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222 California opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2026 58 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Munoz v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2025(See Munoz v. State of California, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1779 .) The trial court also denied the petition without prejudice as to the December 2021 incident because the one-year period had not expired and, thus, it was still possible for Riaz to apply to City to present a late claim for that incident. 2025(See Munoz v. State of California, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1779 .) The trial court also denied the petition without prejudice as to the December 2021 incident because the one-year period had not expired and, thus, it was still possible for Riaz to apply to City to present a late claim for that incident. | 16 | 35 |
Tammen v. County of San Diegogreen2 sentences2022(Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1079 , 1089 (Lincoln).) “Before a court may relieve a claimant from the statutory tort claim filing requirements, the claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both that the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was presented within a reasonable time and that the failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293 (DWP); Tammen v. County of San Diego County 2021Yet, “ ‘[m]ere ignorance of the law, at least where coupled with negligence in failing to look it up, is not sufficient cause to allow a petitioner to file a late claim against a public entity [citations].’ (Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 .)” (Bertorelli v. City of Tulare (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 432, 439 ; see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [noting that, “[i]n cases construing section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held that ‘Ignorance of the law, at least where coupled with negligence in failing to look it up, will not justif | 15 | 24 |
Ebersol v. Cowangreen2 sentences2025First, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied to the public entity for leave to present a late claim “within a reasonable time” not to exceed one year after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 946.6, subd. (c); see § 911.4, subd. (b); Ebersol, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 431 .) Second, as relevant to this appeal, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he failure to present a [timely] claim was through . . . excusable neglect.” (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1); see Ebersol, at p. 431.) If the petitioner satisfies these requirements, the burden 2025First, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied to the public entity for leave to present a late claim “within a reasonable time” not to exceed one year after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 946.6, subd. (c); see § 911.4, subd. (b); Ebersol, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 431 .) Second, as relevant to this appeal, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he failure to present a [timely] claim was through . . . excusable neglect.” (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1); see Ebersol, at p. 431.) If the petitioner satisfies these requirements, the burden | 12 | 18 |
Viles v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2021(Viles v. State (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 31 .) The court also acknowledged that “ ‘[t]he 1963 legislation is remedial and should be liberally construed.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court has addressed section 946.6, which authorizes trial courts to grant relief to claimant where the public entity has rejected an application to file a late claim, and stated that particular provision is a remedial statute intended to provide relief from technical rules that otherwise would trap unwary claimants and identified the primary policy underlying that section as the policy favoring trial on the merits. 2020While our Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘[t]he 1963 legislation is remedial and should be liberally construed’ ” (Viles v. State (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 31 ), and “[t]he policy favoring trial on the merits is the primary policy underlying section 946.6” (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 276 , italics added), the procedures for presenting an application for leave to file a late claim to the public entity have another specific purpose. | 11 | 24 |
Hernandez v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2022Section 911.6, subdivision (b)(2) does state that a public entity “shall” grant a late claim application if “[t]he person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss was a minor during all of the time . . . for the presentation of the claim.” (§ 911.6, subd. (b)(2).) However, “section 911.4’s requirement that the late-claim application be presented within a ‘reasonable time’ is applicable even to late-claim applications by minors.” (Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1029 .) Accordingly, the California Supreme Court has held that “[a] minor is entitled to relief wh 2017Section 911.6, subdivision (b) (section 911.6(b)) states that a public entity "shall" grant a late claim application if "[t]he person who sustained the alleged injury ... was a minor during all of the time ... for the presentation of the claim." (§ 911.6(b)(2).) A minor is entitled to relief whether or not the minor's parents or counsel acted diligently, so long as the application is made within the year after the cause of action accrued. ( Hernandez , supra , 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1027-1030, 232 Cal.Rptr. 519 , 728 P.2d 1154 ; see Rousseau v. City of San Carlos (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 498 , 501, 236 | 11 | 14 |
