useful framework in Colorado

6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp.green ca6 · 2012 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020Accordingly, Caldwell does not inform our analysis. 26 ¶ 57 The Sixth Circuit has developed a useful framework for evaluating the reliability of an expert’s opinion, explaining that there are a number of “[r]ed flags that caution against certifying an expert.” Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2012). 2020These red flags include (1) “reliance on anecdotal evidence”; (2) “improper extrapolation”; (3) “failure to consider other possible causes”; (4) “lack of testing”; (5) “subjectivity”; and (6) that “a purported expert’s opinion was prepared solely for litigation.” Id. (first citing Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir. 2009); then citing Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007)). ¶ 58 Each of these red flags, to one degree or another, is present here.	1	1
Best v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.green ca6 · 2009 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020These red flags include (1) “reliance on anecdotal evidence”; (2) “improper extrapolation”; (3) “failure to consider other possible causes”; (4) “lack of testing”; (5) “subjectivity”; and (6) that “a purported expert’s opinion was prepared solely for litigation.” Id. (first citing Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir. 2009); then citing Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007)). ¶ 58 Each of these red flags, to one degree or another, is present here.	1	1
Shirley Johnson, as Legal Guardian of Michael Gilfeather, an Incapacitated Adult v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc.green ca6 · 2007 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020These red flags include (1) “reliance on anecdotal evidence”; (2) “improper extrapolation”; (3) “failure to consider other possible causes”; (4) “lack of testing”; (5) “subjectivity”; and (6) that “a purported expert’s opinion was prepared solely for litigation.” Id. (first citing Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir. 2009); then citing Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007)). ¶ 58 Each of these red flags, to one degree or another, is present here.	1	1
Zant v. Stephensgreen scotus · 1983 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 2 sentences 1990In essence, an aggravating circumstance is a legislative determination that “this murder is different.” This difference “must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 , 103 S.Ct. at 2742 (footnote omitted). 1990In essence, an aggravating circumstance is a legislative determination that "this murder is different." This difference "must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 , 103 *185 S.Ct. at 2742 (footnote omitted).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Candelaria v. People green colo · 2006 2 sentences 2020We disagree. 4 In Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006), we observed that the jury had been instructed as to first degree murder “according to a theory of transferred intent,” id. at 183 , but we were quick to point out that neither the adequacy of that instruction nor the sufficiency of the evidence was before us, id. at 183 & n.3. 5 For support, the division turned chiefly to People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93 , 412 P.3d 838 , where a different division read our decision in People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981), as establishing “that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to secon 2020We disagree. 4 In Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006), we observed that the jury had been instructed as to first degree murder “according to a theory of transferred intent,” id. at 183 , but we were quick to point out that neither the adequacy of that instruction nor the sufficiency of the evidence was before us, id. at 183 & n.3. 5 For support, the division turned chiefly to People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93 , 412 P.3d 838 , where a different division read our decision in People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981), as establishing “that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to secon	1	2020–2020
People v. Marcy red colo · 1981 1 sentence 2020We disagree. 4 In Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006), we observed that the jury had been instructed as to first degree murder “according to a theory of transferred intent,” id. at 183 , but we were quick to point out that neither the adequacy of that instruction nor the sufficiency of the evidence was before us, id. at 183 & n.3. 5 For support, the division turned chiefly to People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93 , 412 P.3d 838 , where a different division read our decision in People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981), as establishing “that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to secon	1	2020–2020
People v. Hunt green coloctapp · 2016 2 sentences 2020We disagree. 4 In Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006), we observed that the jury had been instructed as to first degree murder “according to a theory of transferred intent,” id. at 183 , but we were quick to point out that neither the adequacy of that instruction nor the sufficiency of the evidence was before us, id. at 183 & n.3. 5 For support, the division turned chiefly to People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93 , 412 P.3d 838 , where a different division read our decision in People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981), as establishing “that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to secon 2020We disagree. 4 In Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006), we observed that the jury had been instructed as to first degree murder “according to a theory of transferred intent,” id. at 183 , but we were quick to point out that neither the adequacy of that instruction nor the sufficiency of the evidence was before us, id. at 183 & n.3. 5 For support, the division turned chiefly to People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93 , 412 P.3d 838 , where a different division read our decision in People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981), as establishing “that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to secon	1	2020–2020
Hagos v. People green colo · 2012 1 sentence 2014An error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "if there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 132 The Eighth Circuit has supplied a useful framework for analyzing prejudice in this context: A reviewing court must carefully serutinize the facts and cireamstances of the manner in which the [codefendant's guilty] plea was used.	1	2014–2014
Popovich v. Irlando green colo · 1991 2 sentences 2012Based on the Smartt and Frohlick Crane Service cases, an alternative phrasing might be "job-related cancers." However, that phrasing is too vague to serve as a useful standard. " 'In the course of employment' generally refers to 'the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred.' " Popovich v. Irlando, 811 P.2d 379 , 383 (Colo.1991). 2012"The 'course of employment' requirement is satisfied when it is shown that the injury occurred within the time and place limits of the employment relation and during an activity that had some connection with the employee's job-related functions." Id.	1	2012–2012
Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People green colo · 1938 2 sentences 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al	1	1983–1983
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. And Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. green ca2 · 1979 1 sentence 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al	1	1983–1983
Van Sistine v. Tollard green wisctapp · 1980 2 sentences 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al	1	1983–1983
Aluminum Company of America v. Electro Flo Corporation, a Corporation, and Ashley L. Robison green ca10 · 1971 1 sentence 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al	1	1983–1983
Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. v. Dravo Corp. green med · 1977 1 sentence 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al	1	1983–1983
Frances M. Bonebrake, Administratrix De Bonis Non of the Estate of Woodrow B. Simek, Deceased v. Donald Cox and Claude Cox, D/B/A Tamarack Bowl green ca8 · 1974 1 sentence 1983Useful factors to consider in determining whether “goods” or “service” predominates include the following: the contractual language used by the parties, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, supra; Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571 , 81 P.2d 764 (1938); whether the agreement involves one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other, see, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., supra; Al	1	1983–1983

Where else courts name it

CA 26 (1974–2021) NM 16 (1996–2024) NY 14 (1925–2025) IL 13 (1980–2020) TX 13 (1977–2026) AL 11 (1991–2012) AZ 9 (1990–2017) IN 9 (1998–2025) OH 9 (1988–2021) NE 9 (1914–2025) MD 9 (1983–2010) NJ 8 (1887–2018) MN 8 (1990–2024) PA 6 (1981–2024) MA 6 (1980–2025) CO 6 (1983–2020) MI 6 (1993–2025) WI 6 (1986–2007) FL 5 (1969–2012) OR 5 (1981–2021) KY 4 (1995–2025) ID 4 (1985–2010) MS 4 (1991–1995) CT 4 (1997–2018) DE 4 (1985–2023) IA 4 (1977–2022) UT 4 (1999–2020) WA 3 (1976–1993) LA 3 (2005–2012) AK 3 (1981–2026) DC 3 (1990–2015) RI 2 (2003–2004) KS 2 (2014–2020) WY 2 (1993–2020) VA 2 (2013–2023) AR 2 (1987–1987) VT 2 (1990–2020) OK 2 (1986–1993) SC 2 (1994–1996) WV 2 (1995–1997) HI 2 (1958–1996)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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