Michigan rule in Michigan

2024Concerning the state test, the Court explained that “Michigan’s test for retroactivity was originally derived from the pre-Teague federal test set forth in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 ; 85 S Ct 1731 ; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965).” Carp, 496 Mich at 496 .

2024Concerning the state test, the Court explained that “Michigan’s test for retroactivity was originally derived from the pre-Teague federal test set forth in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 ; 85 S Ct 1731 ; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965).” Carp, 496 Mich at 496 .

2007Beginning with Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , [8] a case involving the interpretation of MCL 35.21, the majority overruled Michigan precedent establishing prudential standing as the traditional doctrine of legal standing in Michigan. [9] In place of Michigan's doctrine of prudential standing, the majority created for Michigan a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal courts' test for standing, as stated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [10] In Nat'l Wildlife, the majority of four, through lengthy dicta, attacked the Michigan Environmental

2007Beginning with Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , [8] a case involving the interpretation of MCL 35.21, the majority overruled Michigan precedent establishing prudential standing as the traditional doctrine of legal standing in Michigan. [9] In place of Michigan's doctrine of prudential standing, the majority created for Michigan a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal courts' test for standing, as stated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [10] In Nat'l Wildlife, the majority of four, through lengthy dicta, attacked the Michigan Environmental

2025Under MRE 403, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” To be sure, all “evidence offered by the parties is ‘prejudicial’ to some extent, but the fear of prejudice does not generally render the evidence inadmissible.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75 ; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).

2025Under MRE 403, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” To be sure, all “evidence offered by the parties is ‘prejudicial’ to some extent, but the fear of prejudice does not generally render the evidence inadmissible.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75 ; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).

2024Finally, under the third prong of Michigan’s test, the instances in which acquitted conduct was relied on at sentencing are presumably limited, such that retroactive application of Beck would have a lesser effect on the administration of justice than new rules affecting all sentences, see, e.g., id., or rules which would likely result in a large number of retrials, see, e.g., Sexton, 458 Mich at 67 .

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

1981In People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 357 ; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the standard for admitting polygraph results, stating: "The Michigan test presently applied to determine the admissibility of polygraph testimony is that which we enunciated in People v Becker, 300 Mich 562, 566 ; 2 NW2d 503 (1942), and repeated with approval in People v Davis, 343 Mich 348, 370 ; 72 NW2d 269 (1955), that there be: " 'testimony offered which would indicate that there is at this time a general scientiñc recognition of such [polygraph] tests.

1981In People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 357 ; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the standard for admitting polygraph results, stating: "The Michigan test presently applied to determine the admissibility of polygraph testimony is that which we enunciated in People v Becker, 300 Mich 562, 566 ; 2 NW2d 503 (1942), and repeated with approval in People v Davis, 343 Mich 348, 370 ; 72 NW2d 269 (1955), that there be: " 'testimony offered which would indicate that there is at this time a general scientiñc recognition of such [polygraph] tests.

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

2014First, the new rule applied retroactively in McConnell addressed the right to counsel, a right with unique significance both within the context of the criminal proceeding27 and within the context of the United States Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.28 Given this extraordinary footing of the right to counsel, we read 26 The new rule made retroactive in McConnell was set forth in Mempa v Rhay, 389 US 128 ; 88 S Ct 254 ; 19 L Ed 2d 336 (1967), and held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, including the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, extended to the sentencing ph

2014First, the new rule applied retroactively in McConnell addressed the right to counsel, a right with unique significance both within the context of the criminal proceeding27 and within the context of the United States Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.28 Given this extraordinary footing of the right to counsel, we read 26 The new rule made retroactive in McConnell was set forth in Mempa v Rhay, 389 US 128 ; 88 S Ct 254 ; 19 L Ed 2d 336 (1967), and held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, including the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, extended to the sentencing ph

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

2014On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and WHITBECK, JJ., determined that Miller had created a new rule that was procedural in nature and not subject to retroactive application under the rules set forth in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), or the separate and independent Michigan test for retroactivity set forth in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 (1998), and People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008). 298 Mich App 472 (2012).

2008The Poole Court stated that it was “guided by the comment of the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning FRE 804(b)(3), on which the Michigan rule is modeled.” Id.

2008The Poole Court stated that it was “guided by the comment of the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning FRE 804(b)(3), on which the Michigan rule is modeled.” Id.

2007Hendrick, 472 Mich at 560 .

2007Hendrick, 472 Mich at 560 .

2007In place of Michigan’s doctrine of prudential standing, the majority erroneously adopted a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal courts’ doctrine of standing, as stated in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.4 2 MCL 324.1701(1) states: The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or

2007In place of Michigan’s doctrine of prudential standing, the majority erroneously adopted a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal courts’ doctrine of standing, as stated in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.4 2 MCL 324.1701(1) states: The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or

1999The current Michigan standard is stated in People v Krugman, 311 Mich 559, 563; 141 NW2d 33 (1966): “A criminal defendant is presumptively sane..

1999The current Michigan standard is stated in People v Krugman, 311 Mich 559, 563; 141 NW2d 33 (1966): “A criminal defendant is presumptively sane..

1986As stated by this Court in People v Barbara, supra at 358: There was no testimony by disinterested and impartial experts "in the particular field [physiological and psychological] in which it belongs" ( Frye test), and thus no demonstration of "general scientific recognition of such [polygraph] tests" (Michigan rule).

1986As stated by this Court in People v Barbara, supra at 358: There was no testimony by disinterested and impartial experts "in the particular field [physiological and psychological] in which it belongs” (Frye test), and thus no demonstration of "general scientific recognition of such [polygraph] tests” (Michigan rule).

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961]).” Const 1963, art 1, §11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961]).” Const 1963, art 1, §11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961]).” Const 1963, art 1, §11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961])." Const 1963, art 1, § 11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches *374 and seizures." (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961]).” Const 1963, art 1, §11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961])." Const 1963, art 1, § 11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches *374 and seizures." (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961]).” Const 1963, art 1, §11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti

1982See People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554 ; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), cert den 423 US 878 ; 96 S Ct 152 ; 46 L Ed 2d 111 (1975) (imposing higher Michigan standard relative to electronic surveillance); People v Margelis, 217 Mich 423 ; 186 NW 488 (1922) (applying the exclusionary rule prior to the time it was mandated by Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 [1961]).” Const 1963, art 1, §11, provides in part: "The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti

1978At issue in King was the constitutional validity of the Michigan standard policy law of 1881 ( 1881 PA 149 ) which, in the Court’s words, empowered a newly created insurance commission "which was a body having continuous existence, to alter or amend the form so adopted by them 'whenever they shall deem it necessary.’ ” It also empowered the commissioner of insurance "to fix the time when the use of the form of policy so adopted or amended 'shall become obligatory,’ and prohibited thereafter, under penalty, the making of contracts of fire insurance, except in accordance with said form as so alt

1978At issue in King was the constitutional validity of the Michigan standard policy law of 1881 ( 1881 PA 149 ) which, in the Court’s words, empowered a newly created insurance commission "which was a body having continuous existence, to alter or amend the form so adopted by them 'whenever they shall deem it necessary.’ ” It also empowered the commissioner of insurance "to fix the time when the use of the form of policy so adopted or amended 'shall become obligatory,’ and prohibited thereafter, under penalty, the making of contracts of fire insurance, except in accordance with said form as so alt