Martin v. City of Maderagreen2 sentences2021Yet, “ ‘[m]ere ignorance of the law, at least where coupled with negligence in failing to look it up, is not sufficient cause to allow a petitioner to file a late claim against a public entity [citations].’ (Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 .)” (Bertorelli v. City of Tulare (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 432, 439 ; see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [noting that, “[i]n cases construing section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held that ‘Ignorance of the law, at least where coupled with negligence in failing to look it up, will not justif 1987(See Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ]; Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 80-82 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].) II In order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove she was a minor during the entire 100-day period in which to file a claim and that the application to the public entities to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action. | 8 | 10 |
Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Districtgreen2 sentences2025(Id. at p. 33.) Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 273-275 , also considered a trial court’s denial of a petition for relief from the claim presentment requirements after a government entity denied a potential claimant’s request to file a late claim within one year of the incident that gave rise to the action. 2024Plaintiffs Fail to Establish Excusable Neglect “As a general rule, a plaintiff must present a public entity with a timely written claim for damages before filing suit against it.” (J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 652 (J.M.).) “A claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . [must] be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) If the injured party fails to file a timely claim, “a 6 written application” may be made to the public entity for leave to present such a claim af | 7 | 16 |
Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Educationgreen2 sentences2026(Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 713.) Moreover, to the extent petitioners 9 RPI’s argue that the date information was necessary for them to determine whether the late claim procedures of section 911.3 and 911.4 applied. 18 intend to suggest RPI’s waived the argument that there has been no substantial compliance with the claims statute, the record contradicts petitioners’ suggestion. 2025(See Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 610, 617 [petitioner was entitled in a separate action to have a jury determine the date of accrual, where the plaintiff alleged in his application for leave to file a late claim that his causes of action accrued after the date of injury]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 711-712 [petitioner may have a right to have a jury decide whether a claim was timely filed “where the date of the accrual of the cause of action is disputed” or “upon appropriate demand by a petitioner” in the trial court]; | 6 | 8 |
Shank v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2015He had the burden to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was presented within a reasonable time, and that the failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (Shank v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 152, 156 .) FACTS AND PROCEDURE In September 2013, F.A. filed a claim for damages against the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). 1988The applicable law is well summarized in Toscano v. County of Los Angeles, supra, at pages 781-782, as follows: “ ‘An individual cannot bring a lawsuit against a public entity for personal injuries or property damage unless within 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action the individual has presented a written claim to the public entity involved, and the public entity has acted upon the claim or the claim has been deemed to have been rejected. (§§ 911.2, 945.4.) [ft] Where the claimant does not file a claim within the 100-day claim period, written application may be made to the public | 6 | 8 |
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Claragreen2 sentences2022(Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [“[w]hen the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Government Code section 946.6”]; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 480, 488 [same].) IV Collateral Estoppel Both parties request that we determine in the first instance whether the trial court’s ruling on the petition for relief as to the accrual and timeliness issues have preclusive effect in Hogrefe’s federal action 2016(J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1221 ; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [“Filing a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition. [Citation.] When the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Government 4 Code section 946.6.”]; Dixon v. City of Turlock (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 907, 913 [under section 911.4, “appellant’s claim | 6 | 7 |
Toscano v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2021(Greene, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 ; 6 see Toscano v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 783 [“An argument that one filed a timely claim is inconsistent with a petition for relief under section 946.6, since such petition necessarily follows the denial of an application for leave to file a late claim”].) Next, J.G. argues her application to present a late claim and subsequent section 946.6 petition were “based on excusable mistake or neglect arising from a confluence of events and circumstances stemming from the terrifying sexual assault, rape, and threats of violence and ret 1994If the public entity denies leave to present a late claim, a petition may be filed in the court otherwise having jurisdiction in the action for an order relieving the petitioner of the requirement of filing a claim. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) The court shall grant relief *5 if it finds that application was made within a reasonable time not to exceed that specified in subdivision (b) of section 911.4, was denied or deemed denied pursuant to section 911.6, and was late for one of the reasons specified in section 911.6, subdivision (b). (§ 946.6, subd. (c); and see Reyes v. County of Los Angeles (1988 | 6 | 7 |
Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2024DISCUSSION Generally, under the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.), one cannot sue a public entity for money or damages without first presenting a claim to the public entity and having the claim acted upon or deemed rejected. (§ 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 ; see generally Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2024) § 5.14.) When the cause of action is for personal injuries, as in this case, the prospective plaintiff must ordinarily present the claim to the public entity within six months after the cause of action accr 2016(Rason, at pp. 823-824.) Rason discussed section 945.6, which, in contrast to section 946.6, expressly provides the six-month period for filing a lawsuit after denial of a timely claim begins to run on the date notice of denial is personally delivered or deposited in the mail. (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(1); see also § 913.) Rason stated that, unlike section 945.6, under section 946.6 "[t]he clock begins to run on 6 the date that the application [for leave to file a late claim] is denied, even though the notice is mailed or delivered at a later date."3 (Rason, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 824 , italics | 5 | 8 |
Williams v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist.green2 sentences2001Dist. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 843, 850 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 452 ] [the time limit for filing an application with a public entity under the Act is comparable to a statute of limitations].) Cases that have dealt with the tolling aspects of section 911.4, subdivision (b) suggest that the one-year time period within which to present a late claim will be tolled when the claimant does not have a representative capable of representing his or her interests. 2001Dist. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 843, 850 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 452 ] [the time limit for filing an application with a public entity under the Act is comparable to a statute of limitations].) Cases that have dealt with the tolling aspects of section 911.4, subdivision (b) suggest that the one-year time period within which to present a late claim will be tolled when the claimant does not have a representative capable of representing his or her interests. | 5 | 6 |
Bahten v. County of Mercedgreen2 sentences2016In Savage v. State of California (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 793 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 , the plaintiff filed a complaint against the state alleging that an application for leave to file a late claim was pending. ( Id . at p. 795, 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) After the court granted her petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6, she filed a supplement to the complaint describing this event. ( *1049 Savage v. State of California, at p. 795, 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) Because the plaintiff had already filed a complaint against the state, and was later relieved of the necessity of filing a claim, the appellate 2016In Savage v. State of California (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 793 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 , the plaintiff filed a complaint against the state alleging that an application for leave to file a late claim was pending. ( Id . at p. 795, 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) After the court granted her petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6, she filed a supplement to the complaint describing this event. ( *1049 Savage v. State of California, at p. 795, 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) Because the plaintiff had already filed a complaint against the state, and was later relieved of the necessity of filing a claim, the appellate | 4 | 7 |
Savage v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2020For example, in Savage v. State (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 793, 796 (Savage), the plaintiff applied to file a late claim a few days before the one year anniversary of the injury and filed a complaint the next day. 2016In Savage v. State of California (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 793 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 , the plaintiff filed a complaint against the state alleging that an application for leave to file a late claim was pending. ( Id . at p. 795, 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) After the court granted her petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6, she filed a supplement to the complaint describing this event. ( *1049 Savage v. State of California, at p. 795, 84 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) Because the plaintiff had already filed a complaint against the state, and was later relieved of the necessity of filing a claim, the appellate | 4 | 6 |
Scott v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2025(See Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 610, 617 [petitioner was entitled in a separate action to have a jury determine the date of accrual, where the plaintiff alleged in his application for leave to file a late claim that his causes of action accrued after the date of injury]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 711-712 [petitioner may have a right to have a jury decide whether a claim was timely filed “where the date of the accrual of the cause of action is disputed” or “upon appropriate demand by a petitioner” in the trial court]; 1992(Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 829 ; Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 476, 482 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 785 ].) Rather, where a claim submitted along with an application for leave to present a late claim alleges facts which, if true, would make the claim timely, the public entity must give specific written notice of rejection under section 913. | 4 | 5 |
