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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2018A. Deportation is a Penalty for a Criminal Conviction As the Court has recognized, "[o]ur law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century." Padilla , 559 U.S. at 365-66 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 . 2018A. Deportation is a Penalty for a Criminal Conviction As the Court has recognized, "[o]ur law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century." Padilla , 559 U.S. at 365-66 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 . | 1 | 2 |
In Re WMgreen2 sentences2023Relying on prior cases describing SORA as “a remedial regulatory enactment, not a penal law,” “we conclude[d] that the Sixth Amendment does not require that we divert . . . from the statute that calls for jury trial in only these cases where the maximum penalty exceeds 180 days.” Id.; see In re Doe, 855 A.2d 1100, 1103-07 (D.C. 2004); In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 441; D.C. 2023Relying on prior cases describing SORA as “a remedial regulatory enactment, not a penal law,” “we conclude[d] that the Sixth Amendment does not require that we divert . . . from the statute that calls for jury trial in only these cases where the maximum penalty exceeds 180 days.” Id.; see In re Doe, 855 A.2d 1100, 1103-07 (D.C. 2004); In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 441; D.C. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Doe (\ Sd\")"green2 sentences2023Relying on prior cases describing SORA as “a remedial regulatory enactment, not a penal law,” “we conclude[d] that the Sixth Amendment does not require that we divert . . . from the statute that calls for jury trial in only these cases where the maximum penalty exceeds 180 days.” Id.; see In re Doe, 855 A.2d 1100, 1103-07 (D.C. 2004); In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 441; D.C. 2023Relying on prior cases describing SORA as “a remedial regulatory enactment, not a penal law,” “we conclude[d] that the Sixth Amendment does not require that we divert . . . from the statute that calls for jury trial in only these cases where the maximum penalty exceeds 180 days.” Id.; see In re Doe, 855 A.2d 1100, 1103-07 (D.C. 2004); In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 441; D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Spriggs v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023Thomas addressed whether SORA’s registration requirement is a severe enough penalty to overcome the Blanton presumption under the “extremely limited plain-error standard.” 942 A.2d at 1186 (quoting Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C. 1992)). 2023Thomas addressed whether SORA’s registration requirement is a severe enough penalty to overcome the Blanton presumption under the “extremely limited plain-error standard.” 942 A.2d at 1186 (quoting Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C. 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Sessions v. Dimayagreen2 sentences2018See Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1213, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) ("[A]s federal immigration law increasingly hinged deportation orders on prior convictions, removal proceedings became ever more 'intimately related to the criminal process.' " (quoting Chaidez v. United States , 568 U.S. 342 , 352, 133 S.Ct. 1103 , 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (in turn quoting Padilla , 559 U.S. at 365 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 ) ). 2018See Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1213, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) ("[A]s federal immigration law increasingly hinged deportation orders on prior convictions, removal proceedings became ever more 'intimately related to the criminal process.' " (quoting Chaidez v. United States , 568 U.S. 342 , 352, 133 S.Ct. 1103 , 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (in turn quoting Padilla , 559 U.S. at 365 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 ) ). | 1 | 1 |
Chaidez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018See Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1213, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) ("[A]s federal immigration law increasingly hinged deportation orders on prior convictions, removal proceedings became ever more 'intimately related to the criminal process.' " (quoting Chaidez v. United States , 568 U.S. 342 , 352, 133 S.Ct. 1103 , 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (in turn quoting Padilla , 559 U.S. at 365 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 ) ). 2018See Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1213, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) ("[A]s federal immigration law increasingly hinged deportation orders on prior convictions, removal proceedings became ever more 'intimately related to the criminal process.' " (quoting Chaidez v. United States , 568 U.S. 342 , 352, 133 S.Ct. 1103 , 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (in turn quoting Padilla , 559 U.S. at 365 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 ) ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas
green
2 sentences2018The loss of liberty, akin to incarceration, that results from removal as well as the Court's repeated statements about its severity, lead us to conclude, under a Blanton analysis, that deportation is so "onerous" a penalty for conviction that it presents the "rare situation" that should ensure the availability of a jury trial in a criminal proceeding even though the penalty of incarceration does not "puncture the six-month incarceration line." Blanton , 489 U.S. at 543 , 109 S.Ct. 1289 . 2018The loss of liberty, akin to incarceration, that results from removal as well as the Court's repeated statements about its severity, lead us to conclude, under a Blanton analysis, that deportation is so "onerous" a penalty for conviction that it presents the "rare situation" that should ensure the availability of a jury trial in a criminal proceeding even though the penalty of incarceration does not "puncture the six-month incarceration line." Blanton , 489 U.S. at 543 , 109 S.Ct. 1289 . | 4 | 1996–2018 |
United States v. Nachtigal
green
2 sentences2018The Court applied a Blanton analysis one other time, in United States v. Nachtigal , another case that involved operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 507 U.S. 1 , 2, 113 S.Ct. 1072 , 122 L.Ed.2d 374 (1993). 2018The Court applied a Blanton analysis one other time, in United States v. Nachtigal , another case that involved operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 507 U.S. 1 , 2, 113 S.Ct. 1072 , 122 L.Ed.2d 374 (1993). | 2 | 1996–2018 |
Thomas v. United States
green
2 sentences2023Thomas addressed whether SORA’s registration requirement is a severe enough penalty to overcome the Blanton presumption under the “extremely limited plain-error standard.” 942 A.2d at 1186 (quoting Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C. 1992)). 2023Thomas addressed whether SORA’s registration requirement is a severe enough penalty to overcome the Blanton presumption under the “extremely limited plain-error standard.” 942 A.2d at 1186 (quoting Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C. 1992)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Foote v. United States
green
2 sentences1996In any event, this court already has concluded that mere eligibility for recidivist penalties will not rebut a Blanton presumption that an offense is “petty.” As we recently said in Foote v. United States, 670 A.2d 366 (D.C.1996), where the appellant presented a claim identical to the one advanced here: “reliance on ‘commonplace’ recidivist penalties which [the defendant] personally was not facing is foreclosed by Blanton.” Id. *955 at 373 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545 , 109 S.Ct. at 1294 ). 1 Brown also claims the right to a juiy trial because another judge revoked his probation for a pri 1996In any event, this court already has concluded that mere eligibility for recidivist penalties will not rebut a Blanton presumption that an offense is “petty.” As we recently said in Foote v. United States, 670 A.2d 366 (D.C.1996), where the appellant presented a claim identical to the one advanced here: “reliance on ‘commonplace’ recidivist penalties which [the defendant] personally was not facing is foreclosed by Blanton.” Id. *955 at 373 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545 , 109 S.Ct. at 1294 ). 1 Brown also claims the right to a juiy trial because another judge revoked his probation for a pri | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.