document requirement in Maryland

2020See URS Corp. v. Fort Myer Constr., 452 Md. 48, 70 (2017) (holding that “the separate document requirement was waived” and this Court “had jurisdiction to consider the appeals” when “[n]o party objected to the absence of a separate document, . . . [t]he Circuit Court ‘clearly intended [the docket entry] to be a final judgment,’” and remand would merely produce unnecessary delay (quoting Suburban Hosp. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 156 (2000))); see also Lee v. Lee, 466 Md. 601 , 631 n.9 (2020) (“Nothing in this opinion should be read to override case law on waiver of the separate document requiremen

2018The Court of Appeals has held that strict compliance with the separate document rule can be "waived, at least where ... the trial court intended the docket entries made by the court clerk to be a final judgment and where no party objected to the absence of a separate document after the appeal was noted." Id. at 68 , 156 A.3d 753 (citing Suburban Hospital v. Kirson , 362 Md. 140 , 154-56, 763 A.2d 185 (2000) ).

2020In Hiob, id. at 472 , 103 A.3d at 599 , this Court held that a stipulation of dismissal that the parties signed did not satisfy the separate document requirement of what is now Maryland Rule 2- 601(a)(1) because it was not in the form of a judgment, was not signed by the court or the clerk, and was not docketed consistent with the Rule, and that, as such, the docketing of the stipulation did not trigger the thirty-day appeal period. - 25 - In so holding, this Court discussed in some detail the history of the separate document requirement.

2020In Hiob, id. at 472 , 103 A.3d at 599 , this Court held that a stipulation of dismissal that the parties signed did not satisfy the separate document requirement of what is now Maryland Rule 2- 601(a)(1) because it was not in the form of a judgment, was not signed by the court or the clerk, and was not docketed consistent with the Rule, and that, as such, the docketing of the stipulation did not trigger the thirty-day appeal period. - 25 - In so holding, this Court discussed in some detail the history of the separate document requirement.

2021Corp., 452 Md. 48, 67 , 156 A.3d 753, 764 (2017), we stated that “[t]here are certain circumstances[] when the separate document requirement may be waived in order to preserve an appeal, rather than eliminate it as untimely.” (Emphasis in original).

2021Corp., 452 Md. 48, 67 , 156 A.3d 753, 764 (2017), we stated that “[t]here are certain circumstances[] when the separate document requirement may be waived in order to preserve an appeal, rather than eliminate it as untimely.” (Emphasis in original).

2018The separate document rule, now set forth in Rule 2-601(a)(1), " 'eliminates these uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document --- distinct from any opinion or memorandum --- which provides the basis for the entry of judgment.' " Id. at 26-27 , 756 A.2d 560 .

2018The separate document rule, now set forth in Rule 2-601(a)(1), " 'eliminates these uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document --- distinct from any opinion or memorandum --- which provides the basis for the entry of judgment.' " Id. at 26-27 , 756 A.2d 560 .

2014First, in order to provide the desired clarity, the “separate-document rule must be ‘mechanically applied’ in determining whether an appeal is timely.” Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 386 , 98 S.Ct. 1117 (quoting United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 , 93 S.Ct. 1562 , 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973)). 3 In Indrelunas , the United States Supreme Court recognized that the separate document requirement “would be subject to criticism for its formalism were it not for the fact that something like this was needed to make certain when a judgment becomes effective.” *475 411 U.S. at 220 , 93 S.Ct. 1562 (quoting

2014First, in order to provide the desired clarity, the “separate-document rule must be ‘mechanically applied’ in determining whether an appeal is timely.” Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 386 , 98 S.Ct. 1117 (quoting United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 , 93 S.Ct. 1562 , 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973)). 3 In Indrelunas , the United States Supreme Court recognized that the separate document requirement “would be subject to criticism for its formalism were it not for the fact that something like this was needed to make certain when a judgment becomes effective.” *475 411 U.S. at 220 , 93 S.Ct. 1562 (quoting

2021“Determining whether separate statements are admissible under the doctrine of verbal completeness is . . . to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Otto v. State, 459 Md. 423, 446 (2018).

2021Three requirements apply to any evidence admitted as an additional part of a document under that the doctrine: “[1] No utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable; [2] No more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the first part, is receivable; [and 3] The remainder . . . merely aids in the construction of the utterance as a whole[.]” Id. at 541-42 (quoting Feigley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 211 Md. 1, 10 (1956)).

