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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Administrationgreen2 sentences2018In fact, Underwood emphasized as "important background" its understanding-shared by the parties in that case-that the question of WCA preemption would not have arisen had the case contained a Human Rights Act claim. 665 A.2d at 631 . 2018In fact, Underwood emphasized as "important background" its understanding-shared by the parties in that case-that the question of WCA preemption would not have arisen had the case contained a Human Rights Act claim. 665 A.2d at 631 . | 1 | 2 |
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblygreen1 sentence2025Contractors, 285 A.3d 186 , 196-97 (D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 52 See id. at 197 n.7 (citing Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 72 (Cal. 2013)); Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 n. 28. 53 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545 , 550-51 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Poola, 147 A.3d at 280 ). 56 pretextual (though factual allegations contradicting or undermining the employer’s assertion of a legitimate motivation may suffice to defeat the motion to dismiss). 54 In short, “at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ‘minimal burden’ of alleging facts ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.green1 sentence2025Contractors, 285 A.3d 186 , 196-97 (D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 52 See id. at 197 n.7 (citing Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 72 (Cal. 2013)); Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 n. 28. 53 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545 , 550-51 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Poola, 147 A.3d at 280 ). 56 pretextual (though factual allegations contradicting or undermining the employer’s assertion of a legitimate motivation may suffice to defeat the motion to dismiss). 54 In short, “at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ‘minimal burden’ of alleging facts ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. City of Santa Monicagreen1 sentence2025Contractors, 285 A.3d 186 , 196-97 (D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 52 See id. at 197 n.7 (citing Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 72 (Cal. 2013)); Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 n. 28. 53 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545 , 550-51 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Poola, 147 A.3d at 280 ). 56 pretextual (though factual allegations contradicting or undermining the employer’s assertion of a legitimate motivation may suffice to defeat the motion to dismiss). 54 In short, “at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ‘minimal burden’ of alleging facts ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Stephanie Brown v. Allen Sessomsgreen1 sentence2025Contractors, 285 A.3d 186 , 196-97 (D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 52 See id. at 197 n.7 (citing Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 72 (Cal. 2013)); Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 n. 28. 53 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545 , 550-51 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Poola, 147 A.3d at 280 ). 56 pretextual (though factual allegations contradicting or undermining the employer’s assertion of a legitimate motivation may suffice to defeat the motion to dismiss). 54 In short, “at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ‘minimal burden’ of alleging facts ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Veney v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007Rather, it asserts, “ ‘source of income’ must be tied to some other protected class within the District of Columbia’s traditional sphere of interest.” According to the Club, “[i]t is only when ‘income’ is a badge of some other kind of protected class- — e.g., welfare as a possible link to age, race, national origin, familial status— that the language has meaning in an anti-discrimination enforcement context.” We reject these arguments, which ignore the plain language of the statute and the “basic principle of statutory construction ... that each provision of the statute should be construed so 2007Rather, it asserts, “ ‘source of income’ must be tied to some other protected class within the District of Columbia’s traditional sphere of interest.” According to the Club, “[i]t is only when ‘income’ is a badge of some other kind of protected class- — e.g., welfare as a possible link to age, race, national origin, familial status— that the language has meaning in an anti-discrimination enforcement context.” We reject these arguments, which ignore the plain language of the statute and the “basic principle of statutory construction ... that each provision of the statute should be construed so | 1 | 1 |
Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Laborgreen2 sentences1987See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 , 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963 , 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 256-57 , 102 S.Ct. at 1055 . [1] As I understand the plethora of opinions in this case, five judges agree that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not stand in the way of a Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown permit the plaintiff gay rights groups to use university facilities the so-called tangible benefits on the same basis that other University-recognized groups are permitted to do so. 1987See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 , 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963 , 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 256-57 , 102 S.Ct. at 1055 . [1] As I understand the plethora of opinions in this case, five judges agree that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not stand in the way of a Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown permit the plaintiff gay rights groups to use university facilities the so-called tangible benefits on the same basis that other University-recognized groups are permitted to do so. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Furline v. Morrison
green
1 sentence2025Contractors, 285 A.3d 186 , 196-97 (D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 52 See id. at 197 n.7 (citing Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 72 (Cal. 2013)); Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 n. 28. 53 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545 , 550-51 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Poola, 147 A.3d at 280 ). 56 pretextual (though factual allegations contradicting or undermining the employer’s assertion of a legitimate motivation may suffice to defeat the motion to dismiss). 54 In short, “at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ‘minimal burden’ of alleging facts ‘ | 1 | 2025–2025 |
INDIRA POOLA v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY
green
1 sentence2025Contractors, 285 A.3d 186 , 196-97 (D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 52 See id. at 197 n.7 (citing Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 72 (Cal. 2013)); Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 n. 28. 53 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545 , 550-51 (D.C. 2024) (quoting Poola, 147 A.3d at 280 ). 56 pretextual (though factual allegations contradicting or undermining the employer’s assertion of a legitimate motivation may suffice to defeat the motion to dismiss). 54 In short, “at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ‘minimal burden’ of alleging facts ‘ | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dean v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2010We agree with the Board's interpretation of Dean , its view that the Human Rights Act analysis in Dean has limited continuing significance, and its conclusion that the proposed initiative would have the effect of authorizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. [52] In Dean , a *117 panel of this court considered a claim by a same-sex couple that, "by refusing to issue them a marriage license, the Clerk [of the Superior Court acting through the Marriage License Bureau] discriminated against them because of their sex or sexual orientation, in violation of the Human Rights Act, D.C 2010We agree with the Board's interpretation of Dean , its view that the Human Rights Act analysis in Dean has limited continuing significance, and its conclusion that the proposed initiative would have the effect of authorizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. [52] In Dean , a *117 panel of this court considered a claim by a same-sex couple that, "by refusing to issue them a marriage license, the Clerk [of the Superior Court acting through the Marriage License Bureau] discriminated against them because of their sex or sexual orientation, in violation of the Human Rights Act, D.C | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin
green
2 sentences1987"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152, 154 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944). 1987"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152, 154 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
United States v. Lee
green
2 sentences1987See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 , 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963 , 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 256-57 , 102 S.Ct. at 1055 . [1] As I understand the plethora of opinions in this case, five judges agree that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not stand in the way of a Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown permit the plaintiff gay rights groups to use university facilities the so-called tangible benefits on the same basis that other University-recognized groups are permitted to do so. 1987See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 , 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963 , 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 256-57 , 102 S.Ct. at 1055 . [1] As I understand the plethora of opinions in this case, five judges agree that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not stand in the way of a Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown permit the plaintiff gay rights groups to use university facilities the so-called tangible benefits on the same basis that other University-recognized groups are permitted to do so. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.