Phillips v. Desert Hospital Districtgreen2 sentences2024In Phillips, the plaintiff’s defective claim triggered the notice and defense-waiver provisions of the Government Claims Act. ( Phillips, supra, at pp. 707-708 .) The case did not address a situation where, as here, a defective claim is filed after the time has run for the plaintiff to file an application for leave to file a late claim. 2020“The notice must warn the person making the government claim that his or her only recourse is to apply without delay to the public entity for leave to present a late claim.” (Estill v. County of Shasta (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 702, 709 (Estill).) It is well established that “[f]ailure to give the warning within 45 days after the claim was presented results in waiver of the defense that the government claim was untimely. (§ 911.3, subd. (b).)” (Ibid.; see also Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 705-706 [“Failure to provide such notice of timeliness waives a public entity’s defense based on untimeli | 4 | 5 |
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2005“The reason for the one-year statutory requirement is to ‘protect^ a governmental entity from having to respond to a claim many years after the accrual of the action.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1314 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 ], quoting Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1030 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 519 , 728 P.2d 1154 ].) Whether N.L.’s cause of action accrued when she reached the age of majority on October 12, 2001, under section 340.1, as she maintains, or when the molestation actually occurred (see John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dis 2005“The reason for the one-year statutory requirement is to ‘protect^ a governmental entity from having to respond to a claim many years after the accrual of the action.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1314 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 ], quoting Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1030 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 519 , 728 P.2d 1154 ].) Whether N.L.’s cause of action accrued when she reached the age of majority on October 12, 2001, under section 340.1, as she maintains, or when the molestation actually occurred (see John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dis | 4 | 5 |
| Kendrick v. City of La Miradagreen | 4 | 4 |
J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist.green2 sentences2026(J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 652 .) Claims for personal injury, personal property damage, or wrongful death must be presented no later than six months after the cause of action accrues. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A plaintiff who misses this deadline may apply directly to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) If the public entity denies an application for leave to present a late claim, the plaintiff may petition the trial court, within six months of the entity’s denial, for an order relieving the plaintiff from the prefi 2025(J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 653 .) If a personal injury claim is presented more than six months after the action accrues, and the claim does not contain an application to present a late claim, the public entity may, within 45 days after the claim is presented, give written notice to the claimant that the claim was not filed timely and is being returned without further action. (§ 911.3, subd. (a).) The notice must state that the claimant’s only recourse is to apply to the public entity for leave to present the claim late or to petition the superior co | 3 | 11 |
Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agencygreen2 sentences2026Such knowledge—standing alone—constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.”’” (Ibid.) “When a claim that is required by [s]ection 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim.” (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) “The application must be presented to the public entity no later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.4, subd. (b).) Unless the one-year period is tolled (see § 911.4, subd. (c)), the pub 2026Such knowledge—standing alone—constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.”’” (Ibid.) “When a claim that is required by [s]ection 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim.” (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) “The application must be presented to the public entity no later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.4, subd. (b).) Unless the one-year period is tolled (see § 911.4, subd. (c)), the pub | 3 | 6 |
DeVore v. Department of the California Highway Patrolgreen2 sentences2025(See Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435, fn. 8 [order denying a petition for leave to file a late claim under § 946.6 is appealable]; DeVore v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 454, 459 [same].) On November 28, 2022, this court filed an order stating it dismissed the appeal in case No. F085099 as abandoned. 8. 2025(See Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435, fn. 8 [order denying a petition for leave to file a late claim under § 946.6 is appealable]; DeVore v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 454, 459 [same].) On November 28, 2022, this court filed an order stating it dismissed the appeal in case No. F085099 as abandoned. 8. | 3 | 6 |