2020See URS Corp. v. Fort Myer Constr., 452 Md. 48, 70 (2017) (holding that “the separate document requirement was waived” and this Court “had jurisdiction to consider the appeals” when “[n]o party objected to the absence of a separate document, . . . [t]he Circuit Court ‘clearly intended [the docket entry] to be a final judgment,’” and remand would merely produce unnecessary delay (quoting Suburban Hosp. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 156 (2000))); see also Lee v. Lee, 466 Md. 601 , 631 n.9 (2020) (“Nothing in this opinion should be read to override case law on waiver of the separate document requiremen

2017See Houghton v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 305 Md. 407 , 504 A.2d 1145 (1986).

2017See Houghton v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 305 Md. 407 , 504 A.2d 1145 (1986).

2014Id.; see also Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health Center, 960 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir.1992) (Rule 58’s “hypertechnicality” would be relaxed only to save an appeal); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 624 (4th Cir.1981) (Rule 58 should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal) (citations omitted). 4 B.

2014Compare Suburban Hospital, 362 Md. at 154 , 763 A.2d 185 (parties may waive the separate document requirement) with Miller & Smith at Quercus, LLC v. Casey PMN, LLC, 412 Md. 230, 250 , 987 A.2d 1 (2010) (parties cannot agree to confer appellate jurisdiction when all of the claims have not been finally resolved). 22 .

2014Compare Suburban Hospital, 362 Md. at 154 , 763 A.2d 185 (parties may waive the separate document requirement) with Miller & Smith at Quercus, LLC v. Casey PMN, LLC, 412 Md. 230, 250 , 987 A.2d 1 (2010) (parties cannot agree to confer appellate jurisdiction when all of the claims have not been finally resolved). 22 .

2014The rendition of judgment by the court must “clearly indicate[ ] that the issue submitted has been adjudicated completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter.” Id. at 524 , 740 A.2d 1004 ; see also Bd. of Liquor License Comm’rs for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Café, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 129 , 685 A.2d 772 (1996) (the purported judgment “must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy”) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989)). *486 There is no indication, in either the history of Rule 2-601 or our case law

2014The rendition of judgment by the court must “clearly indicate[ ] that the issue submitted has been adjudicated completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter.” Id. at 524 , 740 A.2d 1004 ; see also Bd. of Liquor License Comm’rs for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Café, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 129 , 685 A.2d 772 (1996) (the purported judgment “must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy”) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989)). *486 There is no indication, in either the history of Rule 2-601 or our case law

2014Id.; see also Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health Center, 960 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir.1992) (Rule 58’s “hypertechnicality” would be relaxed only to save an appeal); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 624 (4th Cir.1981) (Rule 58 should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal) (citations omitted). 4 B.

2014See Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir.2013) (a minute sheet was not a separate document because it was not captioned as an order, not signed, and did not establish the disposition of the claim on its face); Silver Star Enterprises, Inc. v. M/V Saramacca, 19 F.3d 1008 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir.1992) (the signature by the clerk is one element required for a minute order to constitute a separate document under Rule 58). *498 The Third and Seventh Circuits have developed tests for determining whether a document sati

2014The rendition of judgment by the court must “clearly indicate[ ] that the issue submitted has been adjudicated completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter.” Id. at 524 , 740 A.2d 1004 ; see also Bd. of Liquor License Comm’rs for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Café, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 129 , 685 A.2d 772 (1996) (the purported judgment “must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy”) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989)). *486 There is no indication, in either the history of Rule 2-601 or our case law

2014The rendition of judgment by the court must “clearly indicate[ ] that the issue submitted has been adjudicated completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter.” Id. at 524 , 740 A.2d 1004 ; see also Bd. of Liquor License Comm’rs for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Café, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 129 , 685 A.2d 772 (1996) (the purported judgment “must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy”) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989)). *486 There is no indication, in either the history of Rule 2-601 or our case law

2014See Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir.2013) (a minute sheet was not a separate document because it was not captioned as an order, not signed, and did not establish the disposition of the claim on its face); Silver Star Enterprises, Inc. v. M/V Saramacca, 19 F.3d 1008 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir.1992) (the signature by the clerk is one element required for a minute order to constitute a separate document under Rule 58). *498 The Third and Seventh Circuits have developed tests for determining whether a document sati

2002See Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1274 (4th Cir.1994).