Legal Principles analysis in District of Columbia

2018“We accept the judge’s factual findings unless they lack evidentiary support, but we review his or her legal conclusions de novo.” Derrington v. United States, 681 A.2d 1125, 1132 (D.C. 1996) (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets, and italics omitted).

2018“We accept the judge’s factual findings unless they lack evidentiary support, but we review his or her legal conclusions de novo.” Derrington v. United States, 681 A.2d 1125, 1132 (D.C. 1996) (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets, and italics omitted).

2014The government notes that Mr. Sinclair’s testimony about Mr. Carpenter’s statements “did not implicate [Mr.] Mobley and were properly admitted as the statements of a party-opponent.” Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles Our analysis is guided by the following standard of review and legal principles. “[T]he trial court’s discretionary judgment regarding whether to grant a severance motion is entitled to great deference and ‘may be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Bailey v. United States, 10 A.3d 637, 642 (D.C.2010) (quoting Winestock v. United States, 4

2014The government notes that Mr. Sinclair’s testimony about Mr. Carpenter’s statements “did not implicate [Mr.] Mobley and were properly admitted as the statements of a party-opponent.” Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles Our analysis is guided by the following standard of review and legal principles. “[T]he trial court’s discretionary judgment regarding whether to grant a severance motion is entitled to great deference and ‘may be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Bailey v. United States, 10 A.3d 637, 642 (D.C.2010) (quoting Winestock v. United States, 4

2014“When two or, more defendants are charged with jointly committing a criminal offense, there is a strong presumption that they will be tried together.” Harrison v. United States, 76 A.3d 826, 833-34 (D.C.2013) (citation omitted).

2011“It is axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to a trial by his peers who are free to deliberate and make an independent personal judgment as to guilt.” Morton v. United States, 415 A.2d 800, 802 (D.C.1980) (citing Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 535 (D.C.1974) (en banc) (Gallagher, J., concurring)).

2011“It is axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to a trial by his peers who are free to deliberate and make an independent personal judgment as to guilt.” Morton v. United States, 415 A.2d 800, 802 (D.C.1980) (citing Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 535 (D.C.1974) (en banc) (Gallagher, J., concurring)).

2010A trial judge “ ‘has wide latitude in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, and [her or] his decision with respect thereto should be sustained unless it is manifestly erroneous.’ ” Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 897 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (quoting Coates v. United States, 558 A.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C.1989))).

2010A trial judge “ ‘has wide latitude in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, and [her or] his decision with respect thereto should be sustained unless it is manifestly erroneous.’ ” Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 897 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (quoting Coates v. United States, 558 A.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C.1989))).

2010A trial judge “ ‘has wide latitude in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, and [her or] his decision with respect thereto should be sustained unless it is manifestly erroneous.’ ” Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 897 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (quoting Coates v. United States, 558 A.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C.1989))).

2007Generally, “[w]e review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.” In re A.C.G., 894 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C.2006) (citing In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826, 830 (D.C.1998)); under D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001), “the [trial court’s] judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it,” In re N.D., 909 A.2d 165, 169 (D.C.2006).

2007Generally, “[w]e review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.” In re A.C.G., 894 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C.2006) (citing In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826, 830 (D.C.1998)); under D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001), “the [trial court’s] judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it,” In re N.D., 909 A.2d 165, 169 (D.C.2006).

2007Generally, “[w]e review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.” In re A.C.G., 894 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C.2006) (citing In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826, 830 (D.C.1998)); under D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001), “the [trial court’s] judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it,” In re N.D., 909 A.2d 165, 169 (D.C.2006).