Ngo v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2025(See Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 610, 617 [petitioner was entitled in a separate action to have a jury determine the date of accrual, where the plaintiff alleged in his application for leave to file a late claim that his causes of action accrued after the date of injury]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 711-712 [petitioner may have a right to have a jury decide whether a claim was timely filed “where the date of the accrual of the cause of action is disputed” or “upon appropriate demand by a petitioner” in the trial court]; 2021Rason held that “a claimant who disputes the [public entity’s] determination of untimeliness must raise that issue by filing suit rather than a section 911.4 application [to present a late claim].” (Rason, at pp. 822-823; Ngo v. County of L.A. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946, 948 .) The distinguishing feature here is that the untimeliness of J.G.’s claim was never disputed. | 3 | 5 |
| Petersen v. City of Vallejogreen | 3 | 4 |
| County of Los Angeles v. Superior Courtgreen | 3 | 4 |
| Black v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 3 | 4 |
| Lineaweaver v. Southern California Rapid Transit Districtgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Jenkins v. County of Contra Costagreen | 3 | 3 |
| Clark v. Kerbygreen | 3 | 3 |
| Carr v. State of Californiagreen | 3 | 3 |
| Gonzales v. County of Mercedgreen | 3 | 3 |
City of Stockton v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025Code,] § 911.2.)”5 (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (Stockton).) “ ‘Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government claims statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 906 .) “ ‘[F]ailure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.’ [Citation.]” (Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738 .) In other words, “[c]ompliance with 2025Code,] § 911.2.)”5 (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (Stockton).) “ ‘Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government claims statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 906 .) “ ‘[F]ailure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.’ [Citation.]” (Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738 .) In other words, “[c]ompliance with | 2 | 7 |
State v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024DISCUSSION Generally, under the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.), one cannot sue a public entity for money or damages without first presenting a claim to the public entity and having the claim acted upon or deemed rejected. (§ 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 ; see generally Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2024) § 5.14.) When the cause of action is for personal injuries, as in this case, the prospective plaintiff must ordinarily present the claim to the public entity within six months after the cause of action accr 2024(State of California, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1243 .) Even if appellant’s November 2, 2019 mailing to the clerk of the County could be considered an application for permission 11 to file a late claim, it was not presented within the one-year time limit set forth in section 911.4. | 2 | 6 |
Barragan v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2026(J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 652 .) Claims for personal injury, personal property damage, or wrongful death must be presented no later than six months after the cause of action accrues. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A plaintiff who misses this deadline may apply directly to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) If the public entity denies an application for leave to present a late claim, the plaintiff may petition the trial court, within six months of the entity’s denial, for an order relieving the plaintiff from the prefi 2022Duran suggests that even if he did not diligently try to retain an attorney within six months of his injury, he may still bring a late claim against Arrowhead under Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373 and DeVore v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 454 (DeVore). | 2 | 4 |
Department of Water & Power v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025To obtain relief from the claim presentation requirement, a petitioner must prove “both that the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was presented within a reasonable time and that the failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293 , first italics added.) Additionally, since appellants did not establish excusable neglect, the burden never shifted to the County to “establish[ ] that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim” if re 2022(Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1079 , 1089 (Lincoln).) “Before a court may relieve a claimant from the statutory tort claim filing requirements, the claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both that the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was presented within a reasonable time and that the failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293 (DWP); Tammen v. County of San Diego County | 2 | 4 |
| County of Santa Clara v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 4 |
| Rivera v. City of Carsongreen | 2 | 4 |
| Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Districtgreen | 2 | 4 |
| Estill v. Cnty. of Shastagreen | 2 | 3 |
| Cory v. City of Huntington Beachgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| E.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtred | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
| D.C. v. Oakdale Joint Unified School District green | 4 | 2014–2017 |
| Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District green | 4 | 2011–2015 |
| Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court green | 3 | 2022–2026 |
| Harvey v. City of Holtville green | 3 | 1971–2020 |
| Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope green | 2 | 1995–2025 |
| Judicial Council v. Superior Court green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School District green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Harvey v. City of Holtville green | 2 | 1979–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.