seminal test in California

2023(See Bryant, supra, at p. 981 [mandatory supervision conditions “are to be evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in [ Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 [ ].”]; Bryant, supra, at p. 986, fn. 6 [explaining that its holding is a general rule that may be subject to certain exceptions].) Lent articulated the seminal test for determining whether a probation condition is reasonable and thus lawful: “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in

2023(See Bryant, supra, at p. 981 [mandatory supervision conditions “are to be evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in [ Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 [ ].”]; Bryant, supra, at p. 986, fn. 6 [explaining that its holding is a general rule that may be subject to certain exceptions].) Lent articulated the seminal test for determining whether a probation condition is reasonable and thus lawful: “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in

2021(Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 845 .) The rule was applied in Lehman to recognize the community interest in an early retirement incentive “result[ing] from ‘improvements to the retirement benefit formula’ under [the employer’s] existing defined benefit retirement plan.” (Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 186 .) And it was applied by the Frahm court to characterize as the employee spouse’s separate property a severance payment unrelated to the retirement benefits acquired and accrued during marriage.

2021(Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 845 .) The rule was applied in Lehman to recognize the community interest in an early retirement incentive “result[ing] from ‘improvements to the retirement benefit formula’ under [the employer’s] existing defined benefit retirement plan.” (Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 186 .) And it was applied by the Frahm court to characterize as the employee spouse’s separate property a severance payment unrelated to the retirement benefits acquired and accrued during marriage.

2008In Terry , the high court held: “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 908 ].) The Terry court continued, “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons fo

2008In Terry , the high court held: “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 908 ].) The Terry court continued, “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons fo

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993We would *1236 need to consider whether there was no opportunity to question the terms of the agreement (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 377 P.2d 284 ]), that there were hidden or ambiguous terms in the agreement (Spence v. Omnibus Industries (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 171 ]), that the adherent would need to sign the agreement or forego necessary treatment (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 ]), that the liability of one party was greatly limited (Tunkl, sup

1993(Neal, supra, 188 Cal.App.2d at p. 694 .) A standardized form in itself does not render a contract to be a contract of adhesion. “[I]n determining whether an individual contract may be classified as a contract of adhesion, the seminal test is whether the stronger party has disappointed the reasonable expectations of the other party.” (Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 315, 325 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In essence, in determining whether a contract is unconscionable or includes terms beyond the reasonable expectations of the ordinary person involves an analysis of many of t

1980Before deciding whether turf grass satisfies the constitutional definition, it is necessary to examine cases which are helpful in delineating the scope of a “growing crop.” The seminal test of the constitutional term “growing crop” was enunciated in Cottle v. Spitzer (1884) 65 Cal. 456 [ 4 P. 435 ].

1980Before deciding whether turf grass satisfies the constitutional definition, it is necessary to examine cases which are helpful in delineating the scope of a “growing crop.” The seminal test of the constitutional term “growing crop” was enunciated in Cottle v. Spitzer (1884) 65 Cal. 456 [ 4 P. 435 ].