preferable instruction in California

1987(Fraijo v. Hartland Hospital, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 347; com. to BAJI No. 3.75, p. 93.) Prosser described “substantial factor" as a term “sufficiently intelligible to any layman to furnish an adequate guide to the jury----” (Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, supra, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 369, 379.) The substantial factor language in BAJI No. 3.76 makes it the preferable instruction over BAJI No. 3.75.

1987(Fraijo v. Hartland Hospital, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 347.) This is especially so where the evidence might lead the jury to misinterpret the phrase “natural and continuous sequence of events” to require an unbroken physical chain.

1971Since the Supreme Court has stated that reapportionment more often than every 10 years is desirable (Burns v. Richardson, supra, 384 U.S. 73, 96 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 393 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 584 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 540 ]), the court necessarily implies that between decennial federal censuses, such redistricting may be based on reliable estimates. 17 Furthermore, although it is true that registration figures are more frequently updated than the federal census, we reject the City’s contention that this alone makes them a preferable, or even acceptable, apportionment standard.

1971Since the Supreme Court has stated that reapportionment more often than every 10 years is desirable (Burns v. Richardson, supra, 384 U.S. 73, 96 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 393 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 584 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 540 ]), the court necessarily implies that between decennial federal censuses, such redistricting may be based on reliable estimates. 17 Furthermore, although it is true that registration figures are more frequently updated than the federal census, we reject the City’s contention that this alone makes them a preferable, or even acceptable, apportionment standard.

1971Since the Supreme Court has stated that reapportionment more often than every 10 years is desirable (Burns v. Richardson, supra, 384 U.S. 73, 96 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 393 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 584 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 540 ]), the court necessarily implies that between decennial federal censuses, such redistricting may be based on reliable estimates. 17 Furthermore, although it is true that registration figures are more frequently updated than the federal census, we reject the City’s contention that this alone makes them a preferable, or even acceptable, apportionment standard.

1971Since the Supreme Court has stated that reapportionment more often than every 10 years is desirable (Burns v. Richardson, supra, 384 U.S. 73, 96 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 393 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 584 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 540 ]), the court necessarily implies that between decennial federal censuses, such redistricting may be based on reliable estimates. 17 Furthermore, although it is true that registration figures are more frequently updated than the federal census, we reject the City’s contention that this alone makes them a preferable, or even acceptable, apportionment standard.

1968While the town’s position is supported by older cases (see, e.g., In re Imperial Water Co. (1926) 199 Cal. 556, 557-558 [ 250 P. 394 ]), the preferable rule, which we henceforth follow, was recently declared in Deepwell Homeowners’ Protective Assn. v. City Council (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 63, 65-66 [48 Cal.Rptr. *537 321]: “So, too, the rule now is that in aid of their appellate jurisdiction the courts will grant supersedeas in appeals where to deny a stay would deprive the appellant of the benefit of a reversal of the judgment against him, provided, of course, that a proper showing is made.

1968While the town’s position is supported by older cases (see, e.g., In re Imperial Water Co. (1926) 199 Cal. 556, 557-558 [ 250 P. 394 ]), the preferable rule, which we henceforth follow, was recently declared in Deepwell Homeowners’ Protective Assn. v. City Council (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 63, 65-66 [48 Cal.Rptr. *537 321]: “So, too, the rule now is that in aid of their appellate jurisdiction the courts will grant supersedeas in appeals where to deny a stay would deprive the appellant of the benefit of a reversal of the judgment against him, provided, of course, that a proper showing is made.

1968While the town’s position is supported by older cases (see, e.g., In re Imperial Water Co. (1926) 199 Cal. 556, 557-558 [ 250 P. 394 ]), the preferable rule, which we henceforth follow, was recently declared in Deepwell Homeowners’ Protective Assn. v. City Council (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 63, 65-66 [48 Cal.Rptr. *537 321]: “So, too, the rule now is that in aid of their appellate jurisdiction the courts will grant supersedeas in appeals where to deny a stay would deprive the appellant of the benefit of a reversal of the judgment against him, provided, of course, that a proper showing is made.