504 (1976); Keller, supra, 137 N.J.Super. at 5 .

1988Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575 (App.Div.1977); Lutz v. Gloucester Township, 153 N.J.Super. 461 (App.Div.1977); In re Roy, 142 N.J.Super. 594 (App.Div.), certif. den., 71 N.J. 504 (1976); Keller, supra, 137 N.J.Super. at 5 .

1975See Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468 , 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 , 426 P. 2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 479 (D.

1975See Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468 , 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 , 426 P. 2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 479 (D.

2025Thus, a determination of what constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" is determined "on a case-by-case basis," Rogers v. Cape May County Office of Public Defender, 208 N.J. 414, 428 (2011), "with the outcome of each case depending 'on the facts presented,'" O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 347 (quoting Ventola v. N.J.

2025In considering a late claim of error in a jury instruction, plain error requires demonstration of "'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to A-3265-22 15 justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that . . . the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'" State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182-83 (2012) (quoting State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).

2025In reviewing for plain error, we "must not look at portions of 'the charge alleged to be erroneous in isolation; rather, the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect . . . .'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 494 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)); see also State v. Smith, 322 N.J.

2025In reviewing for plain error, we "must not look at portions of 'the charge alleged to be erroneous in isolation; rather, the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect . . . .'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 494 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)); see also State v. Smith, 322 N.J.

2025In doing so, the trial court relied on Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 118-19 (2000), and reasoned: "[T]he discovery rule applies and justifies the filing of a late claim.

2025In reviewing for plain error, we "must not look at portions of 'the charge alleged to be erroneous in isolation; rather, the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect . . . .'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 494 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)); see also State v. Smith, 322 N.J.

2022In a written decision granting plaintiffs leave to file a late claim, the trial court stated: "The [c]ourt accepts [Annabella's] certification, together with the ongoing public health crisis, to find that [plaintiffs] ha[ve] shown sufficient reasons for [their] failure to timely file the notice of tort claim." The court declined defendants' request to hold a Lopez2 hearing, stating it was unnecessary as "[t]he determinative factors" in finding "sufficient reasons for the late fi ling" were "the ongoing health crisis, the death of [Edwin], and [Annabella's] illness." 1 Although the letter was s

2019Veteran's Mem'l Home, 164 N.J. 74, 77 (2000), the Court found extraordinary circumstances to allow the late filing in a malpractice case where the physicians' status as a "private physician obscured his true status as a public employee." In Beauchamp, the Court allowed the filing of a late claim because there was "general confusion" about when a claim was to accrue and Beauchamp's attorney had misadvised her that her claim was premature. 164 N.J. at 122-23.

2015Findings about "the lack of 'substantial prejudice' and the presence of 'extraordinary circumstances' . . . must be expressly made in order to comply with the legislative mandate and to justify the entry of an order permitting the filing of a 2 We note that Sea Bright does not contend that the filing of a late claim would be prejudicial to it. 7 A-4061-13T4 late notice of claim under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9." Allen v. Krause, 306 N.J.