nonexclusive factors in Washington

2025Among the nonexclusive factors to be considered are the “ ‘[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of [their] right, and prejudice to the defendant.’ ” Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d at 827 (first alteration in original) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.

2025Among the nonexclusive factors to be considered are the “ ‘[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of [their] right, and prejudice to the defendant.’ ” Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d at 827 (first alteration in original) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.

2018Gunwall Analysis ¶ 21 In Gunwall , we set forth the following nonexclusive factors to be considered when determining whether a provision of the state constitution should be interpreted independently of its corresponding federal constitutional provision: "(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern." 106 Wash.2d at 58 , 720 P.2d 808 . ¶ 22 The first, second, and third factors all support applying federal precedent because the texts are "nearly ident

2018Gunwall Analysis ¶ 21 In Gunwall , we set forth the following nonexclusive factors to be considered when determining whether a provision of the state constitution should be interpreted independently of its corresponding federal constitutional provision: "(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern." 106 Wash.2d at 58 , 720 P.2d 808 . ¶ 22 The first, second, and third factors all support applying federal precedent because the texts are "nearly ident

2005App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: “ ‘(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to change.’ ” Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wn.

2005See, e.g., Markley v. Markley, 31 Wash.2d 605, 614-15 , 198 P.2d 486 (1948); Johnson v. Si-Cor, Inc., 107 Wash.App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶ 13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: "(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to ch

2005See, e.g., Markley v. Markley, 31 Wash.2d 605, 614-15 , 198 P.2d 486 (1948); Johnson v. Si-Cor, Inc., 107 Wash.App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶ 13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: "(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to ch

2005See, e.g., Markley v. Markley, 31 Wash.2d 605, 614-15 , 198 P.2d 486 (1948); Johnson v. Si-Cor, Inc., 107 Wash.App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶ 13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: "(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to ch

2005App. 113 , 124 n.36, 29 P.3d 771 (2001) (quoting Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wn.

2005See, e.g., Markley v. Markley, 31 Wash.2d 605, 614-15 , 198 P.2d 486 (1948); Johnson v. Si-Cor, Inc., 107 Wash.App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶ 13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: "(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to ch

2005App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: “ ‘(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to change.’ ” Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wn.

2005See, e.g., Markley v. Markley, 31 Wash.2d 605, 614-15 , 198 P.2d 486 (1948); Johnson v. Si-Cor, Inc., 107 Wash.App. 902, 906 , 28 P.3d 832 (2001). ¶ 13 Nonexclusive factors promote court discretion in applying judicial estoppel: "(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to ch

2004In Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 346 , 898 P.2d 831 (1995), the court stated that “[a] meretricious relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.” Nonexclusive factors estab lishing a meretricious relationship include “continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties.” Id.

2004In Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 346 , 898 P.2d 831 (1995), the court stated that “[a] meretricious relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.” Nonexclusive factors estab lishing a meretricious relationship include “continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties.” Id.

2002In Schroeder we recognized the following nonexclusive factors to consider in assessing the unconscionability of a liability exclusionary clause: (1) the conspicuousness of the clause in the agreement; (2) the presence or absence of negotiations regarding the clause; (3) the custom and usage of the trade; and (4) any policy developed between the parties during the course of dealing. 86 Wash.2d at 259-61 , 544 P.2d 20 .

2002In Schroeder we recognized the following nonexclusive factors to consider in assessing the unconscionability of a liability exclusionary clause: (1) the conspicuousness of the clause in the agreement; (2) the presence or absence of negotiations regarding the clause; (3) the custom and usage of the trade; and (4) any policy developed between the parties during the course of dealing. 86 Wash.2d at 259-61 , 544 P.2d 20 .

2025The nonexclusive factors courts have used in addressing superseding cause in tort cases include whether the intervening act “ ‘created a different type of harm than otherwise would have resulted from the actor’s negligence.’ ” Id. at 858 n.4 (quoting Campbell, 107 Wn.2d at 812-13 ).

2025Id.

2025The nonexclusive factors courts have used in addressing superseding cause in tort cases include whether the intervening act “ ‘created a different type of harm than otherwise would have resulted from the actor’s negligence.’ ” Id. at 858 n.4 (quoting Campbell, 107 Wn.2d at 812-13 ).

2022We review a maintenance award for an abuse of discretion.19 “‘The only limitation on amount and duration of maintenance under RCW 26.09.090 is that, in light of the relevant factors, the award must be just.’”20 The court can consider the following nonexclusive factors in awarding maintenance: (1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance; (2) the time needed to acquire education necessary to obtain employment; (3) the standard of living during the marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage, (5) the age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the spouse se

2022App. 817, 821-22 , 320 P.3d 115 (2014). 20Matter of Marriage of Anthony, 9 Wn.

2021Randy Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 152-53 . 10 No. 50009-4-II; Cons.

2021The court must “give great weight to the victim’s opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section.” 9 Most importantly, only if the court imposes a sentence contrary to the victim’s opinion must it 6 Id. at 481 . 7 Id. at 481-82 . 8 Appellant’s Br. at 2. 9 RCW 9.94A.670(4). 3 No. 81313-7-I/4 state its reasons or enter findings of fact.10 During sentencing, the court acknowledged RCW 9.94A.670(4) contains a list of factors to consider, and then stated it considered exhibit 1, which included the stipulated facts of Bullington’s offense, the number of victim

2021The court must “give great weight to the victim’s opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section.” 9 Most importantly, only if the court imposes a sentence contrary to the victim’s opinion must it 6 Id. at 481 . 7 Id. at 481-82 . 8 Appellant’s Br. at 2. 9 RCW 9.94A.670(4). 3 No. 81313-7-I/4 state its reasons or enter findings of fact.10 During sentencing, the court acknowledged RCW 9.94A.670(4) contains a list of factors to consider, and then stated it considered exhibit 1, which included the stipulated facts of Bullington’s offense, the number of victim

2018App. 434 , 149 P.3d 446 (2006), aff'd, 164 Wn.2d 83 , 186 P.3d 1062 (2008); DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369 .

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018App. 434 , 149 P.3d 446 (2006), aff'd, 164 Wn.2d 83 , 186 P.3d 1062 (2008); DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369 .

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma

2018In doing so, the court should examine the "facts and circumstances" of the case, DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d at 378 , 816 P.2d 1 , while indulging in " 'every reasonable presumption against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel,' " Madsen, 168 Wash.2d at 504 , 229 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 396 , 986 P.2d 790 ). ¶ 24 To determine whether a request was made, the court can consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) how the request was made-for example, was the request made formally in a motion or spontaneously at a hearing?, compare Ma