document rule in District of Columbia

2017Specifically, Harris averred that the DEA chemist “used the remaining portion of another test sample” to perform the D-L test and opined that “[t]his is not proper scientific practice and could result in contamination of the sample prior to the D-L test.” Harris also averred that sample contamination “can lead to false positive results.” The government asserts that appellant did not meet his burden of making a “prima facie showing of materiality” because his expert Harris “neither cited to a document where such an error was discernible nor ... explained] how she deduced that such an error occu

2017Id. at 1015 n.8. 18 because his expert Harris ―neither cited to a document where such an error was discernible nor . . . explain[ed] how she deduced that such an error occurred‖ and ―did not explain how the use of the same sample to conduct a color test after that sample was viewed under a microscope would undermine the chemist‘s conclusion.‖ The government provided no evidence to counter Harris‘s claim about the DEA chemist using ―the remaining portion of another test sample,‖ but argues that Harris‘s affidavit did nothing more than make ―conclusory arguments that scientific methods are not i

2012Inc., 12 A.3d 28, 36 (D.C.2011) ("The purpose of the separate document rule is to clarify when the time for noting an appeal commences to run and to avoid the inequities that might occur when a party appeals from a document or docket entry that appears to be final, but is not.”). 11 .

1999Compare Williams v. Vel Rey Properties, 699 A.2d 416 (D.C.1997), on the issue of a waiver of the separate document requirement: An appellate court will deem the parties to have waived the separate document requirement where (1) no party objects to the taking of the appeal in the absence of a separate judgment, and (2) it is clear that the trial court intended its action to be the final decision in the case.

1999Id. at 420 n. 8 (citation omitted). 5 .