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7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ozunagreen2 sentences2011Making a determination in light of the totality of the circumstances "protects society's interest in ensuring a complete proceeding." United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir.2009). 1 16 Second, the determination of whether or not to grant a pretrial motion to rehear an evidentiary matter should include consideration of any of the nonexclusive factors described below, or others that may be relevant to a specific case. 2011Making a determination in light of the totality of the circumstances "protects society's interest in ensuring a complete proceeding." United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir.2009). ¶ 16 Second, the determination of whether or not to grant a pretrial motion to rehear an evidentiary matter should include consideration of any of the nonexclusive factors described below, or others that may be relevant to a specific case. | 2 | 2 |
Allred v. Allredgreen1 sentence2005We emphasize, however, that we do not intend our remand to be “merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached.” Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah Ct.App.1990). ¶ 21 Our consideration of the evidence, using the nonexclusive factors set forth above, further demonstrates why we must remand to the district court to weigh the evidence and sort out the key facts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Otkovic
green
2 sentences2017As discussed in State v. DeJesus, this interpretation of Tiedemann is erroneous, and we disavow it. . 2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 24-27 , 395 P.3d 111 . . 2014 UT App 58, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 746 (holding that "to prevail on [a motion to dismiss], a defendant must first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory’” (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 )). . 2017As discussed in State v. DeJesus, this interpretation of Tiedemann is erroneous, and we disavow it. . 2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 24-27 , 395 P.3d 111 . . 2014 UT App 58, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 746 (holding that "to prevail on [a motion to dismiss], a defendant must first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory’” (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 )). . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2017In Jackson, the court of appeals interpreted Tiedemann as holding that "courts should consider the nonexclusive factors outlined in rule 16’ ... [and], [additionally, if a defendant establishes 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, courts also need to consider” the culpability of the State and "the degree of prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Tiedemann
green
2 sentences2017As discussed in State v. DeJesus, this interpretation of Tiedemann is erroneous, and we disavow it. . 2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 24-27 , 395 P.3d 111 . . 2014 UT App 58, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 746 (holding that "to prevail on [a motion to dismiss], a defendant must first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory’” (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 )). . 2017As discussed in State v. DeJesus, this interpretation of Tiedemann is erroneous, and we disavow it. . 2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 24-27 , 395 P.3d 111 . . 2014 UT App 58, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 746 (holding that "to prevail on [a motion to dismiss], a defendant must first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory’” (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 )). . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. DeJesus
green
2 sentences2017As discussed in State v. DeJesus, this interpretation of Tiedemann is erroneous, and we disavow it. . 2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 24-27 , 395 P.3d 111 . . 2014 UT App 58, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 746 (holding that "to prevail on [a motion to dismiss], a defendant must first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory’” (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 )). . 2017As discussed in State v. DeJesus, this interpretation of Tiedemann is erroneous, and we disavow it. . 2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 24-27 , 395 P.3d 111 . . 2014 UT App 58, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 746 (holding that "to prevail on [a motion to dismiss], a defendant must first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory’” (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 )). . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, Judge
green
1 sentence2012Id. 116 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2010To determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts should balance the following nonexclusive factors: the “ ‘[l]ength of [the] delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). 2010To determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts should balance the following nonexclusive factors: the “ ‘[l]ength of [the] delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Kallin
green
2 sentences2007Id. 